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The role of the international community in internal crises of sovereign states has been a subject 
of great debate in international relations studies. The legality and morality (from a United 
Nations Charter and customary international relations perspectives) of military intervention, 
either actively or through the support of an uprising or a rebellion, has been a subject of debate. 
The major debate on the role of the international community has been on the subject of military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes. Military intervention for humanitarian purposes which 
was popular in the 19th century and was seen by scholars as the justification of the military 
interventions in Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo during the 1990s was rekindled with the Arab Spring 
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states’ intervention in Libya and the 
alleged military support to Libyan rebels. NATO member states’ intervention in Libya 
polarized the Security Council and led to paralysis on the Syrian crisis. This thesis critically 
analyses the concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes taking into 
consideration the transformations that have taken place in the international system specifically 
on the concept of sovereignty, human rights, and the United Nations (UN) law as well as the 
rise of the “Responsibility to Protect” as the repackaging of the concept of military intervention 
for humanitarian purposes. The research argues that the concept of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes is controversial and has not gained full recognition by member states of 
the UN. It also argues that the concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes is 
subject to abuse by ambitious powers. Its use in Libya was controversial. However, the 
international community could have learnt from the Libyan mistakes to come up with an 
















The roles of the international community in the internal affairs of a sovereign state have been 
changing since the development of the state system in different regions in the world. The major 
contentious topic on external intrusion into the internal affairs of a state relates to military 
intervention and supporting ‘rebellions’. This thesis notes that there are three broad categories 
of military intervention that a state or group of states can conduct in another state.  
These interventions are:  
1. Military intervention in response to an invasion. This war is accepted as legally and 
morally justified by both customary international law (Vattel; 1758: bk. 3, Ch. 3) and 
the UN law. Article 51 Of the UN charter clearly states that, “Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”  
 
2. An invasion which is driven by any desires pursue self/national/strategic/territorial/geo-
political interests. This category encompasses all wars that are fought without 
internationally accepted legal or moral justification. This type of war also include wars 
that are declared on legally or morally accepted grounds but these legally and morally 
accepted reasons only being used as pretexts to pursue the interest of the invading 
state/s (Vattel; 1758: bk. 3, Ch. 3).  
 
3. Military intervention for humanitarian purposes. Under this third category, a state or 
group of states militarily intervene in another state not for 
self/national/strategic/territorial/geo-political interests or to repel an invasion, but to 
protect the civilians of the subject state who will be under gross abuse by their leaders. 
In other words, it is a war to restrain a sovereign from committing heinous crimes 
against humanity against his/her subjects. 
 
It is important to note that while the research categorized wars from a legal and moral 
perspective in three groups, there are complex issues which relate to the categorization and 
classification of wars. These complex issues include the clear parameters that set boundaries 
on when a states can define the acts of another states as a threat to their security and respond 
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militarily under self defence including pre-emptive attacks. For instance, when a nation is 
amassing weapons that threaten a change in the balance of power and balance of threat with its 
neighbours or rivals, such rivals may attack the state that will be militarizing to restore the 
balance of power. However, such complexities were beyond the scope of this study and 
therefore the researcher deliberately relegated them. 
 
There are no legal arguments on the first two categories of military intervention, namely war 
for self-defence and an aggressive war. A military invasion is clearly illegal and a sovereign 
state has the right to defend itself and can call for assistance from other sovereign states. A war 
of self defence in retaliation to an attack or invasion by another state unjustly is legal under 
international law. Hence, states can form regional defence pacts which are not proscribed under 
international law because of the importance of self defence in the international system.  
 
Military intervention for humanitarian purposes is, however, highly contentious. Theoretically, 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes is traced back to the writings of classical jurist 
and theorist, Hugo Grotius, in his work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace) 
of 1625. The concept which is based on the Grotian argument that, “… where [leaders] provoke 
their people to despair and resistance by unheard of cruelties, having themselves abandoned all 
the laws of nature, they lose the rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim the 
privilege of the law of nations” (Grotius; 1625: 247), supports the use of military force, or the 
threat of it, by a sovereign state in order to stop the commission of gross human rights violations 
and heinous crimes by another state on its subjects/citizens. Although scholars like Emmerich 
de Vattel (1758) also wrote in support of the concept, critics such as Bartolome de las Casas 
argued that the sanctity of every life made it impossible to justify its taking even if it is for the 
defence of those who are threatened by the culture of human sacrifice (las Casas, cited in 
Sorabji; 2006: 20). 
 
In modern times, military intervention for humanitarian purposes was used by the European 
powers (Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia) to extensively intervene militarily in the 
affairs of the Ottoman Empire beginning in the 19th century (Cheikh; 2013: 155). It is however 
difficult to judge the legal standing of military intervention for humanitarian purposes in the 
period before the end of the Second World War (WW II) given that the use or threat of force 




The carnage of the two world wars left international leaders with the conclusion that the use or 
the threat to use force except in cases of self defence should be proscribed as a foreign policy 
tool in the international system. The Charter of the United Nations which created the United 
Nations organization, therefore clearly stated in Article 2 (4) that, “All Members shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.” The founding fathers of the United Nations were pre-
occupied with the issue of wars of aggression and accorded little attention to the rise of internal 
unrests and civil wars as a major threat to international peace and security.   
 
The increase of internal uprising during the last decade of the 20th century resulted in the use 
of brutal force by the state against the perpetrators and brought back the question of military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes. This thesis critically analyses the legality and 
practicality of the concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes under UN law, 
using Libya and Syria as specific comparative case studies. It looks at three examples of 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes during the ‘decade of intervention’ (1990-
1999), namely Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo.  
 
It also discusses the international efforts to come up with a universal position on military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes by redefining the old concept of military intervention 
for humanitarian purposes that was propounded in the absence of a formally recognized apex 
body to suit the current international system in which the UN is the apex universal body that 
regulate state behavior in the international system. It analyzes efforts by contemporary 
interventionists like Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General (1997-2006) to reinterpret 
the UN charter in order to justify the legality of military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
under UN law. The work of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) is discussed at a length. The thesis argues that the commission’s “The 
Responsibility to Protect,” Report is the main tool that the international community tried to use 
to legalize military intervention for humanitarian purposes and co-opt it into the UN law. The 
document classifies international crimes, an exercise which, this thesis argue, was simply a re-
codification of what had already been codified by the international criminal tribunals like the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR 
respectively), International Court for Sierra Leone (ICSL), and the Rome Statute of the 




The major change that the ICISS brought was codifying that any military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes should be passed by the UN through the Security Council. It is argued 
in the research that such a recommendation was taken in order not to upset power structures of 
the UN on contentious issues. However, the recommendation failed to take cognizant of the 
fact that all contentious interventions are mostly related to the interest of the veto powers and 
giving them the powers would only bring the UN to paralysis on matters in which the interest 
of a veto power are threatened. This is put clearly in the thesis as parallels are drawn between 
Libya and Syria in which the issue of the interest of the permanent members in the Syrian case, 
where threatened bringing the whole UN system into paralysis except only on non-binding 
issues like peace talks. 
 
In an effort to clearly bring out the arguments on practicality and legality of the concept, the 
thesis explores international relations theories that have some answers on the contentions on 
both the concept of intervention and the sovereignty of states in the international system. The 
Grotian tradition and the just war theory, realism, human rights theory, and the concept of 
sovereignty are discussed and analyzed in relation to the concept of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes. 
 
The thesis argues that while the sacrosanct nature of state sovereignty is being challenged, the 
international human rights theory has not achieved universal acceptance that can warrant its 
use to justify defying the former and militarily intervene in sovereign states. The failure to 
universalize derives from the fact that different nations are still guided by different and 
diverging cultural beliefs that create glass walls for universalizing human rights. This does not 
mean that there are no universal human rights. As argued by Richard Norman (2006), while 
there are basic universal human rights like the right to life, food and shelter, the current form 
of international human rights are problematic as they are human constructs with no accepted 
universal foundation. Norman, hence questions which minimum number of fundamental 
human rights are there given that the United States of America’s Declaration of Independence 
has three; the French’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen has four; the European 
Convention on Rights has thirteen; while the UN Declaration of Human Rights has over thirty 
(Norman; 2006: 193). 
 
This study also presents an argument on the classical notion of sovereignty which has gone 
through evolutionary changes, yet it still remains the foundation upon which the international 
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system is built. Therefore threatening it with an overhaul might have unforeseen negative 
consequences especially given that states always look for opportunities to increase or maximize 
their influence in the international system. This brings the discussion to the Realist theory 
which argues that the concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes is a case of 
pursuing national interest cased as goodwill and advancing the observation of universal human 
rights.  
 
On the broader and specific case studies, the study argues that the whole unfolding of the Arab 
Spring witnessed some form of international intervention. For instance, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states intervened to control the Yemen uprising and give Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
the former president of Yemen a safe passage. In Libya, Gaddafi had long been indicted by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) before his defeat and assassination by the ‘rebels’.  
 
International intervention was more pronounced in Libya and Syria, two states which ran on 
systems that had notable similarities. However, despite those similarities, the intervention was 
different and influenced by the interests of major powers specifically the GCC, USA, Britain, 
France, Russia, Iran and China.  
 
1.2 Background and outline of research problem 
 
The political uprisings in Libya and Syria since early 2011 were part of the so-called “Arab 
spring” that attracted the attention of the international community. The uprisings were, 
however, different from the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions which preceded them in the 
region during the same period in terms of the reaction of the state security apparatus as the 
police and military had a minimal reaction and confrontation with the demonstrators. The 
uprisings were also different from those that occurred in Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait and other 
Arab states which had minimal militarization of the protesters.  
 
In Tunisia, the Economist noted that around 219 people died (The Economist: 2012), while the 
Egyptian revolution claimed the lives of at least 840 protesters and resulted in a further 6,467 
injuries (Amnesty International; 2011: 8), the Libyan and Syrian uprisings were more violent 
and resulted in many more casualties. Ahmad (2013: 122 states that in Libya and Syria the 
leaders responded with heavy weaponry against the demonstrators. This is supported by Clark 
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(2013: 47) who notes that in Syria, the protests were “ruthlessly suppressed and thousands of 
innocent men, women and children had to flee the country or stay to be tortured and killed.” 
 
The figures for Libya have been hard to access and it is impossible to state with authority how 
many were killed and injured by the Gaddafi regime to warrant an intervention specifically 
targeting his regime in favour of the National Transitional Council (NTC), the then “rebel” 
movement. Gaddafi’s forces and the rebels committed atrocities that claimed hundreds, perhaps 
even thousands, of lives (Smith: 2011).  The conflict in Syria claimed more than 100 000 lives 
by January 2014 when the United Nations stopped taking count of the death toll (Stamper: 
2014). 
 
The conflicts also distinctly differed in that they took regional and ethnic divisive lines. In 
Libya, the protesters were concentrated from the Benghazi area with other pockets of uprisings 
in Sirte and Misrata and later Tripoli, while in Syria the protesters were predominantly Sunni 
Muslims who viewed the ruling Alawites1 as monopolizing power in the Baath Party. The 
uprisings were classified more as rebellions rather than revolutions2 by the international media 
and political leaders. The revolting masses and the dissident soldiers used military ammunition 
that can be characterized as a war situation. This presented a dilemma to the regimes in power 
who had to decide on the amount of force that they should use to quell the rebellions, given 
continued calls by mostly Western powers not to use force against ‘civilians’. 
 
The uprisings in Libya and Syria brought into sharp focus the role of the international 
community in national uprisings. In Libya, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
using the power conferred to it by a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 
to effect a no-fly zone over the country, provided logistical support and supplied arms to the 
                                                          
1 The Alawites are a minority sect in Syria, an offshoot of the Twelver sect of Shiaism. They constitute 
approximately 12 percent of the Syrian population and control national power in Syria since 1966 when they 
rebelled against Sunni who dominated politics in the Baath Party. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad, father to Bashar al-
Assad took over power in a coup. Since then the Assad family and the Alawites have dominated Syrian politics. 
Alawites hold most influential positions in the security sector, politics and business. The rebels are composed by 
those disillusioned by the Assad regime and they are against the monopoly of power by the minority Alawite 
sect. they formed the Free Syrian army and they are made up of civilians and defectors from the Syrian army.  
2 A rebellion can be defined as a high level of political violence directed against the state by a segment of the 
population. “Rebellion or ‘revolt from below’ is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of social revolution 
(Boswell and William, 1990: 540), which can be defined as a mass uprising of the national population, with 
minimum amount of violence, as a result of multiple problems arising from long term shifts in the balance of 
population and resources (Goldstone, 1991: xxiv). A revolution is therefore a transformation that may continue 
for a long time which can be years, whilst a rebellion takes a short period of time that may not go beyond a 
single year before it succeeds or fails. 
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rebels against the government of Gaddafi (Zoubir and Rozsa; 2012: 1273). The situation was, 
however different in Syria where the international community failed to follow the Libyan script 
mainly because of the paralysis in the UNSC resulting from competing geopolitical interests 
of the major powers, which it may be argued, reflects a wider paralysis in international relations 
in general (Thakur; 2013: 61). The fact that Syria appeared militarily stronger than Libya, the 
role of Hezbollah and Iran, and fears of the knock-on effects of intervention on Israel made the 
situation less straightforward for international powers than was the case in Libya (Hasler; 2012: 
5). 
 
In view of the blatant support of the rebels by external forces in Libya (Everest: 2011), and 
allegations of the funding of rebels in Syria by Western powers (Malas and Dagher: 2012), this 
thesis examined the political and legal status of such acts in terms of international law and the 
United Nations (UN) Charter. Did they, for example, contradict the international norm that was 
established by the arms embargo placed on Serbia that strived to stop the trade of arms to the 
warring parties? Did they go against the judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in the USA vs. Nicaragua case in which it was ruled that no state had a right to arm dissidents 
or rebels in another sovereign state (Nicaragua v. United States of America; ICJ: 1986)? This 
dissertation questions whether new rules are being set in the global international system in 
response to these two cases.  
 
The fact that states which had publicly stated that they were against the Gaddafi regime were 
given the mandate to implement a no-fly zone over Libya calls for an interrogation of the role 
of the UN as the final peace broker in international relations. This thesis examined the 
“credibility” of the UN as an international peace broker after permitting non-neutral states to 
effect a no fly zone and send an observer mission to Syria which included individuals from 
states that were clearly not neutral. Many observers felt that the UN was not neutral in the 
Libyan crisis either, and that it engaged in regime change due to its support of the rebels, who 
were branded as ‘Democratic’, rather than playing the role of an honest peace broker.  
 
On the other hand, the African Union as a regional bloc tried to come up with a negotiated 
settlement. Simon Handy (2011: 8), argued that “The AU and some African heads of state … 
consider that what happened in Libya was not a revolution such as those in Egypt and Tunisia, 
but a coup d’état orchestrated by a heteroclite coalition of putschists helped by NATO under 
the pretext of its responsibility to protect.” The AU, due to its policy of not accepting 
8 
 
unconstitutional governments, could not accept the takeover of power by the rebels but had 
planned a negotiated settlement (Simon Handy; 2011: 8). However, efforts by the AU to play 
the role of “honest” broker were thwarted by a number of reasons which included; divisions 
amongst African states on Libya (Kasaija; 2013: 117); African member countries votes for 
UNSC Resolution 1973 for the No-Fly Zone; and the refusal by NATO to stop bombardments 
and open the way for AU brokered talks between the rebels and the Gaddafi government. It 
was, therefore, due to disunity between individual African states that led to the weak position 
of the AU in relation to NATO (Kasaija; 2013: 117). 
 
USA and other NATO states did not accept the proposal by former UN Secretary General and 
first UN-Arab League Special Envoy to Syria (February 2012- August 2012), Kofi Annan, that 
to have a sustainable peace in the Syrian crisis, Iran as a major regional power should be taken 
aboard in discussions. The refusal suggested that Western powers’ policy was driven by their 
interests against the desired general interest of a peaceful political solution.  
 
Another apparent anomaly is that the UNSC was prepared to use force against Libya and that 
NATO countries provided support to rebels in Syria, but not to those in Bahrain, where many 
unarmed protesters have been killed by national and foreign forces in 2011 (Katzman: 2012). 
In the same line, Russia and China accepted the use of force against Gaddafi by abstaining 
from voting in Resolution 1973 but used the veto power to defend Assad, whose situation was 
nearly similar to that of Gaddafi.  This raises the question of whether the actions and discourse 
of the international community, both those countries that are supporting the regime and those 
who are supporting the rebels, is not hypocritical in nature.  
 
Military and non-military interventions by the international community in the domestic affairs 
of sovereign states over the past two decades have generated intense debate over the legality 
and validity of such actions in international law due to selective intervention by international 
powers and organizations. This dissertation interrogates what the legal role of the international 
community is in uprisings within sovereign states in terms of international law, who demarcates 
the amount and nature of force that can be used against an armed population that is rebelling, 






1.3 Preliminary literature study and reasons for choosing topic 
 
The role of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of other states was questioned by 
international law philosophers and writers, such as Vattel, Grotius, Weiss (2007), Lang (2002), 
Coady (2003) and Kochler (2001). The definition of the concept of intervention is contested 
and highly controversial. In a general sense, any act in which an outside state sends its troops 
into or supports a rebel movement in a foreign state can be termed an intervention. Due to the 
controversy brought about by this definition and the desire to separate an armed invasion from 
an intervention to stop the violation human rights by a sovereign against his / her citizen, 
scholars such as J. L. Holzgrefe (2003: 18), define military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes as the use or threat of armed force by a state or group of states to stop gross human 
rights violations. Among the proponents of the concept of intervention is Hugo Grotius (1625: 
207), who argued that those vested with power have a right to punish other leaders for 
committing “gross violations of the law of nature and of nations, done to other states and 
subjects”.  
 
Grotius’ theory was applied extensively by the European powers to justify their interventions 
in the crises of the Ottoman Empire (Cheikh; 2013: 155). However, Hans Kochler (2001: 3) 
argues that the interventions by the European powers (Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and 
Russia) in the Ottoman Empire were driven by geo-political imperatives rather than the sincere 
desire to correct the mistreatment of Ottoman Christians by their Turkish Muslim rulers. 
Kochler notes that the “wrongs” that the European leaders pointed to as the crimes of the 
Ottoman sovereigns were less than the horrendous human rights crimes that they themselves 
were committing in their colonies in Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. Kochler (2001: 3)’s 
argument is that the Ottoman Empire was a tussling ground for control of the Mediterranean 
and Constantinople, particularly between Britain and Russia, with military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes being used as a cover for national interest. 
 
In the contemporary period, one of the chief proponents of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes was Kofi Annan, who sought to redefine the concept of sovereignty in 
order to make it compatible with the concept of the responsibility to protect (military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes). Annan, cited in Massingham (2009: 804), asked, “… 
if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
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respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
affect every precept of our common humanity?” Annan redefined the notion of sovereignty 
from the old Westphalian concept of a state’s right to be the supreme power in municipal issues 
and its non-recognition of any supreme power outside its borders to that of responsibility of its 
actions on its citizens and the international community (Weiss; 2007: 96). The drive by Annan 
to redefine sovereignty and justify intervention led to the production of the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ (R2P) document that was simply a repackaging of the old concept of military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes in a new name and sought to legitimize it through the 
UN General Assembly (Massingham; 2009: 804). 
 
Annan’s drive for the international legalization of R2P, however, suffered a major setback 
when the R2P was used by the US-led “coalition of the willing” to justify the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 in search of weapons of mass destruction. The application of the R2P in Libya raised 
more questions than justification of the legalization of the concept and the desires to limit the 
sovereign powers of the state and the regime in power. This lent weight to the argument of the 
scholars and politicians who are against the R2P concept. Hasler (2013: 5) is of the notion that 
intervention in Libya was not driven by moral intent only but by geopolitical and economic 
interests as well. Hasler (2013: 5) argues that the statements by the former United States of 
America (USA) Under-Secretary for African Affairs, Susan Rice that the American 
government will stand up for people who fight for their basic rights and French Foreign 
Minister, Alain Juppe, that France will not abandon civilians being brutalized by their leaders 
were mere rhetoric. This, Hasler (2013) argues, because these states intervened in Libya but 
failed to intervene in Syria whose civilians were equally suffering like the Libyan from Assad 
who was refusing to allow them to exercise basic democratic rights. Kochler (2001: 3) 
maintained that the concept, now repackaged as the responsibility to protect, previously termed 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes, had never been undertaken for humanitarian 
needs but as a cloak to cover up the pursuit of national interests by powerful states in weaker 
states. Other scholars who are against the application of the concept of military intervention 
for humanitarian purposes include Chesterman (2002: 295) who argues that the general rules 
of international law provide for the non-use of force or its threat in international relations. 
 
The scholars mentioned (Hasler, Kochler and Chesterman) provided interesting insights on the 
subject of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. However, this thesis shed different 
light from their arguments. While Hasler (2013) argues that there was no intervention in Syria, 
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this thesis argued that there was intervention in both Libya and Syria but only conducted 
differently. On one hand, Western states and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states funded 
and armed the rebels (Clark; 2013: 47), while on the other hand, Russia and Iran provided the 
Assad government with arms. These actions are argued in this thesis as intervention. On the 
question of Russia and Iran providing arms arguing that the Assad government was the de-
facto government of Syria, the thesis argues that the heightened and increase in support was a 
reaction to the crisis that was taking place. Hence, their support for Assad is arguably 
intervention.   
 
Although the aforementioned argument concentrated on scholars and proponents for and 
against military intervention for humanitarian purposes as an international response to local 
crises that would have turned into the gross violation of human rights and/or the practice of 
genocide, the topic also calls for the discussion of external support to rebels or dissidents in 
local crises. In one of its major rulings in the case concerning military and paramilitary 
activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United States of America), the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that it is against international law that a state supports dissidents 
and/or rebels in another state and such acts are tantamount to acts of aggression against the 
target state. 
 
Having got a UNSC mandate through Resolution 1973 the entry of NATO into Libya was 
“legitimate” but this thesis looks at whether giving rebels weapons and other logistical support 
was in line with the morals of the theory of military intervention for humanitarian purposes and 
whether it contradicted the mandate given by the authorizing resolution and the UN Charter 
which calls for the limitation of aggression in international relations. In line with this, the 
research also questions the legality and morality of Russia in supplying weapons to the Assad 
led Syrian government at a time when the UN was calling for stopping the supply of weapons 
to the belligerents in order to limit the number of casualties.  
 
The thesis interrogates the alleged supplying of weapons by Western countries to rebels in 
Syria through Turkey against the background that the international community has a moral 
obligation to protect distressed citizens in a conflict situation. Investigations centered on who 
can provide such assistance, whether peace brokers are taking aboard their national interests 




The current notion of military intervention for humanitarian purposes has been overshadowed 
by the use of armed force and the need to justify the use of such armed force mostly by the 
powerful states in humanitarian cases. In a number of instances, powerful states have pushed 
for the use of armed force even in natural humanitarian disasters that would be mitigated by a 
civilian contingent. One can cite, the use of the United States’ army to provide humanitarian 
assistance to Haiti (Taft-Morales and Margesson; 2010: 7). While there is no apparent problem 
in using a military force for humanitarian reasons, the presence of a foreign military force, 
especially from a major power, can threaten national sovereignty.  
 
In instances where the major powers have not used the army, NGOs which have their roots in 
the assisting countries are given funds to assist in humanitarian projects. However, the use of 
NGOs has also been questioned by locals in the target states as they are seen to be bringing or 
promoting alien western cultures and also acting as extensions of the intelligences of their 
mother states to undermine local leaders; a situation which has led Russia to develop an NGO 
Law that seeks to control the NGO operations and track their sources of Finance (Volk: 2006). 
 
The legal foundation upon which this research rest is the charter of the United Nations (UN). 
The UN is arguably the first successful international organization that outlawed “the use of 
force as a legitimate instrument of national policy” (Schrijver; 2003: 1). The UN was founded 
in 1945 with the primary objective of protecting the world against another major war (see the 
preamble to the UN Charter). Article 2 (4) of the UN charter unequivocally prohibited the use 
of force. This article (i.e. 2 (4)) is described by Schrijver (2003: 4) as “the pivot of the UN 
charter” which “serves as the backbone of the envisaged system of collective security and 
peaceful relations among states.” 
 
The importance of the UN charter and the outlawing of the threat or use of force is appreciated 
if one realizes that the quest to delegitimize the use of force as a tool for international relations 
in contemporary times had begun in 1899. After the Hague Convention of 1899, other major 
attempts included the Hague Convention of 1907, the League of Nations (1919) and the Kellog-
Briand Pact of 1928 (Schrijver; 2003: 2). The League of Nations as a predecessor to the UN 
attempted to regulate warfare after the horrific experience of the First World War (WW I). 
Article 11 of the charter of the League of Nations, therefore, declared any war, either involving 
a member or non-member of the League of Nations to be a concern to the whole League which 
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had to take “wise and effectual” action to safeguard peace of nations. However, the League of 
Nations did not ban the use of force but established a moratorium.  
 
The League of Nations also had loopholes which were taken advantage of by aggressor states, 
specifically the use of the word ‘war’ to conceptualize force. This loophole was abused by 
Japan which described its invasion of Manchuria not as a ‘war’ but an ‘incident’ and Italy 
which called its annexation of Ethiopia as an ‘expedition’. Crafters of the UN charter therefore 
opted to use the word ‘force’ to encompass all incidents (Schrijver; 2003: 3). 
 
At birth the UN had clear mandates and guidelines set in the charter, specifically the 
preservation of international peace and security. However, international transformations have 
seen the growth of competing interests within the UN and in the interpretation of the charter. 
Firstly, the transformation from concentrating only on negative peace that was conceptualized 
as the absence of war among states (Institute for Economics and Peace; n. d.; 3), to the 
realization that lack of human security as group level in internal affair of member states also 
constitute a threat to peace and security (Schrijver; 2006: 9, 16-17). It was from the acceptance 
of this new phenomenon that the Security Council declared the situation in the then Southern 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) (Morris; 2013: 1268) and supply of arms to Apartheid South Africa 
as threats to peace and security. 
 
Less powerful states, predominantly the erstwhile colonies, which joined the UN at 
decolonization came in seeking protection to maintain their newly acquired independence and 
sovereignty. The foundation pillars of the UN system of the respect to sovereignty and 
territorial integrity was an assurance to their aspiration of sovereign equality. However, human 
rights issues and the question of military intervention for humanitarian purposes, which have 
come to the front of international debate are perceived by the less powerful states as threats to 
their survival. Some view them as pretext for recolonization by the powerful states (Schrijver; 
2003: 6).  The less powerful states have also questioned the maintenance of 1945 structures in 
the UN which are seen by weaker states as rewards for victors in the Second World War (WW 
II). Schrijver (2003: 6) summarizes the competing interests in the form of classical 
International Law principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and prohibition of the use of 
force on one hand and on the other hand, modern International Law principles of respect for 
universally accepted human rights and the organization of the world as an international 
community, meaning more than just a “world of states”. 
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Scholars and global leaders have given different and sometimes contradictory interpretations 
to the charter regarding the concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. 
Scholars and world leaders like Thomas Weiss, Kofi Annan and Tony Blair argued that the 
charter emphasized the need for both international peace and security, and the observance of 
human rights hence sovereignty was limited to those who respected their subjects. Those who 
abused their subjects could not be protected by the principles of sovereignty and non-
interference from the UN charter. On the other hand sceptics like Ian Brownlie, and most of 
the leaders of the less powerful states argue that the charter has no provisions for military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes and the concept of intervention is prone to abuse by 
powerful states. It was the aim of this research to dig into the arguments and come up with 
negotiated conclusions. The research sought to fill the gaps pertaining the concept and practice 
of military intervention for humanitarian purposes under the UN charter which can be seen as 
the global constitution using Libya and Syria as comparative case studies. 
 
This study therefore: 
a) Discusses the legal framework that governs intervention, with specific interest on 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes, by foreign states in disputes within 
sovereign states under international law; 
 
b) Interrogates the role of the international community in local disputes, with the political 
uprisings in Libya and Syria serving as case studies; 
 
c) Analyzes the disparity between theory and practice on intervention in international 
relations in general, and in the cases of Libya and Syria in particular; 
 
d) Discusses the Libyan and Syrian crises in depth, to determine the level of force which 
can be applied by local regimes against rebelling masses; and 
 
e) Analyses the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept in line with customary 







1.4 Research problems and objectives: Key questions to be asked  
 
The research is centered on the question: What are the international rules and regulations on 
“intervention” which, in terms of international law refers to the forcible interference of one 
country or countries in the internal or external affairs of another state?  
 
From this, a series of further questions emerge: 
a) Under what conditions is intervention considered to be an unlawful act and when is it 
regarded as lawful? 
b) What amount of force can/should a state use against rebelling citizens and who is to 
judge that a certain amount of force is appropriate / excessive? 
c) What changes have there been in international law regarding the rules of intervention 
since the formation of the UN in 1945, and why? 
d) What is the role of the international community in internal states’ political disputes, 
particularly in the case of Libya and Syria? What accounts for the different reactions? 
e) What precedence has been set by the international community’s response to the Libyan 
and Syrian crises? 
f) What is the position of the Responsibility to Protect in International and United 
Nations Law? 
 




The differential response of the international community to the Libyan and Syrian crises 
suggests that the actions of international powers are motivated by global and regional self-
interests and not the genuine desire to intervene on humanitarian grounds.  
 
There has been increased intervention in the affairs of sovereign states over the past two 
decades. Examples include the establishment of a safe haven for Kurds at the end of the first 
Gulf War (1991); missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo (1999), which were all defined 
as ‘threats to peace and security’; the mission to Sierra Leone (1999) was to protect UN 
personnel; and the invasion of Iraq (2003) was to seek out weapons of mass destruction. After 
Kosovo, there was international debate on the legality of military interventions for 
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humanitarian purposes and principles on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This came to an 
end with the invasion of Iraq but surfaced again following intervention in Libya.  
The Libyan and Syrian crises presented a new precedence in international relations as the 
rationale was not a threat to ‘peace and security’ but threats to civilian lives. Since the 
codification of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ document by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in September 2001, there has not been any decision 
by the UNSC mandating the support of rebels against a de-facto state leader, as was the case 
in Libya (Thakur; 2013: 61). The failure by the international community to pass another 
resolution on Syria authorizing intervention portrayed an international order that can best be 
argued to be contradictory and thus leading to disorder and confusion. This apparent lack of 
consistency by various governments, such as China and Russia who did not veto international 
action in the case of Libya but have taken a pro-Assad regime stance in the case of Syria 
(DePetris: 2012) warrants an academic investigation.  NATO’s inconsistency by not going into 
Syria without a UNSC mandate, as it did in Kosovo, also raises questions that warrant 
investigation. 
 
The number of states in which local populations may rebel / revolt may increase in the near 
future for various reasons. In fact, as I am completing this dissertation (October 2014) the 
people of Syria and Iraq are under threat from the self-designated Islamic State (IS), which 
previously called itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The group has been 
described by the United Nations as a terrorist group and designated as a foreign terrorist 
organization by Britain, Australia, the United States, Canada, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
and several other countries.  
 
The protection of civilians again seems to assume importance under UN auspices. The study 
seeks to establish whether there is a new precedence on the role of the international community 
in local disputes, ostensibly to protect civilians, especially with the rise of the new discourse 
on human rights, and whether this is in line with the UN Charter on when the international 
community is justified in employing force or the threat of force to influence the behavior of 





1.6 Principal theories upon which the research project will be constructed (research 
design) 
 
Interrogating the role of the international community in the uprisings in Libya and Syria raises 
a number of conceptual and theoretical questions. The theories that will be used to analyze the 
role of the international community in the uprisings are the theory of sovereignty, just war 
theory, and the realist theory of international relations. The research also relates to the human 
rights theory in international relations because it is used as the benchmark to judge leaders and 
to call or not to call for intervention.  
 
The theory of sovereignty has been a central regulator of international relations since the days 
of the Greek city states (Thucydides; bk. 5; xvi, 27-29 of 31). The crafters of the UN Charter 
were not oblivious to international realities as they incorporated the concept of sovereignty as 
a foundation of the post Second World War (WW II) international community. The crafters 
noted in Article 2(1) of the Charter that for international peace and security to be realized, all 
states should respect the principle of sovereign equality. 
 
The concept of sovereignty denotes that a state is the supreme judge in all its internal affairs to 
which no external interference can be considered legitimate, while externally the state 
recognizes no any other supreme authority. This old Westphalian concept of sovereignty that 
respected the sacrosanct nature of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other states has come under stress due to the changing nature of international 
relations.  
 
In 1993, Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen redefined the notion of sovereignty from the right 
to non-interference in internal affairs to ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (Bellamy; 2008: 619).  
Deng and Cohen argued that while a state enjoyed sovereignty from external intervention, this 
sovereignty was only legitimate when the state was responsible for the well-being of its 
citizens. In cases of “stress”, where the state is unable to discharge its responsibilities, they 
argued that the state could exercise its sovereignty by calling for external support; failure to do 
so would compromise the legitimacy of its sovereignty (Bellamy; 2008: 619). This argument, 
therefore, presupposes the existence of a supreme higher authority in international relations 
that is capable of holding supposed sovereigns accountable (Bellamy; 2008: 620). This 
perspective, it may be argued, is very ambitious given that in the current international system 
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even the UN has not matured enough to be granted the role of legal supreme authority over all 
states. The concept of sovereignty also does not conform to the arguments provided by the 
social contract theorists who argued not for a supreme power to hold the sovereign to account 
but for citizens to hold their leaders to account based on their natural rights against the state 
Aristotle (Trans. B. Jowett; 1999: 77). 
 
In contrast to the theory of sovereignty, the Just War Theory argues that not all wars, which 
are not of repelling an assault on one’s state, are wars of aggression per se. While these two 
theories do not stand totally polarized given that they both recognize the supremacy of the state 
in its internal affairs and the lack of a supreme power externally, the just war theory stops 
recognizing state sovereignty when massive violations of human rights, as contained in the law 
of nature and nations, are committed (Murphy; 1996: 43). The concept of military intervention 
for humanitarian purposes is justified under the theory of just war which has two main guiding 
codes of war, namely the jus ad bellum (rules governing the resort to war) and jus in bello 
(rules governing the conduct of an armed conflict, the treatment of combatants and non-
combatants). More recently, there has been the introduction of a third code, namely, the jus 
post bellum (Rules governing the conduct of the return to peace and stability after an armed 
conflict) (Fabre; 2008: 963). According to the traditional rules of the just war theory, “a war is 
just if the harms that it causes are outweighed by the good that it brings about, and if it is waged 
for a just cause, towards just ends, and by a legitimate authority or authorized by a legitimate 
authority” (Fabre; 2008: 963). 
 
The applicability of just war theory is problematic as it raises a set of contentious questions: 
how and who judges whether the harms are outweighed by the good, and for whom? Who 
decides the just cause of the war? And who can be regarded as the legitimate authority? Even 
with the creation of the UN, problems of legitimate authority continue to arise, as shown by 
USA and NATO activities in Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011).  
 
The Realist Theory of international relations, this study holds, is the best equipped to provide 
answers to the questions of power politics which are raised by these interventions. Realists 
believe that power is the currency of international relations to the extent that the theory is 
sometimes referred to as the Power Theory. The thinking is traced back to the writings of 
Thucydides who noted that states compete and fight for security, honour, and self-interest 
(Nossal; 1998: 66). This is also supported by Hobbes who argued that human beings fight for 
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competition, diffidence and glory (Hobbes; 1651: 77). Classical realist thinkers such as Hans 
J. Morgenthau have also been influenced by the philosophical writings of Thucydides and 
Hobbes and have managed to position the theory in current international relations (Nossal; 
1998: 15). For a realist, states in international relations seek to maximize their power both in 
political and economic terms. John J. Mearsheimer (2013: 78) notes:  
 
Great powers, the main actors in the realists’ account, pay careful attention to 
how much economic and military power they have relative to each other. It is 
important not only to have a substantial amount of power, but also to make sure 
that no other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favor. 
 
While the new thinking on sovereignty as responsibility and the just war theory locate the 
current international system as an intertwined one in which states have a moral duty to protect 
citizens whose rights are grossly violated by their sovereigns, realism argues that there is no 
place for morality in international relations. The theory also argues that the state is the central 
actor in international relations (and not citizens) and that it is a rational actor which can speak 
for the whole nation with a unified voice (Donnelly; 2000: 7-8).  
 
This notion has been heavily criticized by the theory of Globalism which argues that the 
international system has evolved into an international society of individuals. A problem in any 
single state may have negative impacts beyond its borders no matter how much internal it may 
be judged to be. It is therefore argued that internal matters can no longer be covered by 
sovereignty as they have the capacity to have spill overs in other states.  
 
An analysis of the actions of the major international and regional powers in the international 
system shows that while states argue from a moral ground to intervene in the affairs of other 
states, the major reasons behind such interventions are national interests. Actions of the USA 
and NATO have, in some cases, not been sanctioned by the UN, which is supposedly the 
supreme international authority, hence, their actions cannot be accounted for under the just war 
theory. Since the wars were prevalent against states that threaten USA and Western hegemony, 
realism can be the best theory to analyze such extra-legal action in the 21st century. 
 
Discussing the concept and conduct of military intervention for humanitarian purposes rests on 
an invisible foundation of universal human rights which should be respected by all states, 
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leaders and citizens across the world. This body of law can be collectively understood as being 
constituted by humanitarian law (Cassese; 1999: 791). Contrary to that, this body of law now 
moves behind the traditionally understood principles of humanitarian law as it sought to deal 
with inter-state conflicts. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is one of 
the rules of law which were created to govern the conduct of intra-state conflicts, and the 
conduct of leaders against public unrest.  According to Article 1 of the Rome Statute, even civil 
conflicts now threaten international peace and security, hence the involvement of the UNSC in 
matters that would be considered internal affairs.  
 
1.7 Research methodology and methods 
 
Research can be simply understood as “the systematic investigation into and study of materials 
and sources in order to establish facts and reach conclusions” (Oxford Dictionary: online). The 
purpose of research, according to Berg (2001: 6) “is to discover answers to questions through 
the application of systematic procedures.” The researcher sought to establish knowledge and 
answer question on how, where and when a state can militarily intervene in the domestic affairs 
of another state without having been militarily provoked. The researcher specifically sought to 
come up with valuable knowledge on the concept of military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes using Libya and Syria as comparative case studies. The study set the researcher on 
the path of research in social sciences given that states behaviour and interaction, like human 
beings is more of social interaction than scientific phenomena, hence the adoption of qualitative 
research approach.  
 
The researcher was influenced by the interpretive philosophy of world view. From this non-
positivist approach, the researcher sought to come up with conclusions on what can be termed 
as social aspects of states interaction. The researcher therefore adopted qualitative research 
methodology and methods of gathering data not because only qualitative research methodology 
could be used in social science research or superior to quantitative research methodology 
(Nudzor; 2009: 119), but because the researcher judged it to be the best to answer the question 
which the research posed. The researcher borrows from Berg (2001: 6) that, “qualitative 
research properly seeks answers to questions by examining various social settings and the 
individuals who inhabit these settings.” From the perspective of this research, the international 
arena becomes the social setting, while states are taken as individuals who inhabit this setting. 
However, influential individuals with the capacity to influence the behaviour of states are also 
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considered as actors whose action were subjects for analysis. This was because, qualitative 
research is interested in uncovering the meaning of a phenomenon for those involved and the 
construction of world views (Merriam; 2009: 5). 
 
Specifically the researcher was concerned with states interaction with relation to military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes. The subject of research is a highly subjective and 
sometimes emotional concept which, with its long history, has not found universally accepted 
conclusions. Such a phenomenon, according to the researcher, could not be studied using strict 
methods from the positivist approach. The researcher therefore accepted Berg (2001: 6)’s 
philosophy that if states are studied “in a symbolically reduced, statistically aggregated fashion, 
there is a danger that conclusions – although arithmetically precise – may fail to fit reality.” 
The researcher questioned how states use and abuse the concept to either help those in stress, 
or to pursue gains not related to the concept and how law and morals sought to regulate the 
concept (i.e. military intervention for humanitarian purposes).  
 
The major tool for this study was Archival Research which is also known as ‘desk research’. 
Books, journals, newspapers, news bulletins, social media, media release, research reports by 
“think tanks”, policy documents of international agencies, and other such relevant material on 
international relations and international law was used. The researcher was unable to visit the 
study area due to the on-going violence and war in Libya and Syria, which made it risky to 
travel and conduct this study. 
 
The research utilized a variety of sources, including, the following: 
a) International law instruments to establish the laws and regulations pertaining to 
interventions in the domestic affairs of sovereign states; 
 
b) Official reports prepared by various states and international organizations (Arab 
League, European Union, United Nations, African Union) on the Syrian and Libyan 
crises, as well as UNSC resolutions .  
 
c) Minutes of meetings, unpublished correspondence, and media statements; 
 
d) Social media websites to track the feelings of ordinary Libyans and Syrians with regard 
to the actions of the ruling elites in the first instance and the subsequent intervention; 
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e) Secondary books and journal articles pertinent to the study were also consulted. 
 
The Libyan case was intriguing owing to the fact that it was the first time that the UNSC 
contracted an outside party, NATO, to act on its behalf in implementing the responsibility to 
protect. Libya became the first country in which the responsibility to protect was applied since 
the drafting and adoption of the Responsibility to Protect document by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Observers like Stea (2012) argue 
that the reaction of the veto powers had a legacy in international relations and the application 
of Resolution 1973 by NATO had a direct impact on the behaviour of Russia and China in the 
Syrian crisis. All the actions and processes have interesting research areas that have precedence 
in international relations, especially the notion of military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes, now also referred to as Responsibility to Protect.  
 
It would have been appropriate to visit Libya and Syria and interview ordinary people and 
relevant policymakers, to appreciate their feelings with regards to international intervention 
and how they reacted to it but the tyranny of distance, financial constraints and the volatile 
situation in both countries made site visits impossible. The foregoing shortcoming was 
redressed through the usage of the internet to access documents and media sites.  
 
Desk research provided the researcher with invaluable data. The materials needed for the 
research were accessed using internet technology including from the UN archives. Live news 
bulletins with testimonies from victims, interviews, press statements, press conferences were 
accessed from digital television stations like Al-Jazeera, British Broadcasting Cooperation 
(BBC) and Russia Today (RT). Follow up on the news bulletins were made from the websites 
of the different news channels while other print media news which could not be accessed 
physically by the researcher like the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post were accessed 
from their websites. Competing interests and biases of news channels helped the researcher to 
get different views on different issues and check on the authenticity of events and issues 
reported through comparison of stories. 
 
Apart from archival research, interaction with fellow student and political and media scholars 
who followed the Arab Spring assisted the researcher in having insights on the topic. While 
such informal interactions are not referenced in the study they assisted the researcher is making 
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analysis of data, specifically given that the creation of knowledge under the non-positivist 
approach is negotiated between researchers, subjects and the broad society. 
 
Data gathered was analyzed using interpretive and content analysis. Interpretive approach 
allowed the researcher to treat interaction of states and individual state actions and 
policymakers as text from which conclusions were made (Berg; 2001: 239). Actions and 
statements that impacted on the question of intervention or lack of it in the cases under study 
were analyzed to come up with questions and conclusions on the broader study.  
 
Content analysis refers to “techniques for making inferences by systematically and objectively 
identifying special characteristics of messages.” Content analysis was used as a tool to have a 
better objective understanding of documents like the UN Charter, resolution 1973 and other 
international and regional agreements. Conscious of the research methodology, the researcher 
did not seek to analyze data to come up with a single truth, but to set standards for argument 
and debate in order to come up with agreed positions and conclusions to generate policy and 
future debates. 
 
In summary, the study concentrates on the theoretical and legal roles of the international 
community in local crises through a case study of Syria and Libya. It compares the theory and 
law with the actual practice by the international community in both uprisings. It also explores 
the nature of the uprisings in a historical manner in order to create ground for analyzing the 
legality or illegality of international intervention or non-intervention. This means taking note 
of other cases of intervention where they became pertinent for comparative reasons. 
 
 The thesis structure is as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This introductory chapter contains a background to the study, hypothesis, research 
methodology, statement of the problem, research objectives and questions, a brief discussion 






Chapter 2 International Law and Contending theories of intervention 
 
An assessment of the major theories that enable analysts to capture the notion of military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes viz. the Just War Theory, the concept of State 
Sovereignty and the Realist Theory of International Relations. 
 
Chapter 3 Intervention and Precedence, 1990-2010: Kosovo, Somalia, Iraq 
 
A critically analysis of international interventions in the 1990s which was dubbed a decade of 
intervention, which was initiated by the USA at the end of the Cold War. The chapter discusses 
the reasons for the interventions and weighs the official pronouncements against the concepts 
of self interests and universal morality. 
 
Chapter 4 Libya, Syria, and the Arab Spring: Nature of the crises 
 
The Arab spring as transnational uprising did not follow the same events in all the countries. 
The chapter discusses and illustrates the nature of the uprisings in Libya and Syria and also 
discusses whether they can be classified as rebellions or revolutions. 
 
Chapter 5 International law, transnational organizations, and intervention in Libya and 
Syria 
 
The position of the NATO intervention in Libya in international law and also the position of 
Syria according to the Law of Nations are analyzed in this chapter. Discussion is centred on re 
the UN, NATO, AU, GCC and the Arab League. 
 
Chapter 6 Comparative responses of the international community to Libya and Syria  
 
An analysis of the international response to the Libyan and Syrian cases through the 
comparison of actions by the P5, namely Britain, France and the USA, on one hand against 
Russia and China on the other. It questions the moral basis of Russia and China when they 
abstained from voting at the UNSC thereby paving way for intervention in Libya and the active 
use of the veto by the two states in the protection of the Syrian government. It also questions 
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the act of supplying rebels with weapons in any form during the conflicts in both Libya and 
Syria. 
 
Chapter 7 Conclusions 
 
The conclusion sums up the key issues raised in this study and contains recommendations on 




































There are three major types of military intervention under international law which are 
reproduced here as explained in the thesis overview:  
 
1. Military intervention in response to an invasion. This war is accepted as legally and 
morally justified by both customary international law (Vattel; 1758: bk. 3, Ch. 3) and 
the UN law. Article 51 Of the UN charter clearly states that, “Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”  
 
2. An invasion which is driven by any desires pursue self/national/strategic/territorial/geo-
political interests. This category encompasses all wars that are fought without 
internationally accepted legal or moral justification. This type of war also include wars 
that are declared on legally or morally accepted grounds but these legally and morally 
accepted reasons only being used as pretexts to pursue the interest of the invading 
state/s (Vattel; 1758: bk. 3, Ch. 3).  
 
3. Military intervention for humanitarian purposes. Under this third category, a state or 
group of states militarily intervene in another state not for 
self/national/strategic/territorial/geo-political interests or to repel an invasion, but to 
protect the civilians of the subject state who will be under gross abuse by their leaders. 
In other words, it is a war to restrain a sovereign from committing heinous crimes 
against humanity against his/her subjects. 
 
This thesis concentrates on the later type of military intervention which is highly contentious 
in international relations and international law as compared to the other two types. Debate is, 
therefore, centred on some of the major theories of intervention for humanitarian purposes, 
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which refers to the use of military force by foreign state(s) against another state to preserve 
human rights. The key question is, ‘Does a state’s coercive power, as embodied in its military 
forces, have a moral role to play in promoting respect for rights when this is lacking in foreign 
states?’ (Lee; 2010: 22). In this chapter, discussion dwells on the Grotian tradition and the Just 
War theory, Realist theory, theory of State Sovereignty and Human Rights theory, which are 
all deemed to be fundamental theories which have a direct bearing on the concept of military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes.  
 
2.2 The Grotian Doctrine and the Just War Theory 
 
The work of Hugo Grotius3 is often used to justify military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes. Lauterpacht, cited in Malanczuk (1993: 7), is of the view that the writings of Grotius 
contained “the first authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian intervention.” This 
is supported by Murphy (1996: 43) who notes that Grotius maintained that “resort to war was 
lawful… when doing so was based on a just cause… and the infliction of punishment on a 
wrongdoing state of excessive crimes.” Grotius (1625: 247) argued that; 
 
Though it is a rule established by the laws of nature and of social order… that 
every sovereign is supreme judge in his own kingdom and over his own 
subjects, in whose disputes no foreign power can justly interfere. Yet where 
[leaders] provoke their people to despair and resistance by unheard of cruelties, 
having themselves abandoned all the laws of nature, they lose the rights of 
independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privilege of the law of 
nations. 
 
It may, however, be argued that Grotius’s assertion did not amount to giving military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes a legal standing due to the absence of codification of 
what constitutes ‘unheard of cruelties’ or abandonment of the law of nature which in itself is 
not codified and not consensus.  
 
                                                          
3 Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) is considered the father of modern international law 
(www.global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/246809/Hugo-Grotius). He was a Dutch Jurist and philosopher. 
Among his great works is ‘De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace (1625))’ which deals 
extensively on legal and moral issues with regards to wars. 
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According to Vattel (1758: bk. 3, Ch. 3), nations only have the right to employ force to the 
extent ‘necessary for their own defense, and for the maintenance of their rights.’ Vattel further 
notes the corollary that when a nation goes to war when not attacked or threatened, ‘she 
undertakes an unjust war.’ 
 
Coates (2006: 212) notes that the doctrine of Just War in the current age can be grouped into 
three categories - jus ad bellum (rules that governed resort to war), Jus in bello (rules that 
governed the conduct of a war) and jus post bellum (rules governing the obligations and 
conduct after the war).  In relation to the question of military intervention specifically for 
humanitarian purposes, the study is more concerned with jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Sorabji 
(2006: 14) just cause, attempts of peaceful resolution having been exhausted, the war should 
be declared and decided by an appropriate authority, the war should not worsen the situation 
that already exists, a reasonable prospect of achieving the aims of the war and an attitude of 
benevolence as the six conditions of engaging in a just war. The foregoing is reiterated by 
Snauwaert (2004: 172) that, “jus ad bellum criteria have included the following principles: just 
cause, right authority, right intention, proportionality, reasonable hope of success, and last 
resort.” 
 
The issue of military interventions on humanitarian grounds remains highly contested from the 
time of classical philosophers like Grotius and Vattel to the contemporary thinkers like Weiss 
and Annan. Grotius (1625: 247 – 248) strongly supports intervention as he argues that the 
sovereign should treat his subjects with the respect of the law of nature.  
 
Sorabji (2006) notes that Vitoria (1537) had already written on the subject in relation to the 
Spanish invasion of the Americas on the pretext of saving victims of human sacrifice and notes 
that one cannot intervene on the ground of human sacrifice as this was evidenced in Christianity 
by God’s command to Abraham to sacrifice his son (Bible (KJV); Genesis 22: 2) and the 
sacrificial of Christ (Bible (KJV); Romans 5: 8). However, one can intervene on the grounds 
that victims, who have a right to self defence, have a right to be defended even if they do not 
wish to be, argued Vitoria (Sorabji; 2006: 20).  
 
Las Casas (1550), influenced strongly by Christian doctrine, opposed military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes arguing that it is wrong to kill even one innocent person and that it is 
against natural law to bring about more evil than good because in rescuing victims of human 
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sacrifice, more human beings would be killed than saved (Sorabji; 2006: 20). Agreeing with 
Las Casas, Norman (2006: 201-202) argues that military intervention to alleviate victims of 
human rights violations is not acceptable given the sacrosanct right to life of every human 
being.  
 
The work of Vattel (1758) shows just how complex this subject is. Vattel gives contradictory 
versions on the subject of intervention. While supporting intervention to defend those who have 
a right to defend themselves (Vattel; 1758: bk. 2, ch. 4), the dilemma this creates is that nations 
who take up arms when they are not threatened in any way ‘undertakes an unjust war’ since 
only those to ‘whom an injury is done or intended, have a right to make war” (Vattel; 1758: 
bk. 3, ch. 3). This contradicts his argument in Book 2 Chapter 4 that when subjects rise up 
against an unjust ruler, “every foreign power has a right to succor an oppressed people who 
implore their assistance.” Under these circumstances, Vattel (1758) calls for the intervening 
state to do so on the side of justice. For Vattel “it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist 
brave men in the defense of their liberties” (1758: bk. 2, ch. 4).  
 
There is no mutual view on the issue of military intervention for humanitarian purposes as a 
branch of the just war theory given that some state leaders use the military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes as a cover to pursue national interests. Ian Brownlie, quoted in 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996: 64), argues this when he writes that “a rule allowing 
humanitarian intervention … is a general license to vigilantes and opportunists to resort to 
hegemonial intervention.” Norman (2006: 204) supports this argument for, “in practice,” he 
writes, “bad faith is all too apparent.” He believes that nation states are using this license to 
“intervene in pursuit of their own interests, while rationalizing the actions in the language of 
human rights” (Norman; 2006: 204). Many have argued that this is the case in the USA-led 
invasion of Iraq in which leaders of the invading forces, Tony Blair and George Bush of the 
UK and USA respectively, argued that the invasion was to rid Iraq of a tyrant who not only 
threatened international peace but also kept his people under terror (Simura; 2011: 3-4).  
 
There has been acceptance by a number of states that military intervention for humanitarian 
reasons is acceptable but that it needs a regulating authority in the name of the UNSC in order 
to curb its use as a pretext to pursue national interests by powerful states (Goodman; 2006: 
108). The concept has therefore been adopted through the acceptance of the Responsibility to 
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Protect (R2P) document of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty by the UN General Assembly. 
 
2.3 The Concept of Sovereignty 
 
The theory of sovereignty has been going through an evolutionary process which predates the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Abiew (1999: 25-26) traces the history of the absolute nature of 
sovereignty to Roman law and the writings of Aristotle and notes that “the idea of sovereignty 
as formulated in ancient Rome sought to establish the theoretical absolutism of the powers of 
the Emperor and to consolidate the despotism of his rule.” In the midst of varied views, two 
schools of thought, being classical and constitutional are more pronounced.  
 
Classical theory is also termed the primordial concept as it refers to sovereignty in relation to 
Monarchs before the rise of republics. The primordial understanding of sovereignty was that 
of unlimited power vested in the monarch (Pavlovic; 1997: 5). Even Grotius, who supported 
the concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes and Voltaire who is regarded as 
one of the prophets of the French Revolution of 1789, agreed on the primordial notion of 
sovereignty. Voltaire noted that he “would rather obey one lion, than two hundred rats of [his 
own] species,” in a clear rejection of popular democracy (New World Encyclopedia: n d).  
 
Bodin (1576; Trans. M. J. Toley: 25) defines sovereignty as irrevocable power vested in the 
monarch which can be temporarily delegated to governors, ambassadors or military leaders. 
Such power could only be “limited by divine law, natural law, the law of nations, and by such 
agreements as made between ruler and the ruled” (Abiew; 1999: 27). While it is accepted under 
the social contract that the sovereign gains his authority from the governed (Grotius, 1625), 
once that power is vested in him, the power became absolute. 
 
Sovereignty was institutionalized as a cardinal principle in international relations by the Peace 
of Westphalia (1648). The general understanding is that a state is the supreme body regulating 
behaviour within its boundaries and recognizes no outside supreme law or political body. As 
Abiew (1999: 25) puts it, “to be sovereign is to be subject to no higher power.” With the passage 
of time, scholars, sometimes invoking the writing of classical thinkers, produced new thinking 
around the subject which can be referred to as the constitutional theory of sovereignty. The 
American Declaration of Independence (ADI) of 1776, for example, argued against the 
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sovereignty of the British monarch. It held that all ‘men’ were created equal and enjoyed certain 
right, such as life and liberty. 
  
Governments derived their legitimacy and power from “the consent of the governed” who 
reserved the right to change that government when it became destructive in order to “effect 
their safety and happiness” (ADI: 1776). The constitutionalist theory of sovereignty holds that 
sovereignty is a public good and is enshrined in a constitutive document (Pavlovic; 1997: 6). 
This argument is derived from social contract theory which argues that before the formation of 
governments, societies lived in a state of nature which could either be Hobbesian or Lockean. 
Under the Hobbesian state of nature each individual had unrestrained rights and the hallmark 
of life was that of war of one against all (Hobbes; 1651: 79). People agreed to cede some of 
their rights to a sovereign who would institute peaceful co-existence between the governor 
(sovereign) and the governed, as well as among the governed (Hobbes; 1651: 107). Under the 
Lockean state of nature, people live in harmony but in cases of conflict, they meet justice with 
emotions, hence the need for a state regulator in the name of a government (Locke; 1689: 110-
111).  
 
The state of nature has been refuted by Norman (2006: 197) as an imaginary situation that was 
meant to give meaning to the concept of social contract and the rise of governments. A 
contradiction is derived from the writings of Hobbes in The Leviathan, who recognizes that 
Adam was the first person to be created (Hobbes, 1651, 19), a biblical theory has its own 
argument on the development of society, which is contradictory to the concept of the state of 
nature.   
 
Constitutional theory is based on the construction of supreme national constitutions, mostly 
found in republics, which contain the most important laws which citizens regard as 
indispensable ‘for their governance and wellbeing,’ and stipulate various “state institutions and 
distributes powers among them and puts limitations on the exercise of those powers” (Odoki; 
1991: 3). Powers reside in citizens who collectively craft and/or endorse a constitution. 
 
Aspects of globalization which entails economic interdependence have given platform for some 
analysts to claim that the state is conceding its sovereignty to non-state actors as well as 
ordinary people. Annan (1999) argued that globalization and international cooperation have 
resulted in barriers between domestic and international breaking down, and state sovereignty 
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being redefined. States, he argues, “are now widely understood to be instruments at the service 
of their peoples, and not vice versa.” This is supported by Weiss (2011: 8) who argues that 
sovereignty is not absolute and entails not only rights but duties as well. 
 
However, developing states have a tendency to cling to the Westphalian concept of sovereignty 
(Acharya; 2005: 3) because most post-colonial states are weak relative to their powerful 
erstwhile colonizers. Despite the fact that rights abuse and conflict between states and certain 
groups within them, occurs in both powerful (China / Tibet; Russia / Chechnya being examples) 
and weak states, powerful states intervene to “defend” human rights of the citizens in weak 
states. Kochler (2001: 3-4) noted the hypocrisy of European powers who instituted themselves 
as the protectors of the rights of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth-
century while being guilty of the same or even worse crimes in their own colonies.   
 
2.4 Realist Theory and Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes 
 
The Realist theory developed as a field of inquiry after the failure of the League of Nations, 
but it has been read back to philosophers like Hobbes and Thucydides, who is regarded as the 
first Realist thinker(Wisken: 2010). Thucydides (460BC – 390BC) postulated that – “security, 
honour, and self-interest” are the reasons why states compete in international relations (bk. 1, 
ch. 3, 7 of 12). He goes on to describe an anarchic international system when he said that “right, 
as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they 
can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides; bk. 5, ch. 18, 2 of 8). Thucydides further 
notes that one state’s security is derived from the weaknesses of another (bk. 5, ch. 7, 3 of 8). 
 
Hobbes, influenced by Thucydides, argued that the nature of man is to take control of the 
resources and control others in a state of nature when there is no supreme law and power to 
regulate human behaviour. He advocated for the creation of a strong government which he 
termed a Leviathan. Hobbes (1651: 76) suggests that when there is a tussle for finite resources 
men  
become enemies, and in the way to their end …endeavor to destroy or subdue 
one another. And from hence [one only fears another’s power and when one 
possesses what others do not have they will use force to deprive him] … not 
only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader 
again is in the like danger of another.  
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Hobbes (1651: 77) states competition, diffidence and glory as the three principal causes of 
conflict among human beings. Thucydides and Hobbes had a great influence on twentieth-
century century Realist thinking. Hans J. Morgenthau (2006: 29), opines that “international 
politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international 
politics power is always the immediate aim.” According to Mearsheimer (1995: 569);  
 
In Realist thinking, the international system is portrayed as a brutal arena where 
states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other and therefore have 
little reason to trust each other. Daily life is essentially a struggle for power, 
where each state strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the system but 
also to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty position. 
 
Both Liberalism and Realism influenced the crafting of the UN Charter in 1945. The Allied 
leaders, united by a common enemy, had no guarantee that they would not revert to their old 
rivalry and to guard against future wars crafted the UN which was influenced by Liberalism 
but had clear marks of Realism. Contrary to the UN Charter (Art. 2.1) which recognized the 
Westphalian concept of sovereignty and clearly stipulated that it was “based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all its Members”, realist traits are evident in the granting of the 
veto power to the victors of the Second World War (Britain, France, Russia, and the United 
States of America) and China. The paradox was noted by Thomson (1962) when he argued that 
the veto defeated the purpose of the Charter by violating the principle of sovereign equality. 
Only a major power or its ally has the potential to wage a war that has the capacity to threaten 
international peace and security (Thomson; 1962: 833). 
 
These realist traits have been at the centre of international relations since 1945. Military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes has been influenced by the pursuit of self-interests. For 
instance, while the Rwandan crisis of 1994 had all the reason for intervention as forwarded by 
Grotius and other proponents of the concept, there was no intervention which was undertaken 
to protect the ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutu against state and militia excesses.4 
                                                          
4 In the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, the Interahamwe militias, who were support by government the embarked 
on a genocide campaign and crimes against humanity (Carla J. Ferstman, “Rwanda’s domestic Trials for 
Genocide and Crimes against Humanity,” Human Rights Brief, Vol. 5 (1), 1997, p. 1). The actions showed that 
the state had an active role and also gave military and moral support to the militias who killed more than a 
million people the majority being Tutsi (see Carla J. Ferstman, “Rwanda’s domestic Trials for Genocide and 
Crimes against Humanity,” and International Panel of Eminent Personalities, “Rwanda: The Preventable 
Genocide,” accessed 25 September 2013, http://www.africa-
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Realists do not fully accept that military intervention can be wholly influenced by an altruistic 
desire to save distant peoples (Orford; 2009: 440). According to realism, the whole nature of 
the international system in terms of institutions reflects the desires and interests of powerful 
states. Only military intervention that has some benefits for the powerful will be conducted as 
well that which does not affect the interests of some major power. This explains why the 
Security Council was not polarized on the Libyan case in which NATO’s intervention was not 
stopped by the ‘Eastern veto’ of Russia and China, 5 but in the Syrian case Russia and China 
continue to oppose UN involvement in the crisis.6 
 
2.5 Human Rights Theory of International Relations 
 
A lot of the debate on military intervention for humanitarian revolves around gross violations 
of fundamental human rights and acts of genocide. There is no agreement on the minimum 
benchmarks of what constitutes human rights and what constitutes genocide. The concept of 
human rights is a polarized area mostly between Universalists and the Cultural Relativists, 
while the conceptualization of genocide in modern day application is more political than 
scientific. 
 
Senghore (2002: 149) notes that “human rights are the universally accepted principles and rules 
that support and that make it possible for each member of the human family to realize his/her 
full potential and to live life in an atmosphere of freedom, justice and peace. They are those 
fundamental values inherent in every individual human being on the basis of humanity and 
recognized by law, both domestic and international.” Philosophical writing on the concept of 
human rights goes as far back as the writings of social contract theorists. When Grotius (1625: 
247) argued that sovereigns can intervene in the affairs of other states by either using or 
threatening the use of force against a sovereign who does not treat his subjects according to the 
                                                          
union.org/official_documents/reports/Report_rowanda_genocide.pdf). Such acts warranted a military 
intervention to protect the Tutsis and moderate Hutus who also needed the protection as indicated by their 
escape to neighbouring states as refugees. Be that as it may, the genocide took place with no international 
intervention to help those who suffered.  
5 Security Council Resolution 1973 passed mainly because Russia and China did not veto the resolution but 
chose to abstain in what they said it was in solidarity with African states in the Security Council who had voted 
in favour of the resolution. The resolution had also been supported by the Arab league, a regional group to 
which Libya was part of, which had called for the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. 
6 With regards the Syrian case, the Security Council saw the tabling of three resolution from the beginning of 
the Syrian conflict until the end of 2012 which were all vetoed by Russia and China arguing that Western States 
abused Resolution 1973 by acting as an air power for the rebels and effected a regime change in Libya which 
was outside the letter and spirit of the resolution. 
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law of nature, he was implicitly agreeing that there are some rights which even the sovereigns 
themselves ought to respect with regard to the governed.  
 
Norman (2006: 192) argues against the notion of human rights as postulated in the 
contemporary era. He does not argue against the concept of human rights but argues that 
because they are human constructs there is a lack of unison in the human rights declarations in 
international society. In the “absence of guarantees backed by institutional sanctions… talk of 
‘rights’ makes no sense. It may be a good thing if people have certain rights, but it is misleading 
to equate the claim that people ought to have those rights with the claim that they already have 
them at some ‘natural’, pre-institutional level” (Norman; 2006: 192). Which minimum rights 
should we accept?, Norman asks. Is it the US declaration of independence (life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness), the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (liberty, 
property, security and resistance to oppression), the thirteen rights recognized in the European 
Convention on Rights, or the over thirty rights recognized in the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights? (Norman; 2006: 193). 
 
Apart from arguments forwarded by scholars like Norman, the concept of human rights is 
bedeviled by differences between Cultural Relativists and Universalists (Donnelly; 1984: 401). 
Cultural relativism calls for the respect of cultural diversity in the construction and 
interpretation of human rights and holds that moral rules and social institutions should be 
exempt from legitimate criticism by outsiders (Booth; 1999: 36). In her argument against 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes, Orford (2009: 444) noted that the religious 
and military divide in the world simply proves that there is no such thing as “common values 
animating all states and peoples, or that coalitions of the willing might intervene in the name 
of defending such values.”  
 
Universalism, in contrast, argues that human rights are culture blind and predate human 
institutions and societies and so should be enjoyed by every human being equally regardless of 
region, race, or religion (Norman; 2006: 192). This argument is based on the natural law, which 
sees human beings as universally natural and therefore cannot be separated on their rights by 
respective communities (Donnelly; 1984: 401). 
 
It may be argued that the major difference between the two schools of thought is mainly found 
in the interpretation of human rights and their instruments. In respect to fundamental rights like 
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the right to life, it may be argued that all societies accept its universality. However, there are 
differences even in how such a fundamental right should be respected. In classical religious 
laws of Islam and Judaism, for example, one who turns apostate is punishable by death (Lent: 
2010; and Saeed and Saeed; 2004: 444); in contrast to the current universal concept of rights, 
in which each person has the right to choose his or her religion (Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR); n d: Art. 18).   
 
International practice has shown, however, that universalism and weak relativism have gained 
prominence in international human rights discourse (Donnelly; 1984: 402). Most states, 
including those from the conservative Middle East and East Asia regions, have ratified 
important international human rights instruments and declarations including the UDHR and 
CEDAW with reservation on some clauses of the treaties. While the philosophical tradition of 
human rights has a long history, the practical condition is relatively young and can be traced 
back to the American declaration of independence in 1776 and the French’s Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789. 
 
If the practical concept of human rights is relatively young, then the conceptualization of 
genocide is relatively new. The term ‘genocide’ was first used by Raphael Lemkin in 1944 
(Schabas; 2000: 14). Lemkin, quoted in Schabas (2000: 25), defines genocide as; 
  
A coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential 
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves. …Genocide is directed against the national groups…, and 
the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual 
capacity, but as members of a national group.  
 
The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 
defines genocide as, “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group” (Gellately and Kiernan; 2003: 3). 
 
The centrality of genocide is seen in the fact that at the end of major international humanitarian 
catastrophes, the international community constituted international tribunals such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Court for Sierra Leone (ICSL), to 
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individually hold responsible those who took part in the disrespect of international human 
rights and humanitarian law. The appreciation that international human rights and international 
humanitarian law should be respected even in times of war led the international community to 
create the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. 
 
However, the notion of preventing and prosecuting genocide is plagued by a number of legal 
and political questions such as: 
 How many individuals of a certain group should have been targeted for any action to 
be defined as genocide and warrant intervention?  
 Who should declare genocide in a particular conflict, given the fact that belligerents 
have a tendency to use legal and political terms in order to win international support or 
sympathy? 
 
The foregoing questions above become glaring when applied to contemporary conflicts such 
as the Darfur crisis, wherein the international community was divided on whether to declare it 
a genocide or not. While a section of the international community did not recognize genocide 
as per the findings of the UN Secretary General Commission of Enquiry that noted that the 
Sudanese government had not pursued a policy aimed at genocide (Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General: 2005), the USA 
declared the Sudanese government’s actions to constitute genocide but took no further actions 
to ameliorate the plight of groups that were subjects of persecution (Straus; 2005: 123). 
 
The subject of human rights and genocide are therefore affected by political decisions that are 
normally applied ahead of international justice. The issue of human rights has also been 
manipulated by powerful states to justify access to weaker states for strategic and economic 
interest cloaked as military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The drive for human rights 
is also compromised by international power politics as exemplified by the international 
paralysis on the Syrian conflict. The pursuit of economic and strategic interests do cast a long 







2.6 Implications of theories on Military Intervention 
 
Two broad schools of thought have emerged on military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes, namely, Restrictionists and the Counter Restrictionists. Military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes can be defined as;   
 
reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of 
another state from the treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive 
as to exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed 
to act with reason and justice (Abiew; 1999: 31).  
 
Teson, cited in Abiew (1999: 31-32), defines military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
as the “proportionate trans-boundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments 
to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves 
would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government.” 
 
The Restrictionists School is guided by the strict observance of the classical concept of 
sovereignty which argues that whatever happens within the territorial boundaries of another 
state is not subject to review by foreign states until and unless it poses security threats to the 
outside states. From a Restrictionist perspective, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, read in 
conjunction with Article 2 (7), prohibits the use of force against any other state even for 
humanitarian purposes until such internal acts have a direct threat on international security 
(Brown; 2000: 1700). 
 
Restrictionists argue that while military intervention for humanitarian purposes, in some cases, 
is legitimate, it is prone to abuse by ambitious state leaders (Brownlie, quoted in Ramsbotham 
and Woodhouse, 1996: 64). Even Brown (2000: 2), who argues that in extreme circumstances 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes is legal without UN authorization, 
acknowledge that as it stands, military intervention for humanitarian purposes is legally vague 
and can be subject to abuse by powerful states. Chesterman argues that “humanitarian 
justifications may be used in practice to cloak less altruistic foreign policy objectives in the 




Military intervention for humanitarian purposes was supported by legal philosophers and 
practiced since the 19th century in Europe, at a time when the legality of war was narrowly 
defined and many wars of conquest and aggression took place with impunity (Chesterman; 
2001: 5). Chesterman further notes that “neither the writings of publicists nor state practice 
established any coherent meaning of this ‘right’; at best it existed as a lacuna in a period in 
which international law did not prohibit recourse to war” (2001: 5).  
 
In 1986, the British Foreign Office argued against military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes on the grounds that “the UN Charter and the corpus of modern international law do 
not seem specifically to incorporate such a right”; “state practice in the past two centuries, and 
especially since 1945, at best provides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian 
intervention, and, on most assessments, none at all;” and “on prudential grounds, that the scope 
for abusing such a right argues strongly against its creation” (Brown; 2000: 1701). 
 
Jayakumar (2012), citing the ICJ in the case of USA vs Nicaragua, argues that “the use of force 
could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure respect for human rights, that there 
is no general right of intervention in international law and, therefore, intervention violated 
international law.” Jayakumar (2012) further notes “there is a generally accepted notion that 
state practice cannot over rule treaty and customary law, both of which denounce the use of 
force except in self-defence,” hence when states like Tanzania and India intervened in Uganda 
and Bangladesh, respectively, they looked for alternative justifications for the interventions, 
with scholars branding such interventions as humanitarian.  
 
Kochler (2001) argues that since its inception, Military Intervention for humanitarian purposes 
has served the interests of intervening states more than the humanitarian needs of the subject 
state’s citizens. This has been the major reason why scholars in the Restrictionist school are 
against the concept. Chomsky, quoted in Jayakumar (2012) argues that, “For one thing, there’s 
a history of humanitarian intervention. You can look at it. And when you do, you discover that 
virtually every use of military force is described as humanitarian intervention.” 
 
Restrictionists do not deny the existence of military intervention for humanitarian purposes in 
principle but argue against it in a world where state actions are governed by realist politics such 
as the desire to secure geopolitical zones, control areas of strategic resources and markets are 
a political reality since the development of the state system. The inconsistent pattern of state 
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intervention proves this. The USA takes an active role in Latin America and the Middle East, 
Russia in the Caucasus region, while Britain and France do so in their former colonies in Africa; 
with the exception being the involvement of the USA in Somalia and Libya. This makes one 
skeptical about the morality and legitimacy of military intervention for humanitarian purposes.  
 
Counter-restrictionists, on the other hand, argue that military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes is an established practice of customary international law. They refer to the Grotian 
tradition and the argument that those who have a right to defend themselves, have a right to be 
defended (Sorabji; 2006: 20). Abiew (1999: 30) argues in support of counter-restrictionists 
when he stated that military intervention for humanitarian purposes has long co-existed with 
state sovereignty. The practice, he said, “is based on the assumption that states in their relation 
with their own nationals have the international obligation to guarantee to them certain basic or 
fundamental rights which are considered necessary for their existence, and for the maintenance 
of friendly relations among nations.” 
 
Annan, quoted in Massingham (2009: 804), famously asked, “If humanitarian intervention is, 
indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond… to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” 
Greatly influenced by the humanitarian catastrophes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, 
Annan led a crusade for the redefinition of the concept of sovereignty and also the 
legitimization and legalization of military intervention for humanitarian purposes under UN 
law. Annan (1999) argued that “intervention must be based on legitimate and universal 
principles,” and that the UN Charter restricts the use of armed forces “save in the common 
interest.” 
 
In general, Counter-restrictionists argue that the concept of military intervention to stop gross 
human rights violations is an element of customary international law. They point to the 
intervention of European states in the territories of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth 
century as example of this. However, Richards (1950: 155) argued that Britain’s intervention 
in the Ottoman Empire was really driven by the need to check Russian influence in the 
Mediterranean as an important route to the Far East. In such a case, invoking the doctrine of 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes is immoral. Vattel (1758: bk. 3, ch. 3) believed 




Counter-restrictionists argue that military intervention for humanitarian purposes to “correct” 
the wrongs of a despotic leader does not amount to trumping on the territorial sovereignty of 
that state. As derived from Social Contract principles, sovereignty is derived from the authority 
granted by the people and when a leader brutalizes his people to the point that is contrary to 
the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations that leader loses sovereign power and can be deposed 
by the people, who, in instances where they are unable to do so themselves, can be assisted 
legitimately by external sovereigns. Abiew (1999: 30) points out that sovereignty and military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes has existed together since the inception of the concepts. 
 
This argument is also derived from the constitutional theory of sovereignty which argues that 
sovereignty resides in the people who delegate state power and authority through the 
constitution (Pavlovic; 1997: 6). A leader who commits human right violations and contravenes 
the constitution loses his or her sovereign rights, privileges, and power. 
 
Counter-restrictionists argue that the UN Charter is equally concerned with the respect of 
Human Rights as it is concerned about the preservation of international peace and security 
(Bellamy and Wheeler: 2005). The Charter in its preamble notes that peace and security can be 
preserved with the respect of fundamental human rights and freedoms. According to article 
1(3) of the Charter, the UN should promote and encourage respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without any discrimination of race, sex, language, or religion. 
Contemporary supporters of military intervention for humanitarian purposes, having met with 
the stubbornness of the concept of sovereignty, argued for a redefinition of sovereignty in order 
to incorporate the concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. This is captured 
in the report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
(2001: xi), termed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), according to which state sovereignty 
implies responsibility of the leaders to protect their citizens. According to this definition, 
sovereignty refers not to power and non-interference per-se, but to state responsibility to protect 
its citizens from external and internal threats to fundamental rights. This is not a new 
intervention but the unearthing of what Social Contract theorists, such as Hobbes (1651) and 
Locke (1689), alluded to in their crafting of the theory of the state and sovereignty in general.  
 
Proponents of R2P managed to incorporate the doctrine of international human rights to the 
concept of sovereignty by redefining the Charter of the UN as a legal tool that not only sought 
to maintain international peace and security by the respect of state sovereignty but also the 
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international observance of human rights. The R2P document therefore was an incorporation 
of sovereignty as responsibility to protect the human rights of its people. Such rights should be 
regarded as fundamental and universal as the international community becomes more global. 
 
Globalization has transformed issues which were of domestic jurisdiction into issues of 
international concern, mostly because the effects of such conflict situations affect regional 
peace and security. Cases of refugees and cross border raids mushroomed in regional countries 
where civil wars or acts of gross human rights violations took place, a good example is the 
Rwanda crisis which birthed an influx of refugees in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, while the Somali crisis had political and security repercussions in the Horn of Africa.7 
 
The inter-linkages brought about by globalization and the acceptance of the concept of 
fundamental human rights with limited scope for cultural relativism has changed the way 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes should be viewed. Military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes can be, theoretically, undertaken in exceptional areas of gross human 
rights violations, although a lot of areas should be reconciled before the concept of universal 
human rights is incorporated in mainstream international law. This includes the clarification of 
the threshold of human rights abuses and defining the amount of force to be used and by whom 
it is authorized. It can therefore be concluded, as posited by Brown (2000: 1686), that “without 
clear legal standards to limit it, the practice of humanitarian intervention threatens to undermine 





The chapter discussed the major theories that have a bearing on military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes and their implications. The major findings of the chapter are that there 
is no consensus among the theories on the position of military intervention for humanitarian 
                                                          
7 While internal disturbances are regarded as internal matters that do not warrant international intervention as 
they do not amount to threats to international peace and security, recent history has shown that internal civil 
wars can amount to threats to regional stability. During the Rwandan Genocide there were massive refugee 
movements in the great lakes region which resulted in the exporting of violence and the trafficking of arms 
(Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), “A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes 
region,” March 2004, p. 51-54) and this has further destabilized a region that has since independence been 
fragile. The Somali crisis had also a destabilizing impact in the Horn of Africa. Somalia has been alleged to be a 
breeding ground for terrorism (Julie Cohn, “Terrorism havens: Somalia,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 
2010, accessed, 25 September 2013, www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somali/p9366).  
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purposes. Realists and Restrictionists view the concept of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes and its practice with suspicion while proponents of international human 
rights and counter-restrictionists accept it as a practical doctrine that should be legalized in 
order to make the world safe. Even international philosophers failed to agree on military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes with some like Grotius and Vattel accepting it while 
others like Des Las Casas arguing that it is wrong and self-defeating. There is also lack of 
consensus on the acceptable basic human rights that should be universally accepted. The 
UDHR is seen as the benchmark international instrument although there are still cynics who 
view the doctrine with suspicion.  
 
The next chapter focuses on some examples of military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
in recent decades and how they give credence to different theories and how they fit in the 
broader international law. The chapter, like theories, shows that states have remained divided 
even in the period celebrated as the golden age of intervention in contemporary times. It also 
gives background of some of the major international events that influenced international 



















This chapter will discuss and analyse major military interventions that were undertaken since 
the beginning of the ‘decade of intervention’ until the Iraq invasion that was also justified as 
humanitarian by the leaders of the coalition of the willing states. The chapter will assess the 
human rights conditions and unjust practices that preceded intervention in order to determine 
whether such crises warranted a military intervention or not. It will conclude by assessing how 
the interventions fit in the Grotian concept of military intervention and just war or whether they 
were simply driven by national interest, hence proving that the realist notion of military 
intervention is still pertinent. 
 
3.2 Historical background to military interventions for humanitarian purposes 
 
Since the 19th century, European powers have engaged in a number of military interventions, 
citing humanitarian reasons mostly in the affairs of the Turkish Empire (Cheikh; 2013: 155). 
These interventions include Greece (1826), Syria (1860), Crete (1866, 1894), Armenia (1896) 
and Macedonia (1905) (2001: 2). The interventions have been discredited for having been 
driven by national interest of the intervening states and for being selective in application (Kolb; 
2003: 121). There were, however, other cases of genuine humanitarian concerns (Kolb; 2003: 
121), which were only considered crimes when being perpetrated on the Christians. On the 
other hand, the same Christians rulers of Europe were practicing slavery and denying the full 
human rights on non-Europeans arguing that they were either not fully human or were created 
to serve European, as noted in the Social Darwinism theory. The advent of the two world wars 
resulted in the concept of military intervention for humanitarian reasons losing its prominence.  
 
Notable military interventions for humanitarian purposes were conducted by the leading 
powers in 19th century Europe of Britain, France, Prussia and Russia in the affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire. The affairs, while having been justified under military interventions were 
disputed by Kochler (2001: 3) who argued that they were motivated by national interest. 
Richards (1950:155) who concurs with Kochler noted that the interventions specifically by 
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Britain were meant to check on Russia’s influence in the Mediterranean Sea which was an 
important waterway for Britain to its colonial empire in the Far East. To give weight to his 
argument, Kochler (2001: 4) disputed the fact that European powers were intervening to save 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire because these powers were committing more heinous crimes 
in their colonies that were equal or worse than those committed by the Ottoman Turks.  
 
However, prior to these interventions, European colonial powers had also justified their 
military colonial adventures on the basis that they were either spreading Christianity or saving 
the victims of human sacrifices as was the case with the Spaniards in South America (Losada; 
1975: 9). However, De Las Casas cited in Losada (1975: 9), argued that such an intervention 
was against the natural law and trampled on the sacred respect of every human soul. 
 
Prior to the establishment of the UN it was controversial to argue that military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes was illegal given the fact that even wars of conquest were 
countenanced. The establishment of the UN as the supreme international organization of states 
and the Charter, which established the UN law outlawed all wars except in self defence, (UN 
Charter, Article 2 (4). The power to intervene in a war outside self defence against external 
aggression was only entrusted to the Security Council which could only act on crises that 
threatened international peace and security (UN Charter, Articles, 39 and 42).  
 
The concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes was not covered in the UN 
Charter thereby creating debate among international lawyers on the legality of the concept. 
Those who argue against military intervention for humanitarian purposes note that the Charter 
outlawed all wars except in self defence or the intervention of the Security Council on matters 
that threaten international peace and security. They further argue that the charter itself 
emasculated the UN when it noted that the UN shall not intervene in internal matters of its 
member states (UN Charter, Article 2 (7)). In support of this notion, Cassese (while 
commenting on NATO’s intervention in Kosovo), quoted in Allain (2004: 253) noted that, 
“From an ethical viewpoint resort to armed force was justified. Nevertheless, as a legal scholar 
I cannot avoid observing in the same breath that this moral action is contrary to current 
international law.” 
 
Those in support of military intervention for humanitarian purposes argue that military 
intervention can be justified on the basis that the UN Charter noted that the body was created 
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to defend and protect individual human rights in as much as it was established to protect 
international peace and security (see Bellamy and Wheeler: 2005), hence the security council 
has a duty to act in the internal affairs of its member states when they commit gross violations 
of human rights. As noted by Kolb (2003: 126), proponents of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes in the era of UN law argue that military “intervention is directed at 
neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of a targeted State, and thus is not 
inconsistent with Article 2(4)” of the UN Charter. 
 
The cold war period that followed the end of WW II and the establishment of the UN saw the 
two major powers fighting for influence in strategically important areas in the world. Issues of 
human rights and democracy were totally unconsidered as even the liberal democratic states 
like USA, and France that were allegedly born out of the need to recognize the rights of the 
citizens befriended and propped up the most undemocratic and brutal governments like Saddam 
Hussein of Iraq, Francois Duvalier of Haiti, and Joseph Mobutu of the former Zaire 
(Democratic Republic of Congo). The intervention hype came with the end of the cold war. It 
was thought that issues of human rights and good governance would take precedence ahead of 
the national interests of major powers mostly the USA that had emerged then as the sole 
superpower. It was from this euphoria that the 1990s saw major interventions which were 
mostly led by USA. 
 
3.3 Iraq (1991 and 2003) 
 
In the post cold war era, the Iraq case of 1991 can be viewed as a case that set a precedence for 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The treatment of the Kurdish minorities in 
different countries in the Middle East has been a case that did not attract much international 
attention until soon after the defeat of the Iraq forces by an international coalition force of the 
UN. The international intervention in Iraq of 1991 can therefore be traced back to the Iraq 
invasion of Kuwait.  
 
The defeat of the Iraq forces by an international coalition force encouraged the uprising of the 
minority groups who had suffered at the hands of Saddam Hussein (Malanczuk; 1991: 114). 
The uprisings took place in the Southern provinces which are predominantly Shia, and the 
Northern Kurdish provinces. The uprisings were influenced by the speculation that most of the 
Iraq military machinery and personnel would be destroyed by the war against the coalition 
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forces. The Bush (Snr) government in the USA also encouraged the Kurds to rise (Malanczuk; 
1991: 117).  
 
The Kurds therefore rose up anticipating American support (Seybolt; 2008: 49) although this 
was not the case. On one hand, the USA government shied away from supporting the Kurdish 
uprising, either for fear of the financial and human costs or an international uproar against 
intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. On the other hand, the Iraq army survived 
to defend the regime and by the end of March 1991 the army had managed to quell the 
rebellions. 
 
The suppression of the uprisings was followed by a great number of refugees that spread from 
Iraq to the neighbouring countries specifically Turkey and Iran. There were a lot of internally 
displaced persons among the Kurds who took refuge in the mountains as they feared a backlash 
and reprisals from the Iraq forces. One Kurdish leader, Barzani, put the number at 3 million 
Kurds (Malanczuk; 1991: 118). 
 
While in the beginning there was a dragging of feet by world leaders to have a UN or a coalition 
intervention in Iraq to protect the Kurds, pressure from Turkey, France and Iran who sent letters 
in support of the Iraqi Kurds to the UN Security Council, led the Council to adopt UNSC 
Resolution 688 on 5 April 1991 (Malanczuk; 1991: 119). The notion propounded by scholars 
like Gallant (1992: 904) that attribute Resolution 688 as a precedence of Security Council 
authorized military intervention for humanitarian purposes can be contested. Wheeler (2000: 
142-145) notes that on its adoption, Resolution 688 was supported more by the fact that the 
situation in Iraq was posing a threat to regional stability in the Middle East, hence a threat to 
international peace and security.  
 
The resolution was passed by 10 votes in favour, 3 votes against and 2 abstained. States which 
were against the resolution were Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe which argued that a 
humanitarian crisis in Iraq was outside the jurisdiction of the UNSC and Security Council 
intervention and would violate article 2(7) of the UN Charter (Wheeler; 2000: 143-144). States 
that voted in favour of the resolution did not base their vote on humanitarian grounds. They 
argued that the crisis in Iraq, which of a humanitarian nature was threatening regional peace 




The wording of the resolution was crafted in such a manner that it legalized the intervention 
based on the need to protect international peace and security. However, the resolution also 
noted and condemned the repression by the Iraq government of its civilian population 
(S/RES/0688, 1991). 
 
One can also argue that the tabling of the crisis in the Security Council by Turkey and Iran was 
driven not by humanitarian motives but on the need to maintain stability in their states. These 
states, unlike France which is a continent away from the Middle East, share borders with Iraq 
and have large Kurdish minorities. These states feared that the influx of Kurdish refugees from 
Iraq had the potential to politicize their Kurdish populations and lea to instability in their 
borders (Leezenberg; 2000: 3).  
 
The intervention therefore will fall outside the parameters of the just war paradigm as 
propounded by just war theorists like Grotius and Vattel. As they note, there should be no self 
gaining interest. However, the intervention in international law can be argued to have been 
legal as the internal crisis in Iraq had the potential of sparking a regional Kurdish uprising that 
could have destabilized mostly Iraq, Iran and Turkey. 
 
While there was a general unwillingness among the powerful states to intervene even after the 
adoption of Resolution 688 (Seybolt; 2008: 49), the media effect pushed USA, British and 
French leaders to establish a ‘Safe Haven’ for the Kurds. The safe havens were meant to give 
assurance to the displaced Kurds that they could return to the protected areas which had been 
demilitarized from the Iraqi forces. Temporary camps that would serve as a transitional zone 
to their homes were created for the Kurds who had escaped to the mountains. 
 
Humanitarian relief was brought to the safe havens. The Kurds and aid donated to them in the 
safe havens were protected by the military personnel of USA, Britain, France and a small 
Belgian contingent. Humanitarian aid was protected by military personnel, which amounted to 
a threat of force. It was this threat of force and the military presence in Iraq that sparked legal 
and legitimacy questions. The intervening powers argued that resolution 688, whilst it had no 
explicit military deployment clause; could be interpreted as allowing for a military presence as 
it calls for states to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches the Kurds (Bartram; 2000: 1705). The 
Resolution also insisted that Iraq should allow for humanitarian personnel to operate in Iraq 
without disturbance. It can therefore be argued that the Resolution had already used strong 
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language and demands that only legitimized and legalized the operation of foreign forces not 
based on humanitarian reasons per se, but to provide humanitarian relief as a means to stabilize 
the region. 
 
One can therefore conclude that the Iraq case of 1991-3 hinged between a humanitarian case 
and a UN Chapter 7 case. The countries that asked the Security Council to come up with a 
resolution on Iraq were driven by different motives. France was driven by moral motives for 
the Kurds, while Turkey and Iran petitioned the UNSC as they feared a Kurdish backlash in 
their own countries.  
 
The reaction of the UN itself was based more on the need for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. However, it was the second time for the UN to specifically call upon a 
member state to respect human rights after it had done so to apartheid South Africa (Schrijver; 
2006: 17). The use of military personnel for humanitarian ends in Iraq set a precedence which 
was applied in Somalia. The case also set a precedence for the discussion of internal affairs of 
member states in the UNSC. 
 
While it has been noted that the first Iraq intervention opened the decade of intervention in the 
post Cold War era, the 2003 invasion of Iraq by a coalition of the willing led by USA was a 
destroyer to the intervention doctrine. The intervention was initially based on the claimed need 
by USA and Britain to rid Iraq of alleged weapons of mass destruction, yet the failure to find 
such weapons led the coalition leaders to justify the war on humanitarian grounds (Blair; 2010: 
382).  
 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 made Saddam Hussein a foe of USA and other European 
countries like Britain. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons during the Iraq – Iran war and 
against the Kurds in 1988 while it is alleged that he got the chemical weapon technology from 
USA. It was this fact that gave the USA a pretext to argue on the international front. 
 
The failure to secure the alleged weapons of mass destruction led the coalition leaders to argue 
that the invasion was not in vain as it had rid the world of a dictator who not only threatened 
the Iraq citizens but also the international community through the possession of weapons of 




The war in Iraq of 2003 can be discredited by two arguments from the philosophical perspective 
of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. Firstly, from the Grotian perspective, the 
leader of the subject state must be in the process of committing mass atrocities that warrants 
such an intervention. The Saddam regime reportedly had little respect for human rights of its 
citizens, although there is no evidence that the regime was committing mass atrocities and 
genocide that warranted an intervention as enunciated by Walzer (1977). The reason why the 
coalition sought to firstly justify their intervention on the case of weapons of mass destruction 
and not military intervention for humanitarian purposes proves the fact that there was not a 
strong enough case to push for such a kind of intervention. 
 
Secondly, according to scholars like des las Casas, every life is sacred and no life can be 
sacrificed for the protection of the other. The use of such massive force in Iraq including around 
150, 000 ground troops (Roth: 2004) and indiscriminate weapons that claimed the lives of an 
estimated 600 000 civilian lives according to Burnham et.al (2006: 1) while British 
Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) (2011) put the civilian deaths at a lesser but significant figure 
of between 97, 461 and 106, 348, discredited the mission as humanitarian and proved that there 
were other underlying motivations for the war.  
 
I argue elsewhere that the USA led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was driven by the need to stifle 
Iraq’s plans for a change in the international petro currency (Simura; 2011: 42). Iran was 
mooting a similar plan which had tremendous effects that had the potential to shake the 
foundation of the American economy (Simura; 2011: 19). The petro-dollar system became an 
effective substitute of the Bretton Woods system since 1973 after the collapse of the latter.  
 
Saddam Hussein had also fallen out of the USA alliance in the Middle East and was viewed as 
a threat to Israel as evidenced by the fact that when the USA intervened in Somalia where it 
claimed no national interest it pulled out immediately after losing eighteen rangers while it 
soldiered on in Iraq for eight years even though it had lost four thousand, four hundred and 
eighty seven soldiers (BBC: 2011). The US led invasion of Iraq could be explained more within 
the context of the Realist writings and from the works of Thucydides than from a moral or 
international human rights perspective. 
 
The war was therefore driven by national interest rather than humanitarian concerns as was 
declared after the failure to secure the alleged weapons of mass destruction. Roth (2004) 
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concluded that, “The result is that at a time of renewed interest in humanitarian intervention, 
the Iraq war and the effort to justify it even in part in humanitarian terms risk giving 
humanitarian intervention a bad name. If that breeds cynicism about the use of military force 
for humanitarian purposes, it could be devastating for people in need of future rescue.” 
 
In sum, the justification of the invasion of Iraq of 2003 on humanitarian grounds was a 
desperate bid by the coalition leaders to placate the international community and electorate at 
home who were yawning for answers after the claim of the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ 
failed to materialize. This claim can be validated by the fact that a military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes is declared so on entry citing the reasons on the ground. It cannot be 
justified as an afterthought at the middle or the end of the war. Roth (2004) notes that, “Over 
time, the principal justifications originally given for the Iraq war lost much of their force. 
…weapons of mass destruction have not been found. No significant pre-war link between 
Saddam Hussein and international terrorism has been discovered.” The claim is finally 
discredited by the fact that after the war, Iraq is more dangerous for civilians than during the 
time of Saddam Hussein. 
 
3.4 Somalia (1992) 
 
The end of the cold war led to a considerable shift in the foreign policies of both the USA and 
Russia. The latter took a more self introspective policy that saw it cutting back on its fight for 
spheres of influence with USA which did not lose its interest in the Middle East. However, its 
decision to support mostly liberal governments saw Siad Barre losing out on the military and 
financial assistance he had benefitted from the USA to prop up his military heavy handed 
government. This loss of military support led to the crumbling of his military regime and 
Somalia degenerated into a chaotic state. 
 
War lord-ism took over Somalia. All the warring factions that had been united by their dislike 
of Barre’s rule found themselves without a unifying ‘enemy’ but separated by the struggle for 
power. The leading figures in the power struggle were General Aidid and Ali Mahdi. By the 
end of 1991 war between Mahdi and Aidid’s militia units, and the drought that had swept across 
the country resulted in devastating famine which claimed 300 000 lives, internally displaced 




International humanitarian efforts by private Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 
the International Confederation of Red Cross (ICRC) faced the stiff challenge of banditry by 
the warring factions who stole the aid (Philipp, 2005, 524). The United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM I) was subsequently established in order to facilitate supply of aid and 
create a sustainable peace. Despite the formation of UNOSOM I, banditry continued unabated 
thereby leading to the birth of UNSC Resolution 794 which authorized the establishment of the 
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and ‘Operation Restore Hope’. The UN neither organized nor 
commanded UNITAF as operational command fell to the USA which had the largest contingent 
(Philipp, 2005, 534). 
 
The intervention had little controversy as there were sincere humanitarian concerns. 
Intervention in Iraq had already set a precedent for intervention in internal affairs to salvage 
suffering masses. In Somalia, the absence of a recognized central government with effective 
control of the state created a vacuum on the custodian of the sovereign power of the state 
rendering it an international case. Intervention did not trample on state sovereignty because 
Somalia was already a collapsed state which did not have the cardinal principles of statehood 
as mentioned in the Montevideo convention on rights and duties of states. The convention noted 
that a state must have; “a ) a permanent population; b ) a defined territory; c ) government; and 
d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states” (Montevideo Convention on the Rights 
and Duties of States, Article 1). The absence of a government meant that Somalia had no 
capacity to form relations with other states. 
 
The withdrawal of the USA after the death of its eighteen rangers when Pakistan had lost twenty 
five soldiers in Somalia to Aidid’s militia as evident enough that major powers are still driven 
more by the electoral community and other pockets of power at home than by saving those in 
need. This is even compounded by the fact that the USA was reluctant to intervene in the first 
instance and only accepted to lead UNITAF after the administration had been pushed by the 
effect of the international media that beamed pictures of starving mothers and children from 
Somalia in need of humanitarian assistance (Baum; 2004: 204). 
 
3.5 Kosovo (1999) 
 
The crisis in Kosovo took Europe by surprise because since the German holocaust, it had not 
been envisaged that any crisis that would be equated to genocide would occur in Europe. The 
53 
 
crisis resonated in the spheres of self determination, civil war and gross violation of human 
rights by state authorities. The international legal system was strained on the question of 
intervention and non-intervention. 
 
Serbian militias and the government committed atrocities and crimes that could amount to war 
crimes and gross violation of human rights against Kosovar Albanians and other minorities. 
The hostilities had begun in early 1998 and by August 1998, Serbian militias had undertaken 
various repressive actions that had displaced two hundred thousand Kosovars. In January 1999, 
Serbian forces killed forty five Kosovars among the civilian populations in what is famously 
known as the Racak Massacre (Betti; 2010: 5). 
 
European states, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN made attempts to 
have a peaceful solution to the crisis. The UN appointed Richard Holbrooke as a Special envoy 
to the Balkans to broker a peace deal while the UNSC came up with two resolutions (Resolution 
1199 and 1203) that condemned the human rights violations and atrocities as a threat to 
international peace and security. It called on the Federal Yugoslav Government of Slobodan 
Milosevic to cease the hostilities. 
 
The failure by the parties involved to cease the hostilities specifically the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) government, opened the door for a NATO military intervention in Kosovo. 
The intervention which was code named, ‘Operation Allied Force’ raised many questions 
pertaining to its legality, legitimacy and efficacy owing to the fact that NATO was neither with 
nor sought a UNSC mandate to legalize its military operations in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state. 
 
In defence of a NATO intervention in Kosovo, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
cited by Roberts (1999: 106) argued that UNSC authorization of the threat or use of force for 
humanitarian purposes in Bosnia and Somalia had offered precedence for the use of force to 
stop the perpetration of gross human rights violations by those with or in power. The Office 
further argued that, “The UK’s view is therefore that, as matters now stand and if action through 
the Security Council is not possible, military intervention by NATO is lawful on grounds of 




Different NATO states and NATO as a body defended their action on a basket of reasons that 
included the international duty to protect civilians who should be able to defend themselves 
but were lacking in capacity and the duty to protect international peace and security which was 
being threatened by refugee influx in the region posing a threat of escalating and exporting the 
war (Roberts; 1999: 107). In defence of the NATO actions without an explicit UNSC mandate, 
Slovenia argued that the Security Council does not have a monopoly on decision making 
regarding the use of force it has “the primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining 
peace and security” (Roberts; 1999: 105).  
 
In other words, Slovenia argued that any other country or group of countries had a right to act 
to protect international peace and security as well as stop gross human rights violations if the 
UNSC had failed to act. The danger with this argument is that it opens the door for adventurous 
and vigilante leaders of any powerful state to put the international law in the armpits of their 
militaries, hence destroying the confidence which (smaller) states had developed through the 
UN system of international relations (Brown; 2000: 1686). 
 
Slovenia’s contention was countered by the UN Secretary General’s response that all actions 
that had to do with the use of force should involve the Security Council because it has the duty 
to protect international peace and security (Ronzitti; 1999: 46). Even the argument that 
preceding Security Council resolutions, specifically Resolution 1199 which noted that in the 
case of the breaches of peace agreement, the Security Council “would consider further action 
and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region,” did not give 
an implicit mandate to NATO to use force. 
 
One can argue further that the reason why NATO did not attempt to seek a Security Council 
mandate through a resolution was because it was not going to granted on the basis that Russia 
had already declared that it would not support any resolution that allowed the use of force 
(Wheeler; 2000: 261). True to its word, Russia brought forward a resolution which was co-
sponsored by Belarus and India which called for the immediate cessation of all hostilities and 
the resumption of talks. The defeat of the resolution by a margin of 3 votes for and 12 against 
did not inturn authorize the NATO mission in Kosovo. Ronzitti (1999: 49) argues that, “It is 
unreasonable to say that failure to pass a prohibitive deliberation is equivalent to an 
authorization, on the principle that that which is not expressly prohibited is allowed.” Therefore 
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as noted by Simma (1999: 1), the intervention in Kosovo, while having a moral defence, 
breached the UN Charter. 
 
The actions of regional organizations on matters of peace and war are allowed but according 
to the Charter, regional organizations cannot act independently of the Security Council. They 
should either be granted proper authorization or they are delegated upon which they will be 
answerable to the Security Council (UN Charter, Article 53). It is only in self defence or against 
those states that were considered enemy states at the formation of the UN that regional 
organizations could use force without Security Council authorization specifically for self 
defence against aggression.  
 
Therefore, the use of force against FRY by NATO was illegal if measured against UN law. 
However, other scholars like Simma (1999: 1) have argued that even though the intervention 
was illegal, it was a legitimate moral act which saved human lives at a time when the Security 
Council was paralyzed by the veto power. This was also the sentiments of the Kosovo 
Commission which noted that intervention in Kosovo by NATO was illegal but legitimate (The 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo; 2000: 4). If measured against the writing 
of international law philosophers like Grotius, Vattel and Vitoria the military intervention 
would be seen as legitimate in as much as it sought to save civilians from the excesses of their 
leaders but falls short of the theorists’ rules because the use of force resulted in the deaths of 
more civilians from those who sought to defend them and also because the authority of NATO 
on the matter cannot be seen as a right and legal authority in the place of the UN.  
 
According to De Las Casas, the intervention in Kosovo would not be judged as a moral act. 
NATO bombings resulted in an estimated death of about 500 civilians (Koskenniemi; 2002: 
161). According to De Las Casas, every human life is important and cannot be sacrificed for 
the other (Sorabji; 2006: 20). Hence, the killing of an estimated 500 civilians whom NATO 
was on a mission to protect negated the results of the mission.  
 
Scholars like Nicholas J. Wheeler have come up with reasons, outside the humanitarian cloak, 
that could have influenced NATO to militarily intervene in Kosovo. According to Wheeler 
(2001), “Clinton’s guilt over the US failure to act in Rwanda was perhaps a factor in leading 
the President to launch ‘Operation Allied Force’ to rescue the Kosovars. Wheeler (2001: 126) 
goes on to argue that, “The President went to war over Kosovo and not Rwanda because 
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important security interests were perceived to be at stake, including the credibility of the 
alliance, and the use of air power promised a quick result with little risk to NATO air-crews.” 
 
Kurth (2005: 100) also argues that, “As for the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions, the Clinton 
administration saw them as logical extensions of America’s traditional interest in European 
stability, with the sphere of responsibility of the NATO alliance now being expanded from 
Western Europe into Eastern Europe.”  
 
In extension, one can then argue that this encroachment into what has been historically a 
Russian sphere of influence was the reason why Russia rejected the use of force and called for 
the withdrawal of NATO forces. In both cases, while there were genuine humanitarian 





This chapter discussed some of the military interventions that were undertaken in the 1990s. 
Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo were specifically chosen as they were declared to be cases that did 
not have implications on international peace and security but were also justified in 
humanitarian terms. In the case of Iraq, even after the passage of UNSC Resolution 688 based 
more on the issue of regional security, France which was among the first states to call for the 
intervention had used humanitarian reasons to justify the intervention it had called for. Kosovo 
was also justified as such,8 so was Somalia.  
 
These interventions came at the dusk of the Cold War and there was an international euphoria 
for the observance of human rights and for the United Nations and the USA in particular to act 
in pushing states that were seen as rogue to transform into human rights respecting states. The 
interventions had impacts on other crises that followed like the failure to intervene in Rwanda 
                                                          
8 The British foreign and commonwealth office argued that the failure of the Security Council to act in a 
situation of gross violations of human rights made it imperative for NATO to take action (British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, quoted in Roberts, 1999, 106). In announcing the commencement of NATO actions in 
Serbia, the NATO Secretary General said that, “We must stop the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian 
catastrophe now taking place in Kosovo. We have a moral duty to do so” (quoted in Koskenniemi, 2002, 161). 
All these statements were made in a bid to justify the intervention from a humanitarian perspective. 
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and Darfur. They also ushered in an era in which the UNSC passed resolutions that targeted 
specifically matters of internal interests and NATO also took up the role of acting as a military 
machine on crises that did not threaten the security of its member states but seen as 
humanitarian issues. 
 
The selected cases had legitimate humanitarian concerns but also fell short on some areas to be 
classified as legal military interventions for humanitarian purposes. The failure specifically 
rests on the argument that the doctrine of military intervention for humanitarian purposes has 
not been fully developed either by customary or treaty law to be incorporated as legal under 
the current UN law. Even in the 19th Century when it was practiced, it was heavily contested, 
while the theorists who wrote on military intervention for humanitarian purposes did not agree 
on the legality of the concept, with philosophers like Grotius and Vattel accepting it while 
others like Bartolome De Las Casas denounced it. However, while the interventions of the 
1990s could not create a legal precedence, they affected the way in which military intervention 
for humanitarian purposes was to be dealt with in the 21st Century. 
 
It is from this precedence that UNSC passed resolution 1973 that legalized intervention in 
Libya based on the new doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The precedence also 
meant that NATO had a platform to build from in its intervention in Libya. The ‘No-Fly Zone’ 
concept of the Iraq intervention and the NATO air strikes were combined in a manner that saw 
the restriction and finally the defeat of Gaddafi’s forces. 
 
The following chapter will discuss the nature of the Arab Spring in particular how the crises 
unfolded in Libya and Syria in order to create a base of analyzing the role and nature of 









Chapter three examined cases of military intervention for humanitarian purposes from 1990 to 
2010 specifically the cases of Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo. The cases were examined due to the 
attention they attracted and how they impacted on other cases of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes. This chapter analyzes the Arab Spring specifically with regard to Libya 
and Syria. The analysis of each case will be preceded by a brief historical background in order 
to contextualize the uprisings and rebellions. The analysis is also meant to bring to light events 
that called for military intervention for humanitarian purposes in Libya and Syria. 
 
During the 2011 Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in 2011 and spread across North Africa 
and the Middle East, the heads of state in Tunisia and Egypt were removed from power during 
the civil unrest that saw limited participation of the army in trying to stop the uprisings, and 
hence minimum casualties both in terms of the military and civilians (Barany, 2011, 31-32). In 
Yemen, the Head of State, Saleh, negotiated an exit strategy that saw him depart without 
prosecution.9 
 
The Libya and Syria crises had a great impact on the international community as they raised 
the question of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The international response 
showed that the world remains polarized as it also brought about questions on the smooth 
functioning of the UNSC and the objective applicability of international law, specifically with 
regard to military intervention for humanitarian purposes. As pointed out, in order to 
understand the context in which these debates were played out, an overview of historical 
developments to 2011 is provided. 
                                                          
9 On the 23rd of April the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) presented an exit deal to Saleh which he signed on 
the 23rd of November 2011. See “Yemenis Oust Saleh Regime (Yemen Revolution), 2011-2012, 
www.nvdatabase.swrthmore.edu/content/yemenis-oust-saleh-regime-yemen-revolution-2011-2012 . The deal 
which was a Schumpeterian deal as it was not supported by the public in Yemen was also supported by the 
USA. It granted Saleh immunity from prosecution if he relinquished power. After stepping down he went to the 
USA for treatment. This was against the fact that the USA had adopted a hands free approach on other Arab 
states who had gone through the Arab spring in which the former Tunisian president was tried in absentia, and 
Mubarak was tried in Egypt while Gaddafi was indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) before he 
died for their roles in the deaths of demonstrators during the uprisings. Granting Saleh immunity was an act of 
double standards for the GCC and the USA. 
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4.2 The Arab spring 
 
Prior to the revolutions in Tunisia in 2010, democracy was a little known concept in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Western powers, in particular the USA, UK, and France, were complicit 
with the military and monarchical governments that gave them favourable oil concessions 
(Zurayk, 2011, 119) and were seen as preferable to ‘Islamist’ or unstable governments that 
would threaten their position in the Middle East. In the case of Egypt, successive US 
governments favoured the government of Hosni Mubarak, who came to power in October 1981, 
because it supported US Middle East policy in relation to the Arab-Israeli issue. Hence, while 
USA and European governments ‘coerced’ sub-Saharan African leaders to be democratic in 
order to receive aid, North African and Arab leaders such as Mubarak received aid without any 
democratic conditionalities. 
 
Economic meltdown, rising poverty, unemployment, the need for greater and meaningful 
political freedom and the impact of social media networks have been cited as some of the 
drivers of the Arab Spring (Beck and Huse, 2012, 7). Advocates of the social networks systems 
argue that dissent and the need for change had long been there in the region; however, it was 
the advent of social networking systems that allowed people to mobilize in a way that was not 
controllable by the governments (Howard and Hussain, 2011, 36-37). These explanations are 
not sufficient to shed light on the multiple causes of the uprisings in the Middle East and North 
African region, commonly known as the MENA region. As Haddad (2012, 113) argues, 
 
there have been early attempts to frame (the uprisings) with generic economic 
arguments about poverty … and destitution, with regional comparisons to the 
case of Syria … Equally, narrow arguments about the uprisings being a reaction 
to decades of authoritarian rule do not help us to understand why they are 
occurring now. Finally, the prevalent of the “social media revolution” narratives 
merely obscures the important issues at play. 
 
A plethora of drivers, spanning many years, can be seen as the seeds that geminated into the 
uprisings. Quasi-liberal economic reforms that were brought about in the MENA region at the 
end of the 1990s saw the rise of a capitalist elite class that was either related or connected to 
the ruling elites (Smith and Taylor, 2011, 1). The growth of the Gross Domestic Products 
(GDPs) of these states did not trickledown to the grassroots, thereby, leading to widespread 
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discontent. The problem was compounded by high birth rates and low infant mortality that 
resulted in a high population segment of the youths that was being channeled into the labour 
market where they could not be absorbed (Beck and Huse, 2012, 6). This created a fertile 
ground for an uprising which, when coupled with authoritarian exclusionary political systems, 
it created a pressure cooker scenario that only needed a spark for the uprisings. 
 
In Syria, the socioeconomic changes instituted by Bashar al Assad shifted from primarily 
focusing on agriculture and the rural areas and concentrated on urban industrial development 
(Haddad, 2012, 120). This is supported by Phillips (undated) who argues that Assad’s 
“economic reforms alienated the Sunni Arab workers and peasantry”, and while the Syrian 
GDP grew, the subsidies to the poor “were cut and public sector employment decreased.” 
 
However, the argument of the role of economic pressure cannot be applied homogeneously 
because although there was a global financial crisis in 2008 and high rate of unemployment, 
other states affected by the uprisings had relatively stable economies. For example, Egypt had 
a growth rate above 5 percent in 2010 (Zikibayeva, 2011, 2) while Libya was ranked among 
those states with the highest standards of living of its citizens in Africa (Global civilians for 
Peace in Libya, 2011; The Sunday Mail, 23 October 2011). 
 
The need for political reforms had been a major thorn for MENA leaders as the majority of the 
civilian population had for long agitated for democratic governance. This is explained by the 
rise of religious-political organizations in most of the countries in the Arab world like the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria10 which called for political reforms 
long before the Arab Spring. 
 
                                                          
10The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the oldest opposition groups to the long autocratic and dictatorships in the 
Middle East and North Africa. It is not a single political union in all the countries it is found. It differs from state 
to state and has employed different tactics in its opposition to the entrenched rule. As an organization it has 
stood for the upholding of Islam as the official state religion in mostly Egypt and Syria. This agitation has seen 
coming into conflict with the governments hence in most of these states it was banned and existed as an 
underground organization. The states to note were Egypt, where the organization has taken over power after the 
end of the revolution that ousted Hosni Mubarak, and Syria where its leaders are now dominating the opposition 




In most MENA countries there were a number of political prisoners who had been incarcerated 
for calling for democratic reforms and governance and many more were in exile.11 Egypt was 
a military dictatorship that survived more on U.S. patronage than on the support of Egyptians. 
Egypt, in fact, received military aid that was second only to that of Israel in the region without 
questions asked as to whether that aid was used to forestall civilian rights through military and 
other security services repression of the civilians (The Telegraph, 29 June 2011). 
 
In Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was a soldier who came into power through a coup and 
his dictatorship was not challenged, while in Tunisia the leaders had strong alliances with the 
army and business elites. Although no uprising took place for many years, there was much 
unhappiness and all that was needed was a spark and the courage to rise, which was brought 
first in Tunisia by Boaziz12. The masses in other countries took inspiration from these events 
and unrest moved from North Africa to the Middle East (Zikibayeva, 2011, 1). 
 
4.3 Libya – historical overview 
 
Libya was under Muammar Gaddafi’s rule who came into power in 1969 when a group of 
military officers led a bloodless coup against King Idris who had ruled the country when Libya 
achieved independence from the British on 24 December 1951. The king who was an ally of 
Western countries and had little support from his neighbouring Arab states granted the US and 
the UK airbases in Libya and allowed the French to use Libya as a transit route to counter the 
Algerian movements that were fighting for independence from French colonial rule (World 
Model United Nations, 2013, 7-8). 
 
During the Six Day war in June 1976 between Israel and the Arab states, King Idris failed to 
fulfill his pledge to support the Egyptians leading to discontent among Libyans who held 
demonstrations and attacked Jews in Libya, killing eighteen and injuring others, after the defeat 
                                                          
11 This situation was rampant in Libya where Gaddafi even employed agents to murder Libyan refugees to come 
home (Model United Nations, 2013), while in Syria, the political prisoners who were released during the 
Damascus spring were 600. At the unceremonial closure of the Damascus spring more political activists and 
intellectuals were imprisoned. Another factor to note is that a considerable leadership of the uprisings in the 
Arab Spring, Specifically the TNC and SNC were in exile. 
12 Mohamed Boaziz, a youth and street vendor from the city of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia committed protest-suicide 
after having been subjected to maltreatment by police officers who also confiscated his vending cart and failed 
to get a redress from the city police officials after he approached them with his case on 17 December 2010. His 
self-immolation became a spark of the Tunisian revolution as youth initially protested against police excesses 
and later turned into a national revolution against the state. 
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of the Arab states (www.sixdaywar.co.uk/jews_in_Arab_countries_intro.htm). In a context of 
rising Pan – Arabism and the rise of the Nasserite doctrine13, the failure by King Idris to support 
the Arab cause in Palestine was seen as a betrayal of Arabs, both in Libya and the wide Middle 
East.  
 
Internal discontent rose against King Idris because of alleged corruption and mismanagement 
of oil funds to the extent that with oil reserves which were discovered in 1959, the monarch 
relied on assistance from the US while oil concessions were largely given to British and US 
companies. Revenue from oil benefited the elite and little benefit trickled down to the general 
citizens (International Debates, 2011, 6). King Idris’s pro-Western foreign policy and 
corruption created discontent among Libyans. This was fuelled by the growing Arab 
nationalism and Nasserism in the Middle East and North African region. By 1969 there were 
several groups considering overthrowing the king, including those led by army chief Abdul 
Aziz and former Prime Minister Abdul Bakoush (World Model United Nations, 2013, 8).  
 
In 1969, Gaddafi led the Free Officers’ Movement, a group of young officers in the army, to 
occupy and take control of important installations like military stations, radio stations and 
police stations in the urban centres of Tripoli, Benghazi and Bayda (World Model United 
Nations, 2013, 9). On 1 September 1969, Gaddafi declared the end of king Idris’ reign and 
immediately gained recognition from most Arab states to the ewe of most western states who 
neither recognized him nor intervene to save King Idris. 
 
Soon after assuming power, Gaddafi moved to implement reforms internally and externally. 
He applied an anti-western foreign policy and within two months advised the US and the British 
that their military bases and forces had to be evacuated by the spring of 1970 (International 
Debates, 2011, 6). He also expelled the Italians and nationalized the lands that had been in their 
hands (International Debates, 2011, 6). In the 1970s, Gaddafi instituted a policy of achieving 
more control of oil companies and the nationalization of others like British Petroleum and US 
major, Bunker Hunt (Libya Oil Almanac, 2012, 15-16).  
 
                                                          
13 The Nasserite doctrine refers to the Pan Arabism socialist policies that were espoused by the 2nd Egyptian 
president, Gamal Abdul Nasser. The doctrine was centred on the rejection of western, erstwhile colonial 
masters’ influence in Egyptian and Arabian affairs. It also sought to unite the Arabs in the region, as was proven 
by the establishment of the short-lived United Arab Republic which united Egypt with Syria. it was also a 
doctrine that was against Zionism and the establishment of Israel in the Middle East 
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Gaddafi also courted controversy because of his support for revolutionary independence 
movements in Africa and extremist groups internationally. He is alleged to have been behind 
the killing of Israeli Olympic team members at the Munich Olympic games in 1972 (World 
Model United Nations, 2013, 14). Other organizations that allegedly received his support 
included Palestinians movements, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the African National 
Congress (ANC) of South Africa. By the mid-1980s, Israeli sources estimated that Gaddafi 
supported roughly fifty “terrorist” organizations and around forty “radical” governments 
(World Model United Nations, 2013, 15).This claim is ambiguous because the definition of a 
terrorist and a radical are subjective. A case in point is that for a long time the US had South 
African independence leader Nelson Mandela on its list of terrorists.14Gaddafi is also credited 
for supporting the former Liberian leader, Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leonean rebel leader, 
Foday Sankoh (De Waal, 2013, 366). 
 
The waterloo of Gaddafi’s support for terrorist activities was reached on the bombing of the 
Pan American plane in Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. The American and British governments 
demanded that the Libyan government should turn over the two Libyan nationals who were 
suspected of having orchestrated the bombing. The Libyan government refused and the case 
drove the American and British governments to push for UN sanctions against Libya. The 
Security Council passed Resolution 748 which took effect on 15 April 1992 and banned air 
travel and arms sales to Libya until that country surrendered the two alleged suspects (UNSC 
Resolution 748, 1992, Articles 4 and 5).  In 1993, with the coming of the Clinton presidency 
in the USA, the USA government pushed for the adoption of Security Council Resolution 883 
which froze Libyan assets overseas and banned trade in oil equipment (UNSC Resolution 883, 
Articles 3 to 5).  
 
Due to the effects of sanctions, and also partly because of the collapse of communism in Russia, 
whom Libya had considered its ally in international relations, Libya decided to re-align its 
policies with the western powers. In April 1999, the two Lockerbie bombing suspects were 
surrendered to Scotland. This act improved relations with European and American 
governments. Within three months, Britain re-established diplomatic relations with Libya. 
However, the act did not appease the USA to lift the sanctions (Schwartz, 2007, 566-568). In 
                                                          
14 Mandela was on the USA terrorists list since his days in prison and was only removed from the list in 2008, 




the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the USA, Libya condemned the attack 
and sympathized with the USA (Schwartz, 2007, 568). Libya also cooperated with the USA 
against Al-Qaeda since the terror attacks (Schwartz, 2007, 580). 
 
In December 2003, Libya acknowledged that it had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) 
and had also been developing missiles technology (International Debates, 2011, 7). The former 
Libyan leader stated that the missile development plan would be stopped and the WMDs 
dismantled (International Debates, 2011, 7). It may be argued that the move was inspired by 
the USA led coalition of the willing’s invasion of Iraq and the subsequent fall of Saddam 
Hussein. The move was therefore meant to reduce tension with the USA and its NATO allies 
and be removed from the states targeted by the USA in its international war on terror campaign. 
 
In Africa, while Gaddafi was a central figure in Africa Union affairs, his involvement in the 
internal politics of other states brought him enemies and friends alike. In 1972 and 1979 he 
assisted Idi Amin, former president of Uganda, to suppress the rebellion that was taking place 
in Uganda (Museveni, 2011, 22). Museveni (2011, 23) says that;  
 
The third mistake has been the tendency by Gaddafi to interfere in the internal 
affairs of many African countries using the little money Libya has compared to 
those countries. One blatant example was his involvement with cultural leaders 
of black Africa – kings, chiefs, etc. since the political leaders of Africa had 
refused to back his project of an African government, Gaddafi, incredibly, 
thought that he could bypass them and work with these kings to implement his 
wishes. 
 
Museveni’s comments on Uganda may be clouted with personal issues as he was among those 
who fought Idi Amin, but his claims with regards Gaddafi’s interference with internal African 
leadership are backed by De Waal (2013, 367) who points out that, “In line with his insistence 
that he was not a ‘head of state’ but rather the representative of the people, Gaddafi latterly 
began circumventing Africa’s official leaders and aspiring to lead the continent through chiefs 
and monarchs, taking for himself the title ‘King of Kings’.” 
 
He is also alleged to have called for the breakup of Nigeria into separate independent states as 
a solution to solve the clashes between the Muslims, predominantly in the north and Christians, 
65 
 
predominantly in the south (BBC News, 29 March 2010; De Waal, 2013, 366). The foregoing 
statements, which he uttered on Nigerian soil, was viewed as intervening in the internal affairs 
and calling for an act which any sovereign state would not countenance. It should therefore 
come as no surprise that while the African Union as a body stuck with its rules on not 
recognizing the TNC during the war days, a number of African states including Nigeria had 
already granted the body recognition. 
 
The 2011 Uprisings 
 
The Libyan crisis started as a demonstration on 15 February 2011 by some Benghazi residents 
in front of the police headquarters against the arrest of a human rights lawyer who was 
representing the relatives of the over thousand prisoners who were allegedly killed by security 
forces at the Abu Salim jail in Tripoli in 1996 (Daoud; 2011: 221). The planned peaceful protest 
turned violent when the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition declared 17 February 
“a day of rage” and confrontations with the armed forces led to the alleged use of live 
ammunition by security forces against demonstrators (Report of the Independent Civil Society 
Fact-Finding Mission to Libya; 2012: 10). 
 
Human rights activists referred to the Libyan uprising in its initial days as pro-democracy 
demonstrations, but it soon degenerated into a civil war that was divided on regional lines. 
Benghazi, which is in the eastern part of the state, was King Idris’ native home and most of the 
“rebels”, in the initial to medium term of the uprising came from this area (Souare; 2011: 11). 
Souare (2011: 11) notes that amongst easterners the overthrow of the king was a blow to their 
dominant position in the, as Gaddafi promoted his tribes people. 
 
The rebels,15 led by the TNC, used the flag of the former king (Idris) as their new flag and a 
rallying symbol thereby giving rise to questions regarding the regional divide and mass 
popularity of the revolution. Souare (2011, 11) argues that ‘these historical fault lines” remain 
very much a part of contemporary Libyan society and it “is therefore not surprising that the 
overwhelming majority of Libyan rebels are still from the east, where the current uprising/civil 
war started, or that they are using the flag of the Libyan kingdom.” 
                                                          
15 This may be a contested term. As used here, it refers to those who rise in armed resistance against an 




On the other hand, in Tripoli and Sirte, Gaddafi continued to have considerable support, hence 
the argument that he had the capacity to hold on to power despite NATO strikes for almost six 
months. The question is whether this support was based on tribal loyalty, fear or natural 
political inclination of the masses.  
 
Ankomah, (the editor of the New African magazine) (2011, 8) questioned the definition of who 
constituted the ‘people of Libya’ especially as the voices of those who supported Gaddafi were 
not aired in the international media. He queried that 
 
I have watched with dismay in the past three months how an upstart four-worded 
term “the people of Libya”, is taking the shine off our favourite word “regime”. 
So who are “the people of Libya”? How do we define “the people of Libya”? In 
normal times, “the people of Libya should mean “ALL the people of Libya”. 
But these are not normal times. So “the people of Libya” has been made to mean 
“the people” of Benghazi and its environs in the north-eastern districts of Libya 
who want Muammar Al Gaddafi to pack his bags and go (Ankomah, 2011, 8). 
 
Although the foregoing point is legitimate, as events unfolded the uprising moved to other parts 
of the country which were either neutral or Gaddafi strongholds when the uprising started 
where it appears that they joined the uprising in order to claim a share in the next government. 
 
Despite the dwindling popularity of Gaddafi as the rebellion continued, international relations 
scholars, the media and some leaders in Africa, Asia and some European countries queried that 
the intervention in the country was more of the NATO forces supporting the rebels with air 
power against Gaddafi’s forces. Discussions on NATO’s intervention in most media and 
academic circles are analyzed from the time of the passage of Resolution 1973 though it can 
be argued that intervention began when Gulf Cooperation states (GCC) like Qatar supported 
the TNC with finance and ammunition from the end of February 2011, and on the 8th of March 
2011 called for the intervention of the Security Council. This discussion will be continued in 










With regard to the socio-economic-political situation in Syria on the eve of the uprising 
Blanchard and Sharp (2012, 1):note that the country has for decades struggles “with many of 
the same challenges that have bred deep dissatisfaction in other Arab autocracies, including 
high unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility, rampant corruption, lack of 
political freedoms and repressive security forces.” The Syrian state had been unstable and 
between independence in 1946 and Hafiz Al Assad’s coup in 1970, Syria experienced eight 
coups (Al Haj Saleh, 2003, 59) and persistently changed its cabinet and constitution. 
 
Syria was shaped by a long process of state creation given that it declared its independence 
from the French in 1944 but was only recognized internationally on 15 April 1946. Apart from 
the coups, political upheavals saw it merging with Egypt to create the United Arab Republic 
(UAR) which was a short-lived experiment that lasted from 1958 to 1961.  
 
After a series of unstable governments, in November 1970, Hafez Al Assad, the then Minister 
of Defence and father of the incumbent ruler, Bashar Al Assad, seized power through a 
bloodless military takeover. He instituted some economic reforms while he increased his hold 
on power through laws that reduced the prospects of a democratic or military takeover by 
others.  
 
In a bid to consolidate his power, Hafez Al Assad prioritized the military. As a man who rose 
from the military he knew that the army was the most important organ of the Syrian state. 
Having close ties to the army meant that he could effect a coup and when he was in power he 
used the army to quell dissent among the Syrian population (Hinnebusch, 2012, 96 & 97). 
 
In 1973 he spearheaded the formulation of a new constitution that gave him absolute powers 
and an indefinite period of term of office. The new constitution approved the emergency laws 
that had been put in place in 1963 which suspended the constitutional freedoms of civilians. 
These laws, and his failure to create an Islamic state which was the desire of members of the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, created strong internal opposition to his rule which Assad Snr. 





The most powerful opposition to Hafez Al Assad was the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, 
(hereinafter Muslim Brotherhood) which was a legitimate political party from the end of French 
occupation in 1946 until March 1963 when the Ba’ath Party took power in Syria. Since then, 
the party chose the path of violence and disobedience against the Assad government, and 
openly called for the overthrow of the government of Hafiz Al Assad (Porat, 2010, 2).  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood branded the leadership of the Ba’athist party as heretics and as non-
Muslims (Goldsmith, 2011, 42), and called for it to be deposed and replaced with a new 
‘Islamic’ government. The Muslim Brotherhood found fuel in the sense that the Ba’ath Party 
implemented a secularist policy which separated religion from politics and accepted a secular 
society with no special position for Islamic law as the basis and primary source of the law of 
the state.  
 
Al Assad tried to placate the Muslim Brotherhood when he came to power by declaring in the 
constitution that the religion of the president of the state should be Islam (1973 Syrian 
Constitution, Article 3 (1)). However, this fell short of the aspirations of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Sunni Muslims who wanted Islam to be declared the state religion, 
instead of being only recognized as the religion of the majority while the state was secular. The 
clause which declared that the president of the state should be a Muslim rebounded given that 
he (Hafez Al Assad) was from the Alawite sect16 which is considered by Sunni Muslims to be 
non-Muslims. Al Assad therefore quickly moved to disarm legal protest by calling in the 
Iranian born Lebanese Shia cleric, Musa Al-Sadr, to declare the Alawites to be a Shia Muslim 
sect (Schwartz, 2013). 
 
The second half of the 1970s saw an escalation of violence in Syria between the Muslim 
brotherhood and the Assad government. Porat (2010, 3) notes that there are divergent opinions 
                                                          
16 The Alawite sect (or simply Alawites) is a Shia sect that has had a long history that has also seen the sect 
transforming itself into other beliefs that are not part of mainstream Shiaism. Tord Olsson, quoted in Goldsmith 
(2011, 38) defines that, “The Alawites belong to a secret sect of Shia type, with striking Gnostic features. 
Except for the Mandeans, the Alawites seem to be the only living group of people who adhere to a mythological 
gnosis that has been transmitted for centuries as a religious legacy.” Notable Sunni clerics have called them 
heretics and non-believers which led to their persecution. Because of this description and definition, members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and other Muslims argued that Assad Snr. Could not be a Syrian president 




on the exact year in which violence escalated to a civil war between the two. Some accounts 
argue that in 1976 several groups operating under the umbrella of the Muslim brotherhood 
initiated violence against government institutions while the Muslim brotherhood argues that 
the government initiated the attack against the Muslim brotherhood in 1979. According to 
Porat, on 16 June 1979 an Ikhwan attack on the Military Academy for Artillery Officers in 
Aleppo resulted in thirty two deaths and many more injured. Hafez Al Assad responded by 
seeking to “completely uproot the movement” (Porat, 2010, 3). The result was a full blooded 
civil war by 1980.  
 
During the initial stages, the Muslim Brotherhood gained control of major cities on the basis 
of the unity of various Sunni groups and it appeared as though the Assad government was 
losing its grip on power (Porat, 2010, 3). The government responded by massacring large 
numbers of Muslim Brotherhood members (Goldsmith, 2011, 42). According to one source, at 
Palmyra prison, Government troops massacred nearly a thousand inmates who were members 
or supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood (Seale, 1988, 329). The war escalated in 1981 but the 
government regained control by the end of 1982 and rooted the Muslim Brotherhood out of the 
country, with most of its members going into exile in neighbouring countries as well as in 
Europe (Porat, 2010, 3). Apart from the Muslim Brotherhood, the power of the Assad 
government and the Alawite minority was also being threatened by young leftist academics but 
the repressive police state rendered the latter’s opposition ineffective. Most opponents of the 
regime were either in prison or exile by the mid-1980s. 
 
During his reign, Hafez Al Assad maintained good relations with the Soviet Union which were 
strategically calculated to insulate the hostile Western states. In regional and international 
relations, Hafiz Al Assad’s foreign policy was driven by the need to legitimize his rule at home 
by citing international and regional threats (Hinnebusch, 2008, 276). It is not uncommon for 
governments facing legitimacy problems at home to seek to divert citizens’ attention by going 
on international adventures. In 1973, Syria partnered with Egypt in the Yom Kippur Wars 
against Israel, by standing with the Palestinians, the Syrian government positioned itself as pro-
Arab in a way that allowed it to gain internal legitimacy. Syria’s international policy therefore 
was antagonistic to USA and Western interests in the Middle East. 
 
Pipes and Kedar, cited in Hinnebusch (2008, 276), argue that Syria relations in the Middle East 
were driven by the need to placate discontent at home and acquire resources. Syria practically 
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enlisted itself among Arab states that championed Palestinian independence against the 
establishment of Israel and participated in wars that sought to defeat Israel. It also intervened 
in the Lebanese civil war in 1976 and kept some of its forces in Lebanon until 2005, when they 
were moved out after an outcry from western states arguing that the Syrian intelligence had a 
hand in the assassination of Rafik Hariri17. Hof and Simon (2013, 10) concur with this argument 
when they note that Syria's involvement in the 1973 war against Israel “signaled just how far 
Assad was willing to go and the risks he was willing to take to establish himself in the eyes of 
all Syrians as a genuine Arab leader and as a Syrian hero able to transcend sectarian 
identification.” The idea fell short of the desired outcomes by Hafez al Assad to placate the 
majority Sunni Muslim community and the Muslim Brotherhood because the latter initiated a 
rebellion in Hama in the 1980s which was only quelled by outright state military force (Joya, 
2012, 30). Hafez al Assad’s power base, therefore, primarily remained the military and the 
Alawite community. 
 
Syria’s alignment with Russia made it a foe of its neighbour, Turkey, which is aligned to West 
and is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Al Haj Saleh (2003, 60) 
notes that Syria had always had frosty relations with Turkey which “ever since its modern 
reformulation in the 1920s, sought to distance itself from its Arab and Islamic environment, 
allying itself with the West.”  
 
After Hafez al Assad’s death in 2000, his son Bashar Al Assad succeeded his father. His slogan 
on attaining power, “Change through Continuity” (Goldsmith, 2011, 43), was confusing and 
received mixed interpretations from the Alawites and the Sunni Muslim majority. For Alawites, 
it implied a continuation of their privileges and a closed political system that favoured them 
while the Sunni Muslims viewed it as an opening of the political space and the coming of a 
new age (Goldsmith, 2011, 43-44). 
 
Assad promised reform and encouraged political dialogue among the citizens. This was in 
response to calls for politics and governance reforms which culminated in the Damascus Spring 
of 2000 to 2001 in which, among the ideas put forward were the demand for greater freedoms 
                                                          
17 Rafik Hariri is the former Prime Minister of Lebanon between 1992 and 1998 and again from 2000 until his 
resignation in 2004. He was among the most influential persons in Lebanon who opposed the extension of the 
presidential term of the Syrian backed Emile Lahoud. He was popular both in Lebanon and internationally as he 
was the first post war Lebanese Prime Minister. He was assassinated on 14 February 2005 with allegations from 
Western States that Syria could have played a role in the assassination. 
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of association, the release of political detainees and the opening of the media space to private 
players (Kawakibi, 2007, 1). Debating forums were established in Damascus and other large 
towns and ninety nine intellectuals signed a new declaration which demanded the release of all 
political prisoners, freedom of speech and an end to the state of emergency, was published18 
(Kawakibi, 2007, 1). These demands resulted in the release of more than six hundred political 
prisoners on 17 October 2000. The private press also began to emerge and was allowed to 
flourish (Kawakibi, 2007, 1). 
 
These desires of change and democratization were not acceptable to hardliners in the Assad 
government who viewed the then young leader with mistrust, and hence began to close civic 
space for political discussion (Zisser, 2005, 2). The operating space for individuals and political 
groups was reduced through the emergency laws that had been in place since the rule of Hafiz 
Al Assad thereby ending the Damascus Spring. Kawakibi (2007) argues that it ended 
prematurely in March 2001 with the detention of some of the activists and their leaders 
(Kawakibi, 2007, 2).  
 
Although calls for reforms were silenced, by the fall of Saddam Hussein of Iraq at the hands 
of the USA led Coalition of the willing, the ‘liberal’ opposition was emboldened and tried to 
push for reforms (Hinnebusch, 2012, 103). Assad (Jnr) deflected the calls by rallying the 
dominant Sunni sect of Syria against reforms which he called western imperialists driven. He 
argued that political reforms will follow economic reforms in a manner that would follow the 
Chinese model. In order to counter the dissent from the Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni 
Muslims, ‘moderate’ Sunni clerics were given space to preach non-political Islam and others 
were co-opted into the government (Hinnebusch, 2012, 103-105). The move bought time for 
the government but it did not snuff the flame of dissent which was kindled by the closure of 
the Damascus Spring. It was with these embedded political disgruntlements that the Arab 
Spring from North Africa and other Arab states became a spark of the Syrian uprisings and 
subsequent civil war. 
 
 
                                                          
18 The intellectuals at the Damascus Spring were predominantly from Damascus, popularly called the 
‘Damascene Intellectuals’. They were from the opposition, civil society and the media and they sought to 
transform Syria to a democratic state (see Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2012). They 
advocated for the lifting of the emergency laws which were in place since 1963, to allow the return of the exiled 
politicians and to free political prisoners (see Salik, (2013)  
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The Uprisings in Syria 
 
The uprisings that engulfed North Africa found their way into Syria in mid-March 2011, where 
they were molded very much along sectarian lines. Broadly, the uprising and the subsequent 
civil war was dominated and led by Sunni Muslims against Alawites (Hof and Simon, 2013, 
1). The demographic demarcation of Syria is estimated at seventy percent, being Sunnis, 
followed by the Alawites who constitute twelve percent, Christians ten percent, and the Druze 
being three percent (Nishapuri, 2012; Zifcak; 2012: 27). The uprisings began with Sunni 
Muslims demanding democratic reforms and the lifting of the state of emergency (Phillips; 
2012: 67-68), which would allow them to gain power. They called on Assad to step down and 
for a reduction of the influence of the Alawite clique in government. The majority of Alawites 
supported Assad because in the majority of Alawite households there was at least one 
individual in the security forces, while others have benefitted economically due to their military 
or business connections (Nakkash, 2013, 11-12). The roots of the uprisings in Syria were not 
exclusively a result of the revolutions and uprisings in North Africa. The Syrian political 
environment was very volatile since the country’s attainment of independence from France in 
the 1940s.  
 
The “Damascus Spring” opened a political space which, though short lived, provided a taste of 
reforms. Intellectuals and reformists who had been given a taste to oppose the government were 
disgruntled by the closure of the public political space. The fall of Saddam Hussein kindled 
their quest but the government came up with counter measures that delayed the clash until an 
unspecified time in the future. Such an unspecified moment came in the wake of the Arab 
Spring. The coming of the Arab Spring only saved as a spark to the decades old discontent that 
had been brewed by local and regional events since the Damascus spring. 
 
The uprisings in Syria started with a failed demonstration in February 2011 (Sharp and 
Blanchard, 2012, 1-2). However, the protracted struggle was ignited on 15 March 2011 in 
Daraa with demonstrators calling for the release of a group of teenagers who had been arrested 
for drawing graffiti with oppositional narratives (Hof and Simon, 2013, 1). In response to the 
demonstrations, security forces killed some protesters, thereby leading to the increase in 




Bashar al Assad’s government used excessive force to nip the uprising in the bud because the 
preceding government was skeptical about the Sunni sect, which comprised the bulk of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s following. Hafiz Al Assad, after all, had successfully but ruthlessly 
used the security forces to quell civil disobedience and later to destroy the support base Muslim 
Brotherhood. Bashar Al Assad may have wanted to adopt the same strategy during the 2011 
uprisings. 
 
The government did, however, try to placate the demonstrators by introducing reforms such as 
scrapping the emergency laws and passing a bill that allowed for the creation of opposition 
political parties and their participation in national elections (BBC News: 25 July 2011).  The 
State of Emergency, which had been in place since 1963, was scrapped on 19 April 2011. This 
was an important gesture since the law had been used to suspend most democratic and 
constitutional rights and protection of citizens. 
 
A large number of security personnel were killed by armed groups in the Jisr Al-Shugar district 
under the Idlib Governorate (see figure 2 at the end of the chapter) between 3 and 6 June 2011. 
The incident indicated that the protests had transformed into armed conflict (Report of the Head 
of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria: Articles 26 & 27). Military activities 
from the uprising groups increased, leading to their branding as rebels. The Assad regime 
informed the international community that the uprising was fomented by militants and that 
“extremists” and “terrorist” groups had either infiltrated or assisted to infiltrate into Syria to 
help the uprising aimed at toppling Assad (Hof and Simon; 2013: ii & 2). This was initially 
denied by Western states and the Arab League,  but with time these reports were confirmed 
with groups linked to Al Qaeda publicly accepting responsibility for some suicide and other 
terrorist bombings inside Syria and calling for the supporting of the uprising (Sharp and 
Blanchard; 2012: 7). Some of the groups that were later listed as terrorist groups by the USA 
and other western states include Al-Nusra Front, Khorasan Group and ISIL. ISIL grew to 
become a large group aiming to create an Islamic Caliphate that would transcend Syrian and 
Iraq borders. As I conclude this thesis USA managed to call for an international coalition that 
include western and Arab states to fight ISIL which had taken control of large parts in Iraq and 
Syria. 
 
The uprising in Syria is arguably more complex than the other crises in the region. It has both 
internal and external influences and elements. The complexity is due in part to the fact that 
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Syria is in a region that is of unparalleled importance to the major international powers, 
specifically Britain, France, USA, China, and Russia. The former USA president Jimmy Carter 
noted as long ago as the 1970s when he was in power that the Middle East occupied strategic 
position in the national interest of the United States. He categorically stated that, “An attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault 
on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force” (Carter quoted in Woodward, 1991, 225).  
 
Israel has security interests with regard who rules in Damascus. On the other hand, Syrian 
alignment in the region has the potential of tipping the regional balances in relation to Iranian 
or Saudi Arabian alignment which would also spell the balance of international power between 
the Eastern and Western blocs in the region. Al-Rasheed (2013: 36) argues that Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s response to the Arab Spring was driven by the need 
to preserve the GCC and score diplomatic victory against Iran. 
 
The uprising and subsequent civil war in Syria raises a number of questions one which pertains 
to the desires and plans of USA and Israel to clear the region of perceived enemy states. 
Mearsheimer and Walt, in 2006, pointed out that since the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Israel 
and the USA Israeli Lobby have been pushing the USA to embark on a regime change in Syria 
(2006, 36). Several members of the Israel government and the Israeli Lobby in the USA 
mentioned Syria as the next target after the fall of Saddam Hussein (Mearsheimer and Walt, 
2006, 36). Such targeting and the armed uprising raise a question of the role of outside forces 
in the beginning of the uprising and also gave the Syrian leadership a veil to argue with that 
the uprising was engineered from outside and composed of ‘mercenary’ fighters, an argument 
that has now been accepted by many in the international community (Sharp and Blanchard, 
2012, 7). 
 
4.5 General Disproportions in the Arab Spring 
 
The uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria that acquired greater international attention 
and intervention yet the uprisings were widespread in the MENA region affecting Bahrain and 
Yemen significantly with countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria among 
others. It was the international alignment that saw others facing loud condemnations with 
others surviving with reprimands only (Pattison; 2011: 276).  
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International attention was also attracted by the intensity of the uprising and the manner in 
which the governments in different states reacted to the uprisings. In states like Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco and Jordan the uprisings were of low intensity (Dalacoura, 2012, 66) and this allowed 
the governments to announce reforms in a manner that snuffed the flame of the uprisings before 
they gained intense international attention and popularity (Dalacoura, 2012, 66). Lack of 
international attention allowed the governments to put out the last pockets of the uprising using 
force without facing international condemnation. There was, therefore the use of force in a 
manner that stifled the uprisings with the Saudi Arabian monarch getting no reprimand from 
the USA and other Western states as was the case with those states that were on the 
international limelight (i.e. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria). 
 
Major international double-standards specifically by the members of the GCC were on the 
Yemen19 and Bahrain cases.  In Bahrain, the Saudi Arabian government led a GCC intervention 
in support of the Bahrain government against the predominantly Shia demonstrators in Bahrain. 
Saudi Arabia contributed one thousand, two hundred forces, United Arab Emirates contributed 
600 police personnel and Kuwait sent a naval force to protect Bahrain’s maritime borders 
(Katzman, 2012, 8). The intervention was done with complacency from veto wielding 
international powers. 
 
Arguably, one can sum up the nature of the response by the Arab league and the GCC states as 
one that was driven by their interests and not primarily guided by international standards either 
in terms of law or morals. The argument is based on the fact that the powerful GCC states 
thwarted any uprisings that were driven by alleged members of the Shia sect while in Syria 
they supported a predominantly Sunni uprising against an Alawite (which is alleged to be a 
breakaway ‘Twelver’ Shia sect) dominated government. Al-Rasheed (2013: 29) clear captures 
this argument when he notes that the uprisings in “Bahrain and Yemen were seen as a threat to 
Saudi supremacy, while the revolt in Syria was considered an opportunity to score internal and 
regional goals.” 
 
Given the fact that there is a race for regional dominance between Saudi Arabia and Iran as 
well as the fact that one of the leading symbols of the Bahrain uprising, Ayatollah Isa Ahmad 
Qassim is a Shia cleric who is aligned to Iran (Alfoneh, 2012, 1), the Saudi monarchy and other 
                                                          
19 See note 10. 
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GCC member states could not accept a situation in which an Iranian aligned cleric would 
influence an uprising against a Sunni government. It should therefore be noted that while the 
uprisings in the Middle East were driven by genuine grievances, there were also subtle political 





There are contested versions on the causes of the Arab Spring. Scholars like Beck and Huse 
(2012) have argued that the uprisings are a result of economic meltdown especially the rising 
unemployment among the youth, and the lack of democratic space in the region, while others 
like Howard and Hussain (2011) locate the causes in the rise of the digital social media 
networks. Other scholars have celebrated the power of the social media as the major cause of 
the uprisings and the successful removal of leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen; in 
other states like Algeria and Jordan there have been reforms by the governments; and in Syria 
the conflict is raging on with no side able to claim total victory.  
 
The arguments that seek to explain the Arab spring in isolated causes are limited. The causes 
of the uprisings are multiple and complex and a single analysis will limit the understanding of 
the complex nature of the events. While youth unemployment and the limitations on democracy 
had a bigger role in igniting the uprisings in Tunisia, other factors were at play in other 
countries. In states like Libya and Syria, the call for reforms in the political arena did not start 
on the eve of the Arab Spring. There had long been agitation for reforms and the leaders of all 
three states (Mubarak of Egypt, Gaddafi of Libya, and the Assads in Syria) had faced at least a 
single assassination attempt by some disgruntled elements of their citizens during their times 
in power. 
 
Historically, as discussed in this chapter, there was deep mistrust between the government and 
the people, as well as sectional, religious, and ethnic differences amongst various sections of 
the population. The governments stifled attempts of reform and dialogue thereby creating a 
“time bomb” which only needed a spark to light up. While the uprisings had objective concerns, 
it can also be argued that powerful regional and sectarian divides were manipulated in Libya 




The causes and successes of the uprisings should also be located in the international relations 
continuum of the region. In Tunisia and Egypt the swiftness of events limited international 
response, while in Libya and Syria, the power of the rebels was fanned by outside forces who 
had turbulent relations with the government of Gaddafi and Assad, respectively. Parallels can 
be drawn on how sectarianism was a drive on the way GCC states reacted to the uprisings given 
their economic mighty and western alignment in the region. In states like Jordan and Yemen, 
GCC states assisted governments in power to resist the uprising that was dominated by the Shia 
minority while in Syria; the GCC states have been aiding the Sunni majority in the uprising 
against the Alawite dominated government. The uprisings should therefore be viewed from the 
long lenses of the struggle for regional dominance between the Shia led by Iran and the Sunni 
led by Saudi Arabia and internationally on the contestation between the USA and Russia. Such 
will be the major thrust of Chapter 6. The following chapter will analyse international law and 
the role of regional organizations and other states in internal matter specifically using the case 
of Libya and Syria. 
 
The next chapter will question the role played by the international community in the uprisings 
and subsequently, civil wars in Libya and Syria. It will discuss the critique the legality of the 
UN endorsed NATO intervention in Libya and the failure of an UN intervention in Syria. It 
will also discuss the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as it is the focal concept 









Map 1: Fighting in Libya: March 2011 



















Map 2: Syrian Map 







INTERNATIONAL LAW, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND 




This chapter examines the legality of NATO intervention in Libya in terms of UN law and 
customary international law. One of the key questions which the chapter discusses was why 
the international community did not learn from the Libyan intervention to have a sustainable 
intervention in Syria, rather than the return to the paralysis of the Cold War era? This chapter 
also answers the questions: Does the UNSC has the mandate to legalize intervention based on 
human right violations? Is it legal to effect regime change in the process of or after a military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes?, among others.   
 
International law is polarized on the concept of humanitarian military intervention. The 
precedence set by the military interventions in Kosovo, Somalia and Iraq have not acquired 
enough consensus to be accepted as international practice. Critics view such interventions as 
pursuing national interest while proponents argue that while they may be viewed as illegal, 
such interventions are legitimate (Berman; 2006: 751-752). The UN has sought to make 
military intervention for humanitarian reasons legal through the adoption of the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) document by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) which was sponsored by the government of Canada. Intervention in Libya 
was influenced more by the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which is a 
repackaging of military intervention for humanitarian purposes (Payandeh; 2012: 377). 
 
5.2 Responsibility to Protect: Changing the Rules of Military Intervention for 
Humanitarian Purposes? 
 
The post-Cold War conflicts of the 1990s in places like Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), and in the former Yugoslavia underscored the void in rules and 
principles of engagement in international law. The UN Charter and its subsequent laws were 
crafted against a background of aggression between states. Leaders of different states therefore 




The end of the cold war saw the emergence of a new threat in the form of civil wars, militia 
activities and gross human rights abuses by state leaders which the international community 
had to grapple with as this internal stability was destabilizing international peace and security. 
Evans (2006: 706) notes that “the quintessential problem of the 1990s became that of intra-
state conflict, civil war and internal violence perpetrated on a massive scale.” 
 
The Kosovo war in 1999 was tipping point. NATO intervened in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state citing “the overwhelming need to put a stop to the atrocities perpetrated by the 
Serbs” (Cassese; 1999: 793). This intervention was done without Security Council 
authorization because of the fear of a Russian and or Chinese veto (Adjei; 2005: 63). NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo without authorization from the UNSC could have created a dangerous 
precedence in which powerful states could unilaterally intervene in any state militarily and 
disregard UN rules. Hence it threatened the UN with the fate of the League of Nations. This 
concern led to the establishment of an independent International Commission on Kosovo to 
look at the legality and legitimacy of NATO operations in Kosovo and also to come with 
proposals for future operations (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo; 2000: 
19-21). 
 
The commission established that the intervention was illegal because it had no explicit 
authorization by the Security Council, but legitimate because “all diplomatic avenues had been 
exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of 
Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule” (The Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo; 2000: 4). It recommended that the UN set laws that would respond to 
such humanitarian catastrophes in order to avert a situation in which the international 
community would be held to ransom by the politicking of the veto wielding states in the 
Security Council and the old rules of non-intervention and non-interference (The Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo; 2000: 10).  
 
This call was answered by the constitution of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000 which was sponsored by the government of Canada. 
ICISS, which submitted its report in 2001, repackaged the issue of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. According to Gareth Evans (2006: 
708), who co-chaired the commission with Mohamed Sahnoun, the commission “sought to turn 
the whole weary debate about the right to intervene on its head and to re-characterize it not as 
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an argument about any right at all but rather about a responsibility—one to protect people at 
grave risk— with the relevant perspective being not that of the prospective interveners but, 
more appropriately, of those needing support.” 
 
ICISS (2001: xi) broke the responsibility to protect into three categories namely ‘the 
responsibility to prevent’, ‘the responsibility to react’, and ‘the responsibility to rebuild’. The 
commission summarized the responsibilities as follows;  
 
A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct 
causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk. 
 
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human 
need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like 
sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military 
intervention. 
 
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military 
intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, 
addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert. 
(ICISS; 2001: xi).  
 
In its endeavour to find the right balance between intervention and the concerns of less 
powerful states that R2P may be used by powerful states to intervene for their interests, ICISS 
laid down benchmarks for intervention. For intervention to be legal; 
 
there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or 
imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: A. large scale loss of life, 
actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either 
of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state 
situation; or B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether 
carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape (ICISS; 2001: xii). 
Intervention can also be legitimate if it is undertaken using the right intent, undertaken as a last 
resort with proportional means to stop or deter the humanitarian catastrophe, and if there is a 
reasonable prospect of success (ICISS; 2001: xii). 
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On the question of authority, the commission called for the Security Council to be the 
authorizing power of military intervention for human protection purposes. “The task is not to 
find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security 
Council work better than it has” (ICISS; 2001: xii). 
 
One can argue that the only major invention which the commission introduced was the proposal 
for the explicit legalization of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The crimes 
which the commission came up with had already been condemned under different conventions 
and treaties as crimes against humanity. These include genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity were already codified as such under the Genocide Convention, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) of 1998.20 
 
On the rules that govern intervention, pro intervention philosophers had already alluded to 
them. Most of the rules that warrant the legitimacy of an intervention like the correct intention 
were mentioned by Vattel (1758: bk. 3, ch. 3) in his justification of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes. The commission also accepted the classical notion of the pro-
intervention thinkers that military intervention for humanitarian purposes should not start with 
the intention of and/or end with a regime change (ICISS; 2001: 35) as that is a matter that is 
purely internal and a matter of self determination. This notion is however not accepted by 
Walzer (1977: x) who argues that when a regime is built on aggression and criminality, then 
after a war the victors are morally justified to replace such a regime or at least initiate a process 
of its replacement.  
 
Walzer’s argument is drawn from the fact that it is not the authoritarian nature of governments 
that warrant military intervention for humanitarian purposes but the murderous nature of any 
government that would legitimize military intervention hence regime change of any 
government that commits these crimes is morally upright (1977: x).  
 
                                                          
20 The mentioned international tribunals and courts all stipulate genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and aggression as serious crimes of concern to the international community. The ICC explains these crimes in 
articles 5, 6, 7, and 8. The Statute of the ICTR notes the crimes in articles 2, 3, and 4, the statute of the ICTY 
notes the crimes in articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 while the Statute of the SCSL explains the crimes in articles 2 and 3. 
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Giving back the powers of deciding on the legality of an intervention to the Security Council, 
it may be argued, is a drawback because of the politics of veto which continues to play a stifling 
role to the new doctrine. In cases where the interests of veto power states are at risk, they are 
likely to veto the resolutions as in the Syrian case where Russia and China have vetoed three 
UNSC Resolutions. Welsh (2011: 2) argues that R2P was a compromise document. On one 
hand, it faced resistance from the major powers, who saw it as a threat to their domination on 
major international events, specifically on matters to do with military intervention, which is a 
preserve of the five veto powers. On the other hand, less powerful states which dominate the 
General Assembly viewed it as an instrument which would increase major powers’ influence 
in their internal affairs. The outcome of the 2005 World Summit, according to Welsh (2011: 2) 
was therefore a compromise between supporters of the emerging R2P doctrine and detractors 
of this new interventionist doctrine.  
 
Given that military intervention for humanitarian purposes in most cases has a weaker state as 
a target, which weaker states usually does not have power in the security council, it would have 
been more appropriate if the powers were given to the General Assembly on a two thirds 
majority as many less powerful states question the democratic and/or representative nature of 
the Security Council which is regarded as a “prestigious exclusive club” (Akpotor and 
Agbebaku; 2010: 51).  
 
Another question which the crafters of R2P apparently failed to consider is what the response 
of the international community should be in cases where a state fails to defend its citizens from 
insurgencies or internal civil war because they are getting assistance from external powerful 
states as was the case in the Syrian crisis. It seems that the commission was very much 
influenced in its deliberations by the Kosovo crisis and the need to have a justification and an 
acceptable document for military intervention for humanitarian purposes.  
 
While there may be less dispute where a state is specifically brutalizing its own citizens, 
insurgency and internal civil wars are different issue and the ICISS (2001: xi) noted that “where 
a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency (italics - author’s 
emphasis), repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or 
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.” 
This, arguably, opens the door for major powers to instigate civil wars or insurgencies in less 
powerful states in order to gain access through military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
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for resource and geo-political interest. The contemporary crisis in Syria, some may argue, is a 
possible case in point. While there were demonstrations in the initial stages, there was the 
increase of militia groups who were given military and non-military support by external states 
(Joya; 2012: 31).  
 
One can also take issue with the argument by ICISS that the notion of military intervention has 
to be viewed as a responsibility and not as a right (Welsh; 2011: 2). The difference being that 
a right is a legal entitlement upon which one can act upon or can ignore without facing legal 
consequences, while a responsibility is “a duty or obligation to satisfactorily perform or 
complete a task (assigned by someone, or created by one's own promise or circumstances) that 
one must fulfill, and which has a consequent penalty for failure” (Business Dictionary: n d). If 
viewed as a right, military intervention would be an act allowed to those willing to undertake 
a mission and have the resources to pursue the mission with considerable chances of success 
in cases where intervention is warranted, without necessarily making it an obligation upon 
states to do so. Such a right, while open to abuse by states, would have made military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes flexible especially at a time when the UN cannot do 
more than peacekeeping. 
 
By making it a responsibility for the international community to intervene under certain 
conditions, the question is whether such will can be found among different states. This has been 
shown in a number of instances. Although there was enthusiasm in toppling Gaddafi in Libya, 
the Syrian case suggests that states are driven by the will as well as interests beyond the scope 
of rules and/or humanitarianism and such will never manifested in the Syria crisis. The answers 
to these inconsistencies can be found in Grotius’ statement that, “no one is bound to give 
assistance or protection, when it will be attended with evident danger” (1625: 247). What 
Grotius noted was that if there is a danger or cost in assisting those in distress, then such people 
are not obliged to undertake the assistive mission. 
 
Be that as it may, the concept of R2P was accepted by the UN General Assembly, gathering as 
the World Summit in 2005. Such responsibility also fell onto the UN through the use of Chapter 
VI, VIII and in some cases VII of the Charter and to that effect declared that; 
 
In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
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Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (United Nations General 
Assembly; Resolution 60/1, 2005: Art. 139). 
 
The World Summit accepted R2P, although it must be noted that General Assembly resolutions 
have no legal power to amend UN law or enact rules for international law (Kerwin; 1983: 879). 
In analyzing Article 10 of the Charter, Schwebel (1994: 509) notes that, the General Assembly 
“can only, in principle, issue ‘recommendation’ which are not of a binding character.” This 
view is shared by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (1977: 541)) who notes that the General Assembly 
“has no legal power to legislate or bind its members by way of recommendation.” The adoption 
of R2P was not a binding legal document, but a step in the drive to legalize military intervention 
for humanitarian purposes under current UN Law. 
 
In spite of this shortcoming, R2P did bring up to the peak the transformations on customary 
international law and UN law. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an evolution of 
international law from being one that specifically protected states to one that struck a balance 
between the survival of the states as the primary regulators of international relations and 
individuals who are the subjects of states. Bellamy and Williams (2011: 826) “argue that 
“international society is now explicitly focused on civilian protection.” 
 
5.3 International Law and Intervention in Libya 
 
The intervention by NATO states in Libya raised a number of legal and moral questions. The 
case should be analyzed in two tiers thus, was the military intervention legal according to the 
UN law and was the conduct of the intervention legal in accordance with UN law and 
international humanitarian law? 
  
In terms of legality, intervention was sanctioned by resolution 1973 of the UN Security 
Council. According to resolution 1973, the Security Council; 
 
Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in 
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cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, 
notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on 
any part of Libyan territory. 
 
Intervention by NATO member states and NATO as a regional organization was legal in 
accordance with article 53 (1) of the UN Charter which states that the Security Council “shall, 
where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under 
its authority.”  
 
On the other hand, one could argue that the UN was not allowed by Article 2.7 of the charter 
to sanction intervention as the dispute was basically an internal one and the charter prevents it 
from intervening in internal matters of states. It may be argued that Article 2.7 offers an 
exception as Chapter VII permits intervention when international peace and security is 
threatened, but this was not the case in Libya at the time of the passing of the resolution. 
 
The Security Council tried to legalize its intervention by invoking Chapter VII. Resolution 
1973 notes that, “Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security.”  However, in the revolving crisis, no 
reports from the media, Libyan government or neighbouring states were produced that showed 
that the conflict was spilling over into regional countries. Invoking Chapter VII was therefore 
inappropriate as the crisis had not yet developed into one that threatened regional security. This 
line of thinking is supported by former South African President Thabo Mbeki who stated that 
the Security Council failed to show that “the situation in Libya and Ivory Coast constituted a 
threat to international peace and security … yet they authorize the use of military force” 
(Ncana: 2011). 
 
When resolution 1973 was passed, the uprising had already turned into a civil war which pitted 
predominantly two armed sides against each other. The Libyan government was caught in the 
dilemma of trying to defeat a rebelling movement while protecting its civilians. The 
government resorted to using heavy weaponry in civilian populated areas, including rocket 
propelled grenades, artillery shells and tank shells (Blanchard; 2011: 4). It is noteworthy that 
both sides in the conflict were committing acts that amounted to human rights violations and 
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the international community could have taken a middle line by calling both warring sides to 
respect the rules of the conduct of war (jus in bello). Mbeki (2012: 5) argues that what happened 
is that “in essence, NATO intervened not to impose a no-fly-zone to protect civilians, as 
prescribed by the UN Security Council, but to lead and empower the opposition National 
Transitional Council in a military campaign to overthrow the Gaddafi regime.”  
 
The argument that the Security Council resolution was based on international human rights 
theory has no legal basis because Charter law does not mandate the UN to intervene in support 
of the observance of human rights issues. In this case, such an intervention would only be 
legitimate but not legal as was the case with the Kosovo intervention in 1999.  
 
Leaders, such as Tony Blair,21 argued that in matters of humanitarian catastrophe, it is legal 
and morally correct for the international community to act rather than wait while human lives 
are lost. In similar vein, Annan (1999), cited in ICISS (2001: vii) asked, “if humanitarian 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a 
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every 
precept of our common humanity?”  
 
This argument is drawn from the Grotian Doctrine and the social contract theory which argue 
that a government that commits gross human rights violations against its civilians loses its 
legitimacy and the privileges which come with sovereignty (Grotius; 1625: 247). Since war 
machinery is mostly controlled by the government which can use it to maintain its hold in 
power, foreign states can, therefore, assume the of saving those whose lives are endangered. 
This argument, based in international morality and philosophy, was, however, not adopted by 
the crafters of the UN Charter. 
 
Assuming that intervention was based on the need to preserve human rights and enforce 
humanitarian law, then the Security Council should have referred the case to the prosecutor of 
                                                          
21 Tony Blair in his “The Doctrine of the International Community,” said that, “I set out what I described as a 
doctrine of international community that sought to justify intervention, including if necessary military 
intervention, not only when a nation’s interests are directly engaged; but also where there exists a humanitarian 
crisis or gross oppression of a civilian population. It was a speech that argued strongly for an active and engaged 
foreign policy, not a reactive or isolationist one: better to intervene than to leave well alone. … I still believe 
that those who oppress and brutalize their citizens are better put out of power than kept in it.” See Tony Blair, 
“The Doctrine of the International Community: Ten Years Later,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, 
Spring/Summer 2009, p. 5-6 
89 
 
the International Criminal Court to investigate the excesses by those involved in war and not 
to authorize NATO to be part of the war. 
 
Several international instruments and the UN Charter support the argument that the 
authorization which was granted to NATO was not legal under UN law. Article 3.1 of the UN 
General Assembly Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970 states; “No State or group of States 
has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or 
external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of 
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.”  
 
The aforementioned declaration is supported by a number of International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) pronouncements in international cases such as Nicaragua vs. USA case (1986: Art. 55) 
wherein the ICJ read that international law prohibited not only external intervention but also 
interference in matters that are considered purely internal.  
 
The [il]legality of the intervention is more controversial given that the mandate was granted 
and or taken over by a group of states that confessed partiality in the uprising. When the 
uprising was gaining momentum, USA president, Barack Obama, stated that, “Muammar 
Gaddafi has lost the legitimacy to lead, and he must leave” (Landler: 2011). The then US 
Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, reiterated that “instead of issuing threats, Gaddafi … should 
step down from power” (Mohammed and Abu-Aun: 2011). The USA position was supported 
by Western powers who all voted in favour of Security Council Resolution 1973.  
 
The conduct of NATO in Libya raised condemnation from countries such as Russia (Eastweek; 
2011: 2-3), China, Iran and South Africa (De Waal; 2013: 367-368), amongst others, who 
argued that NATO overstepped the boundaries of Resolution 1973 by using it as a pretext to 
effect regime change which is against international law (Campbell: 2013). Mbeki (2012: 5) 
quotes NATO leaders’ intention in their joint statement that, “So long as Gaddafi is in power, 
NATO and its coalition partners must maintain their operations…Colonel Gaddafi must go, 
and go for good.” The price of conduct of NATO in Libya was paid by the Syrian because 





The conduct of NATO amounted to regime change in the affairs of a sovereign state; an act not 
accepted under customary international law as well UN law. Given that the intervention was 
based more on the emerging concept of R2P, it is interesting that ICISS (2001: 35) noted that 
“overthrow of regimes is not, as such, a legitimate objective, although disabling that regime’s 
capacity to harm its own people may be essential to discharging the mandate of protection – 
and what is necessary to achieve that disabling will vary from case to case.” 
 
Walzer (1977: x-xi) argues that although regime change is not the primary goal of intervention 
it becomes part of the process because a tyrant cannot be expected to reconcile with those he 
or she is brutalizing. Walzer uses the example of Rwanda to argue that if there had been “an 
African or a European or a United Nations intervention in Rwanda in 1994 … the initial 
purpose of the military action would have been to stop the massacre of Tutsi men and women 
(and their Hutu sympathizers), but in order to do that and to protect the survivors, it would have 
been necessary to overthrow the Hutu Power regime” (1977: x-xi). 
 
Drawing from Walzer’s argument, one can argue that it was necessary to effect regime change 
in Libya because Gaddafi had already threatened retribution against the people of Benghazi 
(Shrivastav; 2011: 3).  
 
The Libyan case is different in that the goal of the intervening powers was explicitly to oust 
Gaddafi before the passage of Resolution 1973 which paved the way for intervention. 
Furthermore, it was a civil war in which rebel fighters and government forces were fighting to 
the detriment of civilians (Pinfari; 2012:144). It could be argued that in such a case, the 
international community had a duty to holistically look at the case without taking sides. Support 
for the rebels was therefore, drawing from the judgment of the ICJ in the case of Nicaragua vs. 
USA, an act of aggression.22 
 
Finally this raises the question of which law takes precedence over the other. Given that the 
World Summit accepted R2P and noted that even chapter VII of the Charter can be invoked to 
use coercive action against a regime perpetrating gross human rights violations against its 
                                                          
22 As ruled by the ICJ in the case: Nicaragua Vs United States of America, 1986, the support of military bands in 
another country, including provision of weapons and other logistical support is an act of aggression according to 
customary international law. Hence, it can be argued here that the provision of lethal and/or non-lethal military 




civilians (United Nations General Assembly; Resolution 60/1, 2005: Art. 139), how should the 
declaration and the R2P report be harmonized with the UN Charter? In this argument, the UN 
Charter should be seen as the international constitution thereby nullifying all laws which 
contradict with the charter. The R2P was accepted by world leaders who can be viewed here 
as the world’s parliament, but failure to harmonize the agreed resolutions with the Charter, 
viewed here as the constitutive document of the world order, renders more discord in the 
practice of international relations. If R2P is to take precedence, then the UN Charter should be 
ammended in line with the new rules, especially those that pertain to military intervention 
because the charter explicitly states that any member of the United Nations has no such right 
under article 2.7 except on matters that threaten international peace and security. 
 
5.4 The Syrian case and international law 
 
The crisis in Syria, as in Libya, points to gaps in the current international law regime. Following 
the ‘abuse’ of UNSC resolution 1973 in Libya by NATO,23 and involving a state situated in 
the contested region of the Middle East, the Syrian case brought the international community 
back to ‘Cold War’ polarization. In an alleged bid to resolve the crisis, states like Turkey, 
France, Britain, Germany, USA, Russia, China and Iran have hardened their positions which 
are prolonging the crisis. 
 
Legally, a number of states are found wanting. The USA, Turkey, France and Britain have been 
accused of aiding the rebels in Syria (Lendman: 2012). They have also covertly and overtly 
called on Syrian president Bashar al Assad to step down from power (Karmi: 2011). This 
suggests interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, which is proscribed by the UN 
Charter and the UN General Assembly Friendly Relations Convention. 
 
Morally, states like Russia and Iran, and Hezbollah (a non state actor organization based in 
Lebanon) can be argued to have abetted the crisis in Syria by defending the Assad government 
and providing it with weapons (Wezeman; 2013; 270). In supplying weapons, Russia argues 
that it is not violating international law and has to fulfill its contracts (Loiko: 2013). 
                                                          
23 The qualifying of the term ‘abuse’ is contested. In the current case it is being used based on the fact that the 
African countries, particularly South Africa argued that NATO member states intervening in Libya went beyond 
the mandate that was accorded to them by Security Council Resolution 1973. This is also supported by the 
arguments that were put forward by China and Russia, whose abstention from voting paved the way for the 
passage of the resolution. 
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5.5 Aiding Opposing Belligerents under International Law  
 
International law stipulates that it is permissible for a sovereign state to seek outside 
intervention in the case of external aggression. Vattel (1758: bk. 3, ch. 3) wrote that “if any one 
attacks a nation, or violates her perfect rights, he does her an injury. Then, and not till then, 
that nation has a right to repel the aggressor, and reduce him to reason.” The UN charter does 
not proscribe a war of self-defence and it allows collective wars by UN member states acting 
under Chapter VII or friendly states fighting in the defence of a weaker ally fighting a legal 
war. It is for this reason that mutual defence pacts and organizations like NATO, Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) are legal. 
The fact that the UN has worked in cooperation with NATO on some international missions 
shows that mutual defence pacts are not illegal under international law. 
 
There is need to clarify the nature of war that is acceptable when a state is faced with internal 
insurgency. According to customary international law, war and the maintaining of armies and 
military machinery is a preserve of the state as an exclusive right (Grotius; 1625: 44).  Military 
insurgency is therefore illegal in all states in the world. Civil wars have, however, been present 
since the creation of states and sovereigns have also grappled with stopping military 
insurgencies in ways that restored state stability, maintained state cohesion, and helped prop 
their power as undisputed leaders. 
 
The drafting of the UN Charter centred on international wars, especially after the international 
experience with the first and second world wars thereby foregoing the regulation of state 
behaviour in cases of military insurgencies. This was seen as an internal matter and 
international leaders did not seek to regulate it. One can therefore presume that the UN Charter 
saw military insurgency as an illegal act as drawn from customary international law and 
classical legal philosophy (Khan; 1987: 10). 
 
An insurgency that has external support can be treated as aggression on the part supporting the 
insurgency. A case in point is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) under Laurent Kabila 
which, in 1998, was attacked by rebels sponsored by Rwanda and Uganda. As a member of the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security, Kabila sought SADC assistance which was granted by Angola, Namibia and 
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Zimbabwe under ‘Operation Sovereign Legitimacy’ (Ngoma; 2004: 1). It is in this light that 
the Syrian case should be analyzed. 
 
The Syrian uprising started as peaceful demonstrations that sought the transformation of Syria 
to a democratic state (Joya; 2012: 31) but quickly transformed into an insurgency movement 
and a civil war. The formation of the Syrian National Council, the Syrian National Coalition 
(SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), as well as a number of other militia groups in different 
governorates bears testimony that what the international community has been witnessing in 
Syria was a civil war.24  
 
The Free Syrian Army and other insurgency groups have been fighting heavily against the 
Syrian government forces. In June 2011 about one hundred and twenty Syrian soldiers were 
killed in Jisr Al-Shughar (BBC News: 2013) thereby marking the transformation of the conflict 
into a civil war. The Syrian army and the rebels were accused of summary executions in order 
to instill fear in would-be opposers from among the civilians and members of the military forces 
(Amnesty International; 2013: 1, and Human Rights Watch: 2012) proving the growing power 
of the rebels. 
 
The rebellion has an international dimension in that ‘Jihadists’ from across the Arab world 
(Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Libya) are fighting on the side of the rebels (Joya; 
2012:.33) It is also alleged that the USA, Britain and Qatar sent strategists to help the rebels 
(Lendman: 2012). Therefore, while the uprising had internal roots, it was being fanned from 
outside Syria. 
 
                                                          
24 The Syrian National Coalition (SNC) (also known as National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces) preceded the Syrian National Council. It is an amalgamation of different opposition groups 
in Syria founded in November 2012 in Doha, Qatar and has its headquarters in Istanbul, Turkey. It calls for the 
removal of Assad and the Baath party from power in Syria and supports international intervention. It is 
recognized as the legitimate interlocutor of the people of Syria by the European Union (EU) and the Arab 
League. This is exemplified by the decision by the Arab League to give the SNC the Syrian seat at the 
organization. 
The Free Syrian Army is a militia group formed by defectors from the Syrian Armed Forces and other 
individuals who voluntarily joined. It was formed in July 2011 to fight against the Syrian Armed Forces that 
have remained loyal to the Syrian Government. Its main target is the removal of Bashar al Assad from power. 
While the two (SNC and FSA) are independent entities, they have an interactive relationship that has seen the 
FSA acting as the military wing the SNC. They are the most publicized opposition and armed movements in the 




Apart from the presence of foreign national fighters, the rebels have been getting assistance 
from the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), Turkey, USA, and France, including military 
expertise, weapons and means of communication (Joya; 2012: 36-37). This raises questions 
about the role of the international community when it comes to funding rebels in a civil war 
given that aiding the rebels that do not hold the legal monopoly of legitimate force is illegal.  
 
In that regard the Western and GCC states aiding the rebels are found wanting. In moral terms, 
Vattel (1758: bk. 2, ch. 4) argues that it is morally justifiable to assist people who are being 
brutalized by their sovereign. This would seemingly condone the actions of those aiding the 
rebels in Syria. However, the question that needs answering is that what is the representative 
nature of the rebel groups in Syria and the SNC, and what is the percentage of the population 
that still approves the leadership of the Syrian government.  
 
5.6 External Support for the Assad Government: Legality and Morality? 
 
Legal and moral questions also arise against those who are supporting the Assad government. 
This support has come mainly from Russia and China who vetoed UN resolutions against the 
Syrian government; Russia and Iran who provided military hardware (Wezeman; 2013: 270); 
and Hezbollah, Iraq, Pakistani and Afghani Shia in terms of personnel (Al-Jarba: 2013) to assist 
in fighting the rebels. 
 
In terms of the supply of military hardware to the Assad government, it can be argued that the 
morality questions being raised by western powers are ironical given that they are sponsoring 
the rebels. However, moral question can be raised given the fact that the Syrian government 
was using the heavy military weaponry in densely populated civilian areas (Human Rights 
Watch; 2013: 12), which has resulted in the killing of innocent civilians as collateral damage. 
Russian support is morally questionable given that the Russian authorities are aware of the 
events unfolding in Syria and should assist with relevant weaponry.  
 
5.7 The Use of Chemical Weapons and International Response 
 
The use of chemical weapons was termed a game changer by the USA on 20 August 2012 
when it referred to it as a “red line” (The White House: 2012). The weapons were later used in 
August 2013 thereby sparking international outcry. The USA, France and Britain led the call 
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for a military intervention as they alleged that the Assad government had used the weapons 
(Charbonneau and Nichols: 2013), while Russia and Iran among others stood against the 
intervention (Al Jazeera: 2013). The Western powers argued that their intelligence revealed 
that the chemical weapons were used by the Syrian government (Nikitin, Kerr and Feickert; 
2013: 15) while the Russian government stated that there is a possibility that the rebels could 
have used the weapons in order to court international intervention (Russia Today: 2013). The 
UN report did not mention who used the chemical weapons but only asserted that chemical 
weapons were used (United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical 
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic; 2013: Art. 19 & 21). The USA adamantly maintained 
that the Syrian government was at fault given that the findings by the UN technical team 
implicated the Syrian government in the launching and directing of chemical weapons 
(Charbonneau and Nichols: 2013). 
 
The USA government supported by mostly France argued that intervention was necessary in 
order to lay down precedence against the use of chemical weapons in the future as inaction 
would lead a bad precedence in the future (Condon: 2013).  
 
Be that as it may, the Libyan style intervention case failed due to a number of factors. Firstly, 
the British parliament voted against intervention. The action was a big setback for the USA 
which had always relied on British support in its contemporary international military 
interventions. The military intervention case was also done a great blow by the Russian 
diplomatic maneuvers which led to an international agreement being reached by Russia and 
USA which paved way for an international accounting and destruction of Syrian chemical 
weapons stockpile (Irish and Nichols: 2013). 
 
The international hype on intervention coming from the western powers after the use of 
chemical weapons, brings about questions on the humanitarian nature of the intervention given 
that nothing has been done to end the conflict that has claimed more than one hundred thousand 
lives and has created more than two millions of Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey 
and Iraq (Bowen: 2013).  
 
There is a possibility that the USA could have given the rebels chemical weapons and or 
ordered them to use them in order to create a case for intervention (Paul: n d). There have been 
instances in which Syrian rebels in Syria have been seen with chemical weapons equipment 
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and there are also allegations of the involvement of GCC states in the major plot that sought to 
offer the USA a moral pretext for intervention (Paul: n d). 
 
The Middle East is known to be a region of important geopolitical importance to the USA as 
stipulated in the Carter Doctrine and the stifling role to military intervention by the USA and 
its allies have given Russia a new strength in the Middle East as a check on USA actions 
regarding the region in the Security Council. The failure by the USA to have a control on 
Middle East issues with regards Syria in the Security Council could have influenced the 
“redline” call on chemical weapons which is the reason why it has been argued that the USA 




The mere fact that the intervention in Libya by NATO states was sanctioned by the Security 
Council through Resolution 1973 does not render it legal. The UN Charter prohibits the UN 
from intervening in matters that are purely internal. Furthermore the UN had no legal right to 
intervene as the crisis had not turned regional despite the moral justification for intervening in 
order to save the lives of civilians under threat from primarily government forces and rebel 
fighters. The Security Council would only have attained competence had the matter grown to 
threaten regional stability, hence threatening international peace and security. 
  
It can also be argued that the conduct of the intervention also tarnished the legitimacy for two 
reasons. Firstly, intervening forces were mandated with the protection of the civilians. 
However, they actively turned themselves into ‘a rebels’ air force’ (Overhaus; 2011: 2). This 
was compounded by allegations leveled against the French mission of dropping ammunition 
for rebel forces on the ground (BBC News: 2011). The French military leadership quoted by 
BBC News acknowledged having dropped weapons for the rebels when Colonel Thierry 
Burkhard accepted that, “During the operation, the situation for the civilians on the ground 
worsened. We dropped arms and means of self-defence, mainly ammunition” (BBC News: 
2011). Secondly, NATO bombardments resulted in a large number of civilian deaths. Such a 
case raises forth the argument proposed by Des Las Casas that using military means for the 
purposes of saving lives endangered by war or tyrant sovereigns is self defeating as the 
intervention results in the death of the same human beings whom the intervention purports to 
protect (Sorabji; 2006: 20). Although there are no universally accepted statistics on the 
97 
 
casualties from exclusive NATO’s Operations alleged targeting of Gaddafi family members 
specifically his sons, Khamis, Mutassim, and Saif Al Islam as they commanded respect among 
the Libyan military forces (which NATO denied and claimed to be targeting military 
installations) (Payandeh; 2012: 379) tarnished the moral legitimacy on which the intervention 
was grounded on. 
 
In Syria, from the Grotian and Just War perspective, the conflict warrants military intervention 
to save civilians who are not only in danger of the government forces but also from the rebels 
whom the government failed to contain. If one weighs all the necessary conditions for military 
intervention, the Syrian case would prove to be a classical case for an R2P intervention. Firstly, 
international negotiations to stop the crisis failed and there was no other possible peaceful 
avenue that would end the war except the outright defeat of either of the parties. However, with 
the nature of the crisis, waiting for one side to have a decisive victory that would force the other 
to the negotiation table will only open the door for a protracted struggle with a heavy toll on 
the civilian population. 
 
Secondly, there has been a heavy civilian toll that cannot justify non-intervention. The major 
challenge is the fact that human right were being violated by the government as well as the 
rebel movements supported by some major powers as noted by Mather (2012: 502 & 505-507)) 
that Alawites, Christians and civilians who fail to enlist their children in the Free Syrian Army 
or other militant groups faced execution. These are not the only atrocities committed by the 
rebel units given the fact that they are also in position of bigger arms which can indiscriminately 
kill targets and civilians (Mather; 2012: 506). The current toll according to conservative UN 
figures as of the end of August 2013 is placed at more than 100 000 dead with the majority 
being civilians.  
 
In that regard, the manner in which the international community has responded to the uprisings 
in Libya and Syria is questionable. The Libya case had minimal casualties given that the 
intervention was based on the threats of hunting down all those who had taken part or supported 
the rebellion from Benghazi in the event of a Gaddafi victory. In Syria the civilian toll has 
reached a threshold where most would agree that an international military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes is justified. Be that as it may, the intervention is hampered by 
international polarity at Security Council level. The polarity has proven the fact that the failure 
by the ICISS to look for an alternative body to assess issues of military intervention for 
98 
 
humanitarian purposes and leaving it with the Security Council has failed to steer the 














The international response to the rebellions in Libya and in Syria show that even in matters of 
international law, interests of states have a great bearing that may militate against legal and 
moral issues. In Libya the proponents of intervention celebrated a precedent that would not 
only allow for future intervention but also deter would-be aggressors based on the fear that the 
international community was willing to respond while critics saw intervention as yet another 
flawed act driven by self-interests (Lee; 2012: 22).  
 
The international paralysis in the case of Syria shows that the responsibility to protect is not 
established as an international norm that stands above veto power paralysis. The international 
community, it appears, has not learnt from mistakes committed during the implementation of 
UNSC Resolution 1973 in Libya in order to develop a sustainable solution in the case of Syria. 
The Syrian crisis proved true the statement by Weiss (2011: 10) during the Libyan intervention 
that, “If the operation fares well, the norm (R2P) will be strengthened. If it goes poorly, future 
decision-making about its implementation may be even more problematic than in the past.”   
 
This chapter compares and contrasts international responses to the Libyan and Syrian crises 
and analyses the factors that led to certain actions on the part of international states. The first 
part of the chapter discusses similarities and differences between the two crises as a background 
to analyzing international responses. 
 
The international community appeared not prepared for the political and social upheavals in 
the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 / 2011 where events moved quickly and most 
countries, it may be argued, adopted a wait and see policy in order to protect their relations 
with either the governments of the day or the revolting masses. In Egypt, the USA was caught 
between supporting an old and ‘stabilizing’ ally in the region and supporting the rising power 





The case was different in Libya and Syria where the governments in power had neither 
protracted cordial relations with the west nor their Arab counterparts. In this case, the response 
from the west was more hostile, while the Russian and Chinese governments stuck to their non-
interference principles.25  
 
6.2 Similarities and Differences in the Libyan and Syrian Crises 
 
The Libyan and Syrian crises which followed uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt differed much 
their predecessors because they no longer adhered to the dictates of demonstrations but turned 
into rebellions and civil wars.  
 
The thin line between rebellions and peaceful demonstrations or revolutions was evident in the 
cases of Libya and Syria where the complete military stand-off between those referred to as 
‘rebels’ and ‘pro-Gaddafi / pro-Assad’ forces showed that the uprising had surpassed the 
threshold of ‘peaceful demonstrations.’ The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt targeted the 
leadership in general and its system of governance, while in Libya the rebellion was driven 
more from Benghazi and later spread to other towns (Lacher; 2012: 12), and in Syria, the target 
was Assad and his Alawite government (Phillips; n d: 37). 
 
The National Transition Council (NTC) was formed in Benghazi in March 2011 and declared 
itself the transitional government of Libya. In a manner that exhibited regionalization of the 
Libyan crisis, the NTC was dominated by elites in the North East from where the former Libyan 
monarchy hailed and those who had ties to the former Libyan monarchy (Lacher; 2012: 12 & 
13). Rebels also retained the flag of Libya that was used during the era of the monarchy (Issaka; 
2011: 11). Similarly, the uprising in Syria developed sectarian rifts (International Crisis Group 
(ICG); 2012: 24-25) wherein the Assad regime propped up by the Alawite sect courted 
animosity mostly from Sunnis who comprise sixty percent of the Syrian population (Phillips; 
n. d: 37 & 40). The Christian community was caught in-between because on one hand it enjoys 
the religious liberty that came as a result of Hafez al Assad’s secularist policies while on the 
other it wanted to protect itself in the event of a power take over by a ‘radical’ Islamic group 
                                                          
25 In the wake of the Middle East Uprisings, Russia and China have remained resolute to the principle of non-
intervention. Both countries abstained from voting on the passage of UNSC Resolution 1973 of 2011 on Libya. 
While they have been criticized for propping the Assad government in Syria, specifically Russia, these states 
pointed out that they acknowledge the opposition and have been pushing for a political solution to the crisis 
through dialogue between the opposition and the government in Geneva.  
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which had already exhibited hostility towards them (Assyrian International News Agency 
(AINA): 2013). The concept of an elitist transitional council was also applied in Syria as in 
Libya. The Syrian National Council declared itself the transition government and liaised with 
states hostile to the Assad government for recognition and support. 
 
The crises also had governments that were entrenched and exhibited dynastic tendencies 
(Owen; 2012: 374-375). In Libya, Gaddafi exhibited ambitions that he wanted his son, 
presumably Saif al Islam who was installed as the second in command and was instrumental in 
the dialogue with major western capitals like Washington, London and Paris, to succeed him 
(Khechana; 2010: 2). Gaddafi also put some of the special military units under the command 
of his tribesmen or sons (Adams; 2012:9) specifically the 32 Brigade dubbed the Khamis 
Brigade that got its name from Khamis Gaddafi. In Syria, the Assad family’s four decade reign 
ushered in Bashar al Assad who succeeded his father Hafez al Assad in 2000. Similarly to 
Gaddafi, Bashar al Assad put the command of the armies under close relatives, such as the elite 
Republican Guard that is commanded by his brother Maher al Assad (Beck and Huser; 2011: 
2).   
 
The similarities between the Syrian and Libyan crises did not translate to similar international 
responses which appeared to be determined by the relationships that existed between these 
states and the international community. Intervention was also varied because the two states 
have different geographical locations, thus Libya is an African country located close to the 
European mainland while Syria is in the Middle East. They are both members of the Arab 
league and Libya is also a member of the African Union. 
 
The possession or alleged use of chemical weapons is another major difference between the 
two countries. The use or threat of the use of chemical weapons was never issued in Libya 
where the defining issues were the use of heavy weaponry in highly civilian populated areas 
and the threat to have a house by house attack in Benghazi.26 In Syria, the USA government 
issued a ‘red line’ warning on the use of chemical weapons on 20 August 2012 (The White 
House: 2012). The weapons were allegedly used in August 2013. The USA government pushed 
                                                          
26 In the Libyan case, the passing of Resolution 1973 sanction military intervention was due to the abstention by 
Russia and China as well as the African vote. As noted by the Russian ambassador to the UN, the major reason 
was that Gaddafi was threatening excessive use of force and had not heeded the unanimous international call for 
the cessation of violence as called for in UNSC Resolution 1970 of 2011. 
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for an intervention arguing that inaction would create a bad precedence against states with 
chemical weapons (Condon: 2013). One of the major arguments was on who used the weapons. 
Rebels and the western governments argued that the weapons were used by the Syrian 
government(Charbonneau and Nichols: 2013) while the Syrian government and Iran, among 
others, argued that the weapons were used by rebels with support of some GCC states in order 
to create a pretext for intervention outside the ‘morally driven’ humanitarian drive (Paul: n d).  
 
The call for this military intervention started to crumble when the British Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, failed to get a parliamentary approval for intervention (Watt and Hopkins: 2013). 
The British parliament’s refusal weakened the USA position which had undoubtedly relied on 
European support in intervention given the strained nature of its military resources. One would 
argue that there was generally a reluctance on intervention even in USA basing on the 
‘intelligence reports’ that laid the blame on Syria due to the failure to find weapons of mass 
destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after ‘intelligence reports’ had been used as the basis for 
the argument for military invasion. 
 
A middle line was found when the USA Secretary of State, John Kerry, announced that the 
USA would not pursue a military intervention plan if Syria gave up its chemical weapons 
stockpile to the international community (Alexander: 2013). Through the intervention of 
Russia, Syria allowed the inspection by international inspectors on its chemical weapons 
stockpile and agreed on a timeline of the destruction of the stockpiles and the production 
facilities (CBS/ AP: 2013). The agreement ushered in a new era of agreement on the need for 
a political solution to the Syrian crisis and an official international acceptance of the failure of 
the military solution. 
 
Zifcak (2012: 26-27) postulate that another major difference between Libya and Syria, which 
influenced the Security Council to authorize intervention in Libya and failure in Syria was on 
the two leaders of Libya and Syria’s reaction to the uprising. On one hand Gaddafi issued 
explicit threat to destroy all who had joined the rebellion from Benghazi using the word, 
“cockroach” which was used during the Rwandan Genocide. On the other hand, Bashar al-
Assad lamented that the revolution in Syria had been hijacked by armed gangs and extremists 
and promised reforms. According to Zifcak (2012), this different conceptualization of the crises 
in their states meant that the international community came hard on Libya and soft on Syria, 
even though they all used their military machineries against their peoples. 
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6.3 African Union (AU), Arab League and United Nations (UN) on Libya  
 
The conclusion of Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 which authorized the 
implementation of a no fly zone over Libya for the protection of civilians was as a result of 
Libya’s relations with different states and international organizations. The Libyan case was 
different from the Syrian case partly because of the different foreign relations between Gaddafi 
and Assad with individual states as well as international alignment. 
 
6.3.1 Africa and the African Union (AU) 
 
There was a discrepancy in the responses of African states and the AU to the Libyan uprising. 
At a regional level, the AU tried to take a middle ground in its response to the uprisings not 
only in Libya but in all the uprisings that affected its Arab membership. The regional body was 
bound by the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which aims, among 
other things to,  “prohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional change of government in any 
Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, security and development” (Article 2). The 
Charter further states that “State Parties agree that the use of, inter alia, the following illegal 
means of accessing or maintaining power constitute an unconstitutional change of government 
and shall draw appropriate sanctions by the Union: … 3. Any replacement of a democratically 
elected government by armed dissidents or rebels” (Article 23 [3]). The AU therefore did not 
extend formal recognition to the Transitional National Council (TNC) when it was established 
in Benghazi.  
 
However, the regional body attempted to have a ‘peaceful solution’ by dispatching an AU high 
level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya which was composed of Presidents of South Africa, Uganda, 
Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, Mauritania and the AU Commission chairperson, Jean Ping. Its task 
was to negotiate with the Gaddafi government and the TNC to accept a peaceful roadmap that 
was going to be implemented through the creation of a unity government (Ping; 2011: 2). 
Among the issues that had to be implemented in the transition roadmap were the cessation of 
hostilities, accepting humanitarian agencies to help those in need of socio economic assistance, 
the protection of foreign national working as expatriates in Libya and an inclusive transition 





The initiative failed for a number of reasons. At local level, individual states had conflicting 
responses to the uprisings and the leadership of the rebellion. Gambia, Nigeria and Senegal 
extended formal recognition to the TNC while Zimbabwe and South Africa did not. The 
Zimbabwean government expelled the Libyan Ambassador from Harare when he defected to 
the TNC (Machivenyika: 2011), while the Ambassador to South Africa was not expelled. His 
roles were assumed by the Charge d’Affaires who was already at the embassy (Alzubedi; 2011: 
14). The Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, in his 
explanation of why the government of Zimbabwe expelled the ambassador argued that; 
  
Once you renounce the authority, which gave you letters of credence, pull down 
their portrait, burn the flag and pledge allegiance to a different authority, it 
means that act alone deprives you of the diplomatic standing, which you had 
been accorded. This is what happened here with the ambassador and his staff. 
That act alone deprived the Libyan ambassador and his staff of any diplomatic 
status or standing in Zimbabwe because Zimbabwe does not recognize the 
National Transitional Council (Machivenyika: 2011). 
 
The contradictory responses between individual states and the AU as a regional body, which 
emanated from the collision between national interests of different states and the legal protocols 
of the AU, was one of the reasons why the AU failed to have an ‘African solution to an African 
problem’. 
 
The AU mission failed in part because of mistrust from the NTC as a result of Gaddafi’s 
perceived influence in the continental body and the TNC’s belief that Gaddafi would not accept 
change. These suspicions were further compounded by the fact that Gaddafi quickly accepted 
the AU peace plan. On the other hand, the TNC was emboldened by NATO support. TNC fears 
were arguably not unfounded. In the two classic examples of inclusive governments that had 
been formed under the auspices of the AU and regional organizations in Zimbabwe and Kenya, 
the incumbent leaders had a large share of power and greater influence in political decisions 
than the new ‘junior’ partners (Mapuya; 2013: 113). 
 
The AU mission also failed because of the Arab League’s stance against Gaddafi. The fact that 
Libya belonged to both the AU and the Arab League made it complex to understand which 
regional body’s decision took precedence when the AU was discussing a peace roadmap, the 
105 
 
Arab League referred the case to the Security Council, hence, the Security Council had a 
mandate to act as it was invited by a recognized organization under Chapter 8 of the UN 
Charter. The Arab League reference was driven by its relations as an organization and the 
different relations between Libya and individual member states of the League. These relations 
will be discussed in the following section. 
 
The AU argued that its response to the crisis in Libya was appropriate as guided by its 
principles on democratic governance and constitutional change of government. Ping (2011: 1) 
argues that African “issues have long suffered from either a lack of exposure in the mainstream 
media, marginalization and misrepresentation or from outright silencing. The case of the 
African Union’s intervention in Libya is a classic example of how African efforts go unreported 
or are twisted to suit a hostile agenda.” 
 
In his defence of the AU peace plan, Ping (2011: 2) noted that the organization was neither in 
support of Gaddafi nor the rebel movement but tried to balance the wishes of the Libyan people. 
When the Ad Hoc High Level Panel was making efforts to redress the crisis in a peaceful and 
inclusive manner, NATO stifled the plan;  
 
The members of the ad hoc Committee met in Nouakchott, on 19 March 2011. 
They were planning to travel to Libya the following day, to interact with the 
parties. As required by resolution 1973 (2011), the Committee sought 
authorization for the flights carrying its members to Libya. This request was 
denied. In actual fact, the military campaign to enforce resolution 1973 started 
the very day the ad hoc Committee was meeting in Nouakchott. 
 
Ping notes that the course of events in Libya differed from the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, 
hence, acknowledging that in Libya, the crisis was more of a rebellion than an uprising. The 
case, therefore, required a different reaction which meant not simply accepting the newly 
formed TNC until it was in effective control of Libya after the fall of Tripoli. The AU therefore 
granted recognition to the TNC on 20 September 2011.  
 
Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, made a stern analysis of events and blamed the 
the Security Council and the Arab League for the AU’s failure. Mbeki (2012) noted that, “the 
UN Security Council willfully elected to ignore the decisions of the African Union, treating 
106 
 
these decisions relating to an African country, and therefore us, the peoples of Africa, with 
absolute contempt.” Mbeki (2012: 5) notes that the Security Council argued that Gaddafi had 
distanced himself from the AU (Mbeki; 2012: 5), a claim that was unfounded. In actual fact, 
Libya under Gaddafi only remained a nominal member of the Arab League while most of its 
attention was on Africa, hence the contempt with which he was treated by Arab states. Mbeki 
concludes that the intervention by NATO was not in good faith as it was aimed at effecting 
regime change in Libya (Mbeki; 2012: 5), an act which is illegitimate and illegal in both 
customary and international treaty law. 
 
6.3.2 Arab States and the Arab League 
 
The Arab League’s decisions on the crisis were given precedence over those of the AU 
principally by the USA and the EU as they had entrusted the League to do so (Bradley and 
Levinson, 2011). The Arab League’s response to the crisis in Libya was totally different from 
that of the AU. The League suspended Libya from the organization on 22 February 2011 citing 
its heavy handed response on ‘civilians’ (Al Arabiya News: 2011). This was ironic given that 
other League members, including Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, used force in suppressing 
dissenting voices (Blanchard; 2012: 9 – 12 & 13). 
 
On 12 March 2011 the Arab League urged the Security Council to enforce a ‘no-fly zone’ over 
Libyan airspace (Freeman, Meo and Hennessy: 2011). The decision could have been influenced 
by the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Bellamy and Williams; 2011: 841), 
comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, and which 
stated that the Gaddafi government had lost legitimacy and that the GCC would initiate contact 
with the Libyan rebels (Al Jazeera: 2011). 
 
The statement by the GCC, the USA and EU’s deferment to the Arab League on whether a 
military intervention was possible and feasible in Libya seem to have been coordinated between 
the regional bodies and states given that the EU, on 11 March 2011 had stated that Gaddafi’s 
government has, “lost all legitimacy and is no longer an interlocutor for the EU” (Al Arabiya 
News: 2011).  
 
The role of the Arab League, particularly the GCC countries, appears to have been influenced 
more by the relations these states had with Libya than legal or humanitarian motives. While 
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the Gaddafi government was transforming into a Western ally especially after the surrender of 
the Lockerbie bombing suspects to Britain and when the USA resumed diplomatic relations 
with Tripoli in 2004 (World Model United Nations; 2013: 15), this was not the case with the 
GCC. As long ago as 1980 it was alleged that Gaddafi was involved in a plot to assassinate 
King Hussein of Jordan (World Model United Nations; 2013: 15), while in 2004 Saudi Arabia 
alleged that Gaddafi was plotting to assassinate its Crown Prince(World Model United Nations; 
2013: 19). 
 
6.3.3 The International Community and the UN 
 
Gaddafi had no permanent alliances internationally and vacillated between being critical of the 
West, supporter of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism, before lingering back to the Western 
powers’ armpits. The Western states that never trusted him seized the moment by protecting 
their national interest, while Russia and China’s abstention from the vote in UNSC Resolution 
1973 showed that they had no interest in protecting Gaddafi who had courted an alliance with 
Western powers. The resolution was passed with ten votes in favour and five abstentions 
(Xinhua: 2011). Apart from China and Russia, which are veto power wielding states, the other 
states which abstained were Brazil, Germany and India (Xinhua: 2011).  
 
The Chinese, through their permanent representative to the UN, noted that China was 
concerned by the situation in Libya and supported appropriate measures by the Security 
Council to stop the killing of civilians (Xinhua: 2011). However, China had serious concerns 
over some of the clauses in Resolution 1973 and therefore abstained from voting as it respected 
the decision by the Arab League for the implementation of a no fly zone and also the fact that 
all the African countries at the Security Council had voted in favour of the resolution (Xinhua: 
2011). The Chinese delegate exposed the detachment China had with Libya when he stated that 
while China “abstained during the vote on the resolution, Resolution 1973, we support the 
secretary-general's special envoy for Libya and the African Union and the Arab League in their 
continuing efforts to address by peaceful means the current crisis in Libya” (Xinhua: 2011). 
 
Russia argued that it abstained on the basis that it respected the aspirations of the Arab states 
as represented by their call for a no-fly zone on Libya through the Arab League (UNSC 6498th 
Meeting minutes; 2011: 8). The Russian Ambassador to the UN noted that his country also 
took into consideration the need to preserve the lives of the Libyan civilians who were 
108 
 
threatened by the heavy weapons used by the government in civilian populated areas but had 
reservations on the language of the final draft which opened room for excessive use of force 
(UNSC 6498th Meeting minutes; 2011: 8). Vitaly Churkin noted that on resolution 1973, 
“Gaddafi was coming out with various threatening statements with regard to the population of 
Benghazi. And there was a real possibility of a bloodbath” (Turlin: 2011).  
 
The history of vetoing security council resolutions shows that veto powers usually use such 
powers where their interests are threatened or in support and or defence of their non-veto allies. 
Thomson argues that the veto is a weapon to maintain the international hegemony of those who 
wield it and that it leads to the paralysis of the UN. According to Thomson (1999: 878), “the 
structure and voting procedure of the Security Council have made it impossible for any great 
power, or the protégé of any great power, to be condemned as an aggressor by the United 
Nations. It is therefore, normally impossible to take punitive action against such a state through 
the machinery of the United Nation.” 
 
The move by China and Russia not to veto Resolution 1973 should not only be analyzed in 
terms of Chinese/ Russian-African Union-Arab League relations, but also in the political 
interests of these veto powers. The Chinese argued that they wanted the case to be resolved 
amicably yet they shied from vetoing the resolution that opened the gates for NATO air strikes 
and regime change in Libya. It can therefore be argued that Gaddafi’s lack of clear cut 
international alignment and leaning more to the West, which had its own interests as far as the 
Arab League was concerned, cost him support from Russia and China. 
 
NATO member states had mobilized for a military intervention in Libya even before the 
passing of Resolution 1973 (Issaka; 2011: 10-11). This decision by NATO member states, 
specifically Britain, France, Italy, and the USA, was influenced by their past history of hostility 
with Gaddafi, the geo-strategic importance of Libya and the desire to have a stake in Libyan 
natural resources as exemplified by the fact that French government signed a contract with the 
NTC as early as April 2011, when the rebels conceded 35 per cent of Libya’s crude oil to Paris 







6.4 Syria, the Arab League and the International Community 
 
The response of the Arab League to the Syrian crisis has shown some similarities in the manner 
in which the organization responded to the Libyan uprising. The Arab League suspended the 
Syrian government on 12 November 2011 stating that the Assad government had failed to stop 
a crackdown against anti-government protesters (Russia Today:2011). On 26 March 2013 the 
Syrian National Council (SNC) was invited to occupy the Syrian seat at the Arab League (Fox 
News: 2013), a clear sign of the recognition of SNC as the legitimate representative of the 
Syrian people. Similarly the League suspended the Gaddafi government from the regional 
organization and in a joint statement with the EU, granted recognition to the ‘rebel’ TNC which 
was recognized as the “legitimate interlocutor representing the aspirations of the Libyan 
people” (Arab Times: 2011). 
 
While the Arab League was not the primary deciding body on the international response in 
Syria, the majority of its member states, including Libya and Tunisia who had come through 
the processes of the Arab Spring, are hostile to the Syrian government of Bashar Al Assad and 
have pursued a response that is not in line with international law and morals for protecting 
civilians, but a radical policy that seeks to oust Bashar Al Assad at all cost. This has been done 
by providing material and moral support to rebel groups inside Syria (Joya; 2012: 32). 
 
The developments and responses to the crises in the Middle East countries, Syria included, has 
created suspicions in many minds of a Sunni Muslim conspiracy against Shiites who are a 
regional minority. This draws from the fact that in countries where the uprisings are driven by 
Shiites, GCC states have supported a sitting Sunni government, while in Syria, where the 
Alawite which dominated government has Shia roots, the GCC states have sided with Sunnis 
(Abdo; 2013: 2 & 4).  In Bahrain, the GCC sent in military assistance to the ruling government 
against the demonstrators who were mainly Shia, while in Yemen, the Saudis, long before the 
Arab Spring, helped the Saleh government to control the militant Shia community that was 
waging an uprising in Yemen in 2009 (Winter; 2011: 104). This support was also extended in 
the work of the Arab Spring in which Saudi Arabia helped to broker a deal that saw Saleh 
agreeing to an exit plan that granted him immunity from prosecution (Almasmari: 2011).  
 
The regional ‘cold war’ which had been given impetus by the Iranian nuclear projects was 
rekindled by the Syrian crisis. The response of the GCC has been in support of the Free Syrian 
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Army and the SNC, which are dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Sunni Muslims 
while Iran has stood by the Assad led Syrian government. In support of this argument, Sun 
(2012: 2) notes that, “Indeed, some Chinese analysts argue that the campaign against the Iran-
backed Assad government is essentially a Christian-Sunni Muslim coalition against Shiite 
Muslims.” 
 
The sectarian divide in Syria has a regional interest explanation. Syria is a major ally of Iran in 
the region due to its centrality and standing as a buffer between Iran and Turkey. Therefore, 
Iran sees the survival of the Assad government as the maintenance of a buffer against NATO 
encroachment into its proximities, while the success of the western and Arab League backed 
SNC will mean the isolation of Iran.  
 
The Gulf states, specifically Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which failed on the plan to use the 
Security Council platform in a replay of the Libya case in which Resolution 1973 paved the 
way for regime change, resorted to media war against Syria. Joya (2012: 37) notes that Qatar 
“directed its foreign policy through Aljazeera Arabic, a media outlet which serves an important 
role in shaping public opinion in the Arab world.” Saudi Arabia conducted its media campaign 
“through its London based network, Al-Arabia, which offered a platform for fundamentalist 
clerics who painted the Assad regime as non Muslims and the Alawites as heretics who should 
be deposed” (Joya; 2012: 39). The media war helped to shape international reaction in Europe 
and North America where the public would support western intervention in the Middle East. 
There is a symbolic annihilation of the voices supporting a peaceful demonstration or those 
supporting the government in favour of those who are militant or aligned to the SNC (Joya; 
2012: 38). 
 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia have gone beyond a media war against Syria in advocating open 
support, including supplying arms to the SNC and the Free Syrian Army. The Amir of Qatar 
and the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saud Al Faisal, described the arming of the 
opposition in Syria as an excellent idea. This process draws some similarities with the Libyan 
case in which France supplied weapons to the TNC (Spencer: 2011). The case has been 
compounded by the use of chemical weapons in 2013. GCC states like Saudi Arabia quickly 
called for a western led military intervention. The call was accepted by the governments of 
Britain, France and USA. These states argued that they had intelligence which implicated 
Bashar al Assad’s government in the use of chemical weapons (Nikitin, Kerr and Feickert; 
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2013: 15). They also argued that the UN report on the chemical weapons implicated the Syrian 
government (Charbonneau and Nichols: 2013). 
 
The argument was rejected by major Syrian allies who alleged that even the rebels had the 
capacity to have used the chemical weapons so as to court international intervention (Paul: n 
d). Russian dissent meant that taking the case to the Security Council would be futile. Britain 
took the case to the House of Commons where it was rejected (Watt and Hopkins: 2013). There 
were also cold feet among some USA policymakers. The tense international climate was 
salvaged by John Kerry’s suggestion that if the Syrian government gave up its chemical 
weapons arsenal there will be no strikes (Alexander: 2013).  
 
Russia and Syria agreed to the proposition. The deal was not acceptable to Saudi Arabia which 
some analysts like Ron Paul; argue that it had provided the weapons to the rebels to initiate a 
strike that would bring in international intervention (Paul: n d). Given the changes in the Iranian 
presidency and government to a leadership that sought rapprochement with the west, failure to 
remove Assad by force may pose a geo-political threat to Saudi Arabia. The same fears are also 
shared by Israel, another USA and Western ally in the region. 
 
In a clear show of geo-political concerns, Saudi Arabia threatened to review its relations with 
the USA due to the failure of unilateral airstrikes (Foster, Sherlock and Spillius: 2013). The 
transformation of relations after a seemingly Russia-Iran victory has seen Saudi Arabia and 
Israel disheartened by USA responses to their political survival needs in the region. 
 
6.4.1 The International Community 
 
The response of the international community to Syria shows glaring differences from its 
response to the Libyan uprising. The UN and the Arab League made strides to have a peaceful 
solution to the Syrian crisis. This may have been influenced by the international polarity that 
was not visible in the Libyan crisis. Under the auspices of the UN and the Arab League, a peace 
plan was muted. The peace process was initially led by Kofi Annan and later by Lakhdar 
Brahimi (UN/Arab League Special Envoy to Syria) after the resignation of the former.  
 
Under the peace plan, Kofi Annan proposed six points which called for cooperation by both 
the government and rebels with the international community in a peace process under UN 
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supervision. The plan proposed the opening of inaccessible areas due to war for humanitarian 
assistance, the release of political prisoners and to ensure freedom of movement for media 
personnel and freedom of association for the general citizenry 
(http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/six_point_proposal.pdf). 
 
The six point peace plan accepted what the Arab League Observer Mission noted that military 
activities were being conducted by both the government and the rebel fighters. The peace plan 
called on all sides to stop military activities and engage in acts that would bring peace and trust 
among the parties and hence begin the process of peaceful negotiations and transition to a 
democratic society. 
 
The process however failed and Kofi Annan resigned, citing lack of cooperation from both 
sides as well as the Security Council (Gladstone: 2012). A ceasefire process that had been 
commenced by the Syrian authorities on 12 April 2012 it did not stop clashes between rebel 
and government fighters and lack of support from regional and international powers saw the 
Plan collapsing (The Telegraph: 2012).  
 
Joya (2012: 32) supported the notion that international players specifically those aligned to the 
rebels were not committed to the success of the peace plan when she noted that the SNC 
“pushed for sanctions and policies to isolate the Ba’thist regime and its proposals have been 
received positively by western powers. The group condemned diplomatic solutions as well as 
the Kofi Annan Peace Plan.” Joya (2012:35) further notes that the USA and its allies have 
shunned diplomatic solutions to the Syrian crisis as their ultimate goal is the defeat of Iran 
through regional and international isolation of which defeating and overthrowing Bashar Al 
Assad was a stepping.  
 
Western powers supported the SNC, in the same manner it did with the TNC, but that support 
did not translated into a military intervention that would have propelled the SNC to power as 
was the Libyan case. This failure of a western driven military intervention is only due to the 
Chinese and Russian vetoes in the Security Council because most western powers and the GCC 
states preferred a military intervention. Russia and China have responded very differently to 
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the Syrian crisis. They vetoed three Security Council resolutions on Syria27 unlike abstention 
in the case of resolution 1973 which paved way for the ousting of Gaddafi in Libya. 
 
The Russian government criticized implementation of Resolution 1973 in the case of Libya. 
On 20 March 2011, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the use of force went 
beyond the agreed principles in the resolution, while Vladimir Putin (The Russian President, 
then Russian Prime Minister on the passing of Resolution 1973) was quoted on 21 March 2011 
saying that the resolution was deficient in that it gave room for interference in the internal 
affairs of a sovereign state in a manner that was reminiscent of the mediaeval crusades (Global 
Research: 2011). The Russian Ambassador to the UN on 8 December 2011 argued that UN 
actions in Libya “impacted on our thinking on Syria and led to our veto, together with China, 
of a resolution on Syria” (Tulin: 2011). 
 
While resolutions on Syria were watered down, Russia and China feared that they would be 
used for military intervention. Another precedent was Kosovo in which resolutions 1199 and 
1203 of 23 September and 24 October 1998, respectively, were interpreted by NATO as 
authorization for militarily intervention without an explicit military intervention resolution. 
Efforts by Russia on that occasion to reverse the Kosovo intervention through the Security 
Council were defeated by fifteen votes to three. Russia came to believe that once in motion, it 
would be impossible to reverse military intervention. Churkin (quoted in Tulin: 2011) notes 
that, “we have a new phenomenon in place, where Security Council resolutions are simply 
regarded by some countries as a trigger.” 
 
Geo-political interests also played a role in the Russian response to the Syrian crisis. Russia 
felt sidelined in the implementation of Resolution 1973 by NATO and the fact that it did not 
take part in the Libyan Contact Group which provided political guidance to Libya (Allison; 
2013: 798). Russia is also challenging Western-led intervention in order to check USA 
influence in the Middle East (Allison; 2013: 808), given that the USA already has considerable 
influence over Sunni leaders in the region. Therefore, aligning with the Shia was one way to 
check on USA influence.  
                                                          
27 Michelle Nichols, “Russia, China Veto UN Security Council Resolution on Syria,” Reuters, 19 July 2012, 
accessed 30 September 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/19/us-syria-crisis-un-
idUSBRE86I0UD20120719, The 19 July 2012 double veto was the 3rd, having been preceded by the 1st on 4 
October 2011 and the 2nd on 4 February 2012. 
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Mearsheimer and Walt (2006: 25 & 29) argued that there is a USA / Israeli plan to effect regime 
change against governments in the Middle East that are not friendly to them with the chief 
targets being Iran and Syria and Iraq before the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Sharon, when 
he was leader of Israel, and his Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz, called for the USA to put “very 
heavy” pressure on Syria, Sharon’s national security advisor, Ephraim Halevy, was quoted as 
saying that the USA had to “get rough with Syria”. The Israeli lobby in the USA was clear that 
“there has got to be regime change in Syria” (Mearsheimer and Walt; 2006: 36). 
 
Syria came to be increasingly seen as a terrorist state due to its relationship with Hamas and 
Hezbollah. This was despite the fact that Syria had co-operated with the USA in its international 
“war on terror” by exchanging intelligence on Al-Qaeda with the CIA and had given CIA 
interrogators access to Mohammed Zammar, the alleged recruiter of the 9/11 hijackers 
(Mearsheimer and Walt; 2006: 37) . Syria became a target of regime change as a step towards 
isolating Iran. Joya (2012: 35) notes that after the defeat of the Security Council resolutions on 
Syria, the USA, Britain, France and Germany pushed for regime change through arming Syrian 
rebels.  
 
Joya (2012: 35-36) believes that this is not a ‘recent development.’ The US and Israel have 
wanted to contain Iran for a long time and effecting regime change in Syria “will get the US 
one step closer to its goal.” Seen from this perspective, there was a conspiracy between the 
USA, Sunni Arab states, and Israel to contain Iran and Syria in order to curtail Shia influence 
in the Middle East. 
 
Syria became a battle ground for regional dominance between Turkey and Iran. Mohammed 
(2011: 66) argued that Syria was the “epicenter for clout competition among several actors. 
Turkey and Iran have appeared as two prominent rivals in Syria.” Prior to the Arab Spring and 
the uprising in Syria, Turkey courted Syrian attention and pushed for diplomatic cooperation 
(Mohammed; 2011: 68-70). However, the uprising saw aligning with the Western powers due 
to international and religious sectarian alignment, while Iran supported the government of 
Bashar Al Assad (Robinson; 2012:334). The Syrian government therefore drifted to the Iranian 
sphere. This radical shift in allegiance saw Turkey supporting the SNC, giving bases to the 
Free Syrian Army and being a route for weapons transfer to the Free Syrian Army and other 




The support given to Syrian rebels by the Turkish authorities created more tension with the 
Syrian authorities. The Syrian Ambassador to Turkey warned that for Syria “the Muslim 
Brotherhood is like the PKK for Turkey” (Mohammed; 2011: 72). The PKK is a Kurdish group 
that seeks autonomy from the Turkish government and is regarded by the government as a 
terrorist organization (Mohammed; 2011: 72). Syrian ambassador to Turkey noted that 
Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood implied that it wanted to destabilize Syria which 
may offer a sanctuary for the PKK in retaliation. 
 
Turkey saw the survival of Assad’s government as a threat to its internal stability as proven by 
the threats of possible support for the PKK and subsequently a regional victory for Iran in its 
struggle with Turkey for regional dominance. On the other hand Assad’s fall, would give 
Turkey the upper hand and be advantageous to NATO and allow it to pressure Iran over issues 
such as its nuclear programme. 
 
The Syrian uprising should therefore not only be viewed as an internal democratic uprising, 
but also one with geo-political issues that have fuelled the conflict for so long. There has been 
a neglect of international law, humanitarian law and the responsibility to protect concepts as 
major powers tussles for dominance and maneuvering under the guise of military intervention 
for humanitarian purposes.   
 
The use of chemical weapons did not change the responses of the players in the international 
system on Syria. The USA, Arab League members, European powers like Britain and France, 
used the case to push for an intervention against the Assad government (Charbonneau and 
Nichols: 2013). These states argued that they had intelligence implicating the Assad 
government in the case (Nikitin, Kerr and Feicket: 2013: 15) and also argued that the UN report 
had information that proved their argument (Charbonneau and Nichols: 2013). 
 
Russia and Iran argued to the contrary and stood by Assad. They noted that there was a 
possibility that the rebels could have used the chemical weapons to court USA led intervention 
(Russia Today: 2013). They, hence stood against the calls for a military intervention as a 
punishment for Assad. The western driven intervention momentum eased when the British 
parliament voted against Cameron government’s call for intervention (Watt and Hopkins: 
2013) alongside France and the USA. Even in the USA there was skepticism against 
intervention. The announcement by John Kerry in early September 2013 that if Syria 
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surrendered its chemical weapons stockpile to the international community there will be no 
intervention (Alexander: 2013) transformed the polarized international climate but not the 
regional climate in the Middle East. Syria agreed to a Russian plan for chemical weapons 
surrender (CBS/AP: 2013) which brought some degree of international consensus that there 
was need for a political solution in the form of talks between Syrian parties mediated by the 
international community in Geneva. 
 
The polarity proved that the major international and regional powers were standing by their 
sides. Even the fact that more than one hundred thousand deaths had been surpassed, the 
international community seemed not concerned about the humanitarian catastrophe which 
leads one to question on what are to be the benchmarks for military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes. 
 
6.5 Regime Change and Other Factors 
 
Regime change is one of the many reasons why powerful states intervene in other states on the 
pretext of humanitarian intervention is regime change. Regime change can be defined as, “The 
forcible replacement by external actors of the elite and/or governance structure of a state so 
that the successor regime approximates some purported international standard of governance” 
(Reisman; 2004: 516). 
 
Regime change has been part of the foreign policy of powerful states before the regulation of 
war in the international system. Reisman (2004: 516) notes that, “States have long meddled in 
the politics of other states in order to change the governments there to their own liking, whether 
impelled by revolutionary political, racial, or religious ideology; fear; or sheer lust for power.” 
The creation of UN Law which illegalized all other wars and the threat of the use of force 
except in self defence or for the protection of international peace and security, meant that 
forcible regime change became an illegal act in international relations. The act was also 
rendered illegitimate by the upholding of the principles of self determination and sovereignty. 
 
The current UN Law stipulates that waging a war that is driven by the need for regime change 
is not accepted. Walzer (2006: xiii) points that, “I do not believe that regime change, by itself, 
can be a just cause for war.” Even in cases of a war against aggression, after defeating the 
aggressor, the victors have no right to forcibly change the government of the state they were 
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fighting (Walzer; 2006: x). Such an act would be against the principles of sovereignty and self 
determination of the citizens of the defeated state. 
 
Inspite of the foregoing, powerful states have continued to intervene in other states and effect 
regime changethereby usurping of the right of self determination of the citizens in an intervened 
state. However, Walzer (2006: x) argues that in an intervention against a regime committing 
genocide and gross human rights violations, there is need for regime change because the 
government system would be criminal. Its murderous system makes it morally liable for regime 
change, which will be an assurance for safety and protection to the civilians. In this regard, 
Walzer argues that if a humanitarian intervention had been conducted in Rwanda, such an 
intervention could only be completed with the intervening powers leading in changing the 
Rwandese government (2006: x-xi). 
 
Regime change after a humanitarian intervention can be justified as a moral assurance of safety 
for the citizens, however, questions arise in cases where intervention is a pretext to regime 
change. In Libya and Syria, Western leaders called for the removal of Gaddafi and Assad, 
respectively, before the talk of humanitarian intervention. The interventions that followed calls 
for the resignation of the leaders for the troubled states, as was the case in Libya later, where 
obviously done in pursuit of regime change. This was also proven by the failure by the 
intervening states to assist in stabilizing Libya after the war, an act which is a duty under the 
Just War Doctrine (Jus post bellum).  
 
Regime change in Libya, and as also argued for in Syria, was not meant to save the lives of the 
civilians, because many were killed after Gaddafi, while in Syrian (and Iraq) terrorist groups 





The international response to the uprisings and the crises in Libya exhibited some uniformities 
and divergences. In Libya, there was an understanding between the major powers and most 
other states in the Security Council which led to the passage of resolution 1973 which paved 
way for a legitimate and legal military intervention in Libya by NATO member states and 
NATO itself. The major reason for the passage of resolution 1973 can be seen as the lack of a 
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clear alignment policy by Gaddafi. In the last years before the Arab Spring, Gaddafi had 
pursued a western alignment policy. One can therefore argue that the abstention was a silent 
message to both the western powers and Gaddafi that Russia and China were not part of the 
camp and so had no interest to protect by voting for or vetoing the resolution. 
 
The conduct was, however, riddled with international criticism regarding the manner in which 
the Security Council sidelined the African Union as the regional body that had the primary 
responsibility to respond through the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes on the 
Libyan crisis. In the same vein, the Security Council granted this mandate to the Arab League 
to which Gaddafi had only become a nominal member without active participation and had bad 
relations with most of its members, leading to the hastened call by the Arab League for the 
Security Council to enforce a no fly zone over the Libyan territory.  
 
The implementation of the resolution by NATO was also against the spirit of the resolution 
1973. NATO states extended their mandate against the prescription of the resolution to become 
a de facto air power for the TNC and effecting a regime change. This led to suspicions among 
the major powers that have led to the polarization in the Security Council among the veto states 
on the Syrian crisis. 
 
The international and regional response in the Syrian crisis has been marred by politics of 
national and geopolitical interests. The Sunni Muslim dominated states in the Middle East led 
by Saudi Arabia and Qatar have pushed for a regime change by any means necessary in Syria. 
This has the blessing of Western powers that see the fall of Assad’s government as a major step 
to isolate and contain Iran which is seen as a regional power with the capacity to threaten 
Israel’s security. 
 
Military intervention was stopped because China and Russia vetoed all resolutions on Syria as 
they were skeptical of the Western powers’ plans on Syria. The resistance against a western 
backed intervention by Russia and China can also be understood in the context of geo-political 
influence. Syria holds the only Russian naval base in the Middle East and a success of a western 
driven intervention had the capacity to tip the scale in favour of the USA and its allies against 
those of Russia, as was the case in the Libyan intervention. International pride can also be seen 
as an influencing factor. After the Libyan intervention, Russia and China were overshadowed 
by the USA and the EU even though their abstention paved way for the intervention. The 
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response by the new Libyan government could have influenced Russia and China to stop a 
forcible western intervention, while at the same time playing a mediatory role by recognizing 
the need for talks in Geneva in which they would be influential to the point of ushering a new 
Syrian government that would be seen as pro-western. 
 
Syria was also a battleground to test the regional dominant power between Turkey and Iran. 
The international response in Syria, as was in Libya was, therefore, not driven by the need to 
protect civilians from government forces or rebel forces but driven more by national interests 
and the battle for regional dominance. Even the international reaction to the use of chemical 
weapons was not driven more by the need to protect civilians but the need to push for 
dominance between contending powers in the Middle East. 
 
The laxity of USA policy especially after the success of a Russian driven policy for the 
surrender of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile to the international community so as to avert 
USA air strikes can also be explained in the renewed nuclear talks with Iran in Geneva after 
the ascension of Hassan Rouhani to the Iran presidency that saw an initial nuclear agreement 
being reached on 24 November 2013. However, the deal has not been welcomed by Saudi 
Arabia and Israel (Yan and Levs: 2013) whose major regional policies were sustained by 
antagonism with Iran, a policy that influenced their response to the Syrian crisis. 
 
The responses to the Syrian crisis by both regional and international powers have been 
influenced by geo-political implications. Legal and legitimate concerns as advocated for by 
international law and the doctrine of military intervention for humanitarian purposes have been 
flouted. There has not been an active military intervention, bu indirect intervention through the 
unveiling of weapons to the parties and official announcements by major powers that has 














The international community’s active role in the crises in Libya and Syria raises legal and 
moral questions on the role of states in the internal affairs of other states. The active or passive 
participation of powerful states such as the members of NATO, Russia, China, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey and Iran, amongst others, in the crises has seen questions of sovereignty, the 
use of force and human rights issues resurface on the table of international relations. This 
chapter synthesizes the major findings and arguments raised in this thesis and makes some 
recommendations.  
 
7.1 General Findings: Libya and Syria  
 
Since the 1990s military interventions for humanitarian purposes have raised the need to 
synchronize international law, human rights law and military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes. The international human rights doctrine gained momentum since the end of the Cold 
War but it has not been developed to the extent that it can be considered as unseating the 
concept of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The 
doctrine has failed, among other things, to gain full universal acceptance. International human 
rights doctrines are accepted by different states, depending on their cultural values or political 
exigencies. There are no commonly accepted parameters or statistics to define gross human 
rights violations. One may argue that this is one of the reasons why there was intervention in 
the Libyan crisis and a failure to intervene in the Syrian crisis even though more civilians died 
in Syria than in Libya. 
 
The question of military intervention for humanitarian reasons, having been brought to light by 
the NATO intervention in Libya, raises judgmental questions. As noted in chapter 5, the 
legality of the Security Council’s resolution 1973 was questionable as the UN does not have a 
mandate to intervene in matters that are purely internal to a sovereign state.  The Security 
Council, therefore, tried to make its intervention legal by invoking the threat to international 
peace and security clause in the preamble of Resolution 1973. One may argue that the 
intervention was legitimate as it was based on the evident grounds of the Libyan authorities 
using heavy weaponry in civilian populated areas (Blanchard; 2011: 4), thereby endangering 
the lives of those who were not part of the rebellion or uprising. Intervention also gained 
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credence from the international backing, as shown by the support that the resolution had from 
Security Council members, including the three African members. 
 
However, the legitimacy of the intervention became questionable because of the conduct of the 
intervening states and the regional security organization (NATO) which acted in a manner that 
was arguably against the spirit and letter of Resolution 1973. The resolution called for the 
protection of civilians and their residential areas, NATO actively provided air cover for the 
rebel forces28 who were also committing human rights violations against civilians they labeled 
‘Gaddafi loyalists’.  
 
The Resolution itself (art. 4) also singled out Benghazi specifically as deserving protection. 
The Security Council thus offered protection to the city of rebellion to the neglect of other 
areas, specifically those that were seen as sympathetic to Gaddafi. 
 
According to Walzer (1977: 21), when a state intervenes in another state militarily, its actions 
should be judged by its motive to intervene and the military methods it applies in order to 
succeed in winning the war against an aggressor or in stopping the commitment of massive 
human rights violations. The sincerity of NATO states in enforcing UNSC Resolution 1973 is 
questionable given that all states that intervened had overtly called for the stepping down of 
Gaddafi29, which was against international law as such acts amount to interference in the 
sovereign affairs of another state. Although the actions of the Libyan forces in stopping the 
rebellion can be judged as excessive due to the use of heavy weaponry in civilian populated 
area (Blanchard; 2011: 4), the action of stopping the rebellion itself was legal in the jurisdiction 
of the Libyan authorities. The overt and covert support that different intervening states directed 
to the rebels was therefore illegal. UNSC Resolution 1973 called for ‘all necessary means to 
preserve civilian lives’, not to expressly take a side in the conflict.The mandate was for the 
                                                          
28 While the mandate provided by Resolution 1973 was for the protection of civilians from any attack from the 
warring sides (Though primarily from the Libyan forces), NATO’s role was specifically directed at destroying 
the capabilities of the Libyan forces against the rebels as evidenced by the fact that France dropped weapons for 
the rebels and there was coordination between NATO forces and rebels in Libya. See Richard Spencer, “France 
Supplying Weapons to Libyan Rebels,” The Telegraph, 29 June 2011, accessed 4 June 2013, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8606541/France-supplying-weapons-
to-Libyan-rebels.html 
29 The USA President, Barack Obama and the former USA Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton on different fora 
called on Gaddafi to resign. The same calls also came from the French, British and Germany leaders. (See 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news//worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/ posted on March 3, 2011, or the Arab 
News, Sunday February 27, 2011, www.arabnews.com/node/388329)   
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preservation of human rights, primarily the right to life of civilians who were not part of any 
side of the military conflict.  
 
The failure by the UN Security Council to promulgate an intervention framework on Syria 
drawn up from lessons learnt from Libya raises the question of the capability of the body to 
deal with human rights issues in internal affairs of other states. 
 
The Security Council is not necessarily the best organ to impartially militarily deal with 
intervention for humanitarian purposes and international justice because its veto power system 
is biased towards those who wield the veto power and can use it in defence of their interests or 
that of their allies. This was manifested in Syria when Russia and China used the veto power 
to defend Syria against Security Council condemnation that would have resulted in a military 
intervention, while Britain, France and the USA supported the rebels with arms while 
denouncing the same war in the Security Council. 
 
Supporting rebels and calling for international military intervention, as was the case with the 
USA, European states such as Britain and France, Turkey and the GCC States (BBC: 2013), is 
illegal in international relations as they were fighting against a legal government thereby 
destabilizing a sovereign state.30 The decision to support rebel groups also proved that the USA, 
Britain, France, Turkey and GCC states were driven by national interests and sectarian politics 
against the Syrian government. In some cases, GCC states and some groups from them sent in 
‘jihadists’ who some of them were members of terrorist groups to fight Assad. The USA 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives in 2013 acknowledged that besides groups like the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (or and the Levant) (ISIS/ISIL), which were known to be terroristic in nature, 
other groups perceived to be moderates had been radicalized and these groups included Jabhat 
Al-Nusra (Al Nusra Front) and Ahrar Al-Sham had ‘franchises’ with Al-Qaeda (Poe; 2013: 2). 
These groups survived on different channels of funding one of the primary one being donations 
from Gulf States (Poe; 2013: 2).  
 
                                                          
30 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), International Court of Justice, 27 June 1986, Article 205 
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The roles of Russia, China and Iran are also called for interrogation. The two gave a nod to 
intervention in Libya by abstaining from voting, but denied military intervention on 
humanitarian grounds in Syria where more civilians have died due to the crisis than those who 
had died in Libya when the Security Council passed Resolution 1973. The crisis in Syria raises 
the issue of the strategic interests of powerful states in international relations. According to 
Mearsheimer and Walt (2006: 25 & 29) there exists a USA / Israel plan to effect regime change 
in states that are hostile to the interests of the USA and Israel in the Middle East. This argument 
is given credence by the fact that while the Arab uprisings covered most countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa region, the response by powerful states, specifically the USA, was not 
uniform in supporting the uprisings. The USA turned a blind eye against the use of Saudi 
Arabia-led military intervention in stopping the uprisings in Bahrain, a state which it enjoys 
cordial relations with (Katzman; 2013: 15-16).  
 
Apart from supporting the Syrian government by vetoing UNSC resolutions against Syria, 
Russia delivered weapons to the embattled government when the crisis had reached 
unprecedented levels (BBC: 2013). The Iranian government allegedly supported the Syrian 
government with ammunition to stop rebel advances as Syria is one of its allies in a region 
where most Sunni Muslim states are considered hostile to its advances as a regional power 
(Nichols: 2012 and Yan: 2013). 
 
The response of the GCC states and the Arab League to the crises in the Middle East raises 
serious questions regarding conspiracies, collusions and sectarian politics in the region. Their 
outright support for civilians in the Libyan crisis and condemning the use of force by states 
against their civilians was shown by the League’s call for a No-Fly zone over Libya (Leyne: 
2011). The foregoing was in contrast with their previous historic responses which depicted 
them as a league of despots and monarchies due to their support of the leaders and stance 
against revolutions (Leyne: 2012).  
 
The Arab League’s calls on the Security Council to pass a resolution establishing a No-fly Zone 
on Libya. It was this decision, and the support that was given by the three African non-
permanent member states namely to the Security Council, that gave impetus to the Security 
Council resolution and NATO military intervention. This paradigm shift, coming as the first 
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect concept, was seen as an acceptance of the new 
rising concept of intervention under the auspices of UN law (Bellamy and Williams; 2011: 825 
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& 826). Its coincidence with the French intervention in Ivory Coast in early 2011 was seen as 
the rise of a new precedence of UN sanctioned military intervention for humanitarian purposes. 
 
However, the hopes of the acceptance of the new doctrine were snuffed by the international 
response in the Syrian crisis and other crises in the Middle East, specifically Yemen and 
Bahrain. The GCC states out-right supported the rebel groups in Syria with arms and some 
members of the Arab League sent ‘jihadists’ to support the Syrian uprising (BBC: 2013). This 
brought into question the sincerity of the Arab League to protect civilians when the group gave 
rebels weapons to fight a sovereign government. The action was also in contrast to the support 
that the Arab League, specifically the GCC states, gave in the Yemen and Bahraini crises to 
incumbent dictatorial governments against protesters who, in both cases, are from the Shia sect 
(Colombo; 2012: 7). 
 
The response to the uprisings by the Arab League can be interpreted as being driven by political 
alignment and sectarian biases. In the Libyan case, Gaddafi had frosty relations with Saudi 
Arabia and most of the GCC states (Bellamy and Williams; 2011: 842); in Syria, Assad is from 
the Alawite sect which is an offshoot of the Shia sect; in Bahrain, the demonstrators were 
predominantly Shia against a Sunni monarch (see Colombo: 2012); and in Yemen the uprising 
was dominated by the Shia against a Sunni government even though the nature of the 
demonstrations were more complex than in other states (Colombo; 2012: 9). In all the 
uprisings, except for Libya, the Arab League supported Sunni sects either as rebels or as the 
government, to try and defeat the Shia, both as demonstrators / rebels or government. 
 
It appears that religious sectarianism is playing a critical role in shaping the foreign policy 
decisions of certain countries. These examples show that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
does not override sectarian sentiments in these states. Hence, there appears to be a failure in 
the functioning of the Arab Muslim states who seem to be driven by religious sectarian 
sensibilities rather than secular political principles. 
 
Arab Sunni regimes have long been suspicious of Iran’s Shia identity and fear Shia hegemony 
which, they believe, Iran is seeking to achieve by expanding its links and support to Shia groups 
in the region with the broader objective of undermining their own (Sunni) regimes. The 
attempts of Saudi Arabia and its allies like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Qatar 
to resist Shia influence in the region, with their fear heightened by the Shia majority 
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government in Iraq, has led to the growth of sectarianism in the region with some of these 
regions funding fighters in Syria, even beyond those supported by Western countries. This 
sectarianism, it may be argued, is fuelled by the actions of non-state Sunni actors who are also 
funding rebels in Syria. The perceived Iranian support for Shias is also making many ordinary 
Sunnis suspicious of Iran’s ambitions, thus further fuelling sectarianism which the Sunni 
regimes can feed off. 
 
It can nevertheless be concluded that transformations in international law has failed to establish 
an express and universally accepted doctrine on military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes. The role of the international community in the application of military intervention is 
only accepted in so far as it is in conformity with the cardinal principles of the UN Charter. 
These principles are primarily the safeguarding of sovereign equality and non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of other states. This principle has been reinforced by a number of ICJ 
promulgations in different international cases, specifically in the case of Nicaragua vs USA.31  
 
There is need for military intervention for humanitarian purposes in extreme cases of gross 
human rights violations and genocide, but pursuance of national interest by powerful states 
who have the capacity to intervene, clouds the concept. Historically, major powers have not 
intervened in states where they do not have interest, or where such intervention would be 
contrary to the major powers’ geo-political interests no matter how prevalent human rights are 
violated. This is exemplified in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the ongoing Palestinian conflict 
and the Darfur crisis, amongst other such cases. 
 
The Libyan and Syrian cases have shown that the international community is still far from 
formulating rules of military intervention for humanitarian reasons. In Libya, although a 
successful but controversial intervention in terms of morality and legality was instituted, failure 
by the international community to reach consensus on active military intervention in Syria for 
humanitarian purposes is a travesty on humanity and humanitarianism. 
 
The international community failed to reach agreement on how to engage in an acceptable 
intervention strategy which has resulted in the deaths of more than 191 000 civilians and 
                                                          
31 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), International Court of Justice, 27 June 1986, Article 205 
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military personnel in Syria, as of April 2014, according to the United Nations Human Rights 
Office.32 The decision by different international and regional powers in the Middle East to 
selectively take sides in a manner that is driven by national self-interests against humanitarian 
concerns is arguably the chief reason for the protraction of the crisis. The Gulf States and 
Western powers as well as Turkey emboldened the rebels and other opposition movements by 
supporting them in their refusal to compromise and call for the stepping down of Assad. The 
fact that the crisis has claimed more than 2 000 state soldiers means that the rebels were also 
being supplied with sophisticated ammunition from outside by powerful states. Such acts are a 
negation of the concept of humanitarian aid which seeks to limit the deaths of civilians. 
 
On the other hand, the support to the Syrian state by Russia, China and Iran contributed to the 
deaths of citizens as these weapons were being imported for war and not for any other actions. 
The Syrian government has a right under international law to procure weapons for the 
safeguard of national sovereignty and cohesion but the use of weapons in a way that may harm 
civilians is against the morals of war and Geneva conventions. This brings a dilemma on the 
international community on how to deal with a rebel movement and a government who are all 
fighting for power to the detriment of civilians. 
 
From this argument, a void is discovered in the concept of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes which was developed as a counter measure to a sovereign which had 
become extremely brutal to civilians. Military intervention for humanitarian purposes is 
however blind in instances in which a rebel movement of equal power to the state is 
perpetrating crimes against humanity, especially in the era of non-discriminate weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction. The concept of the responsibility to protect as a follow up to the 
concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes has also failed to regulate this 
situation. It has become a common practice that the rebel movement or a militia fighting 
government forces attracts international sympathy and support. This was the case in the Ivory 
Coast, Libya and Syria. it is noteworthy that although the governments in power would have 
their excesses or would have turned illegitimate due to contested election results, as was the 
                                                          
32 According to the United Nation Human Rights Office on 22 August 2014, while the documented death from 
the Syrian war since the beginning of the conflict to April 2014 is estimated to be slightly above 191000, there 
are more undocumented death. This means that the estimates might to considerably lower than the actual death 
toll of the conflict. See Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Death Toll in Syria Estimated at 191 000,” New York Times, 22 
August 2014, accessed 5 November 2014, www.mobile.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/middleeast/un-raises-
estimate-of-dead-in-syria-conflict-to-191000.html?referrer=&_r=0   
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case in the Ivory Coast (Bellamy and Williams; 2011: 832), or using force to defend power 
which was gained in unconstitutionally, as was the case in Libya as well as Syria, the lives of 
civilians are sacrificed for power by both the rebel movements and the state governments in 
the name of the same civilians. This negates the concept of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes and calls for another relook into the concept and the guidelines for 
intervention. 
 
The Libyan and Syrian cases made rebel movements realize that capturing international public 
attention and aligning with powerful states are stepping stones to attaining legitimacy. This is 
proven by the fact that soon after its creation, the TNC was accorded recognition by a number 
of powerful states who had an impact in directing the course of events internationally and 
regionally on Libya, such as France and the GCC states, and in the case of Syria, the Arab 
League invited members of the SNC to occupy the seat of Syria (Al-jazeera: 2013).  
 
This precedence might embolden rebel movements in the future, especially in geo-strategic 
zones while also scaring smaller states, particularly in Africa, where they have been critical of 
the interests of western states on the continent. The role of the International Criminal Court has 
been under the spotlight and it is seen by the majority of African leaders and intellectuals as an 
appendage of western powers to stifle leaders that are critical of western policies. This phobia 
has been emboldened by the ‘reinterpretation’ of resolution 1973 on Libya by NATO and the 
desire to have a similar resolution on Syria, to aid a rebel group in regime change. 
 
Less powerful states have contended against the doctrine as they fear that it can be abused by 
the powerful states to punish governments who will be considered hostile to the interests of 
powerful states or to unfairly gain access to the natural resources in these countries or simply 
for geo-political reasons. The concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes can, 
hence, be seen as an old concept that is still developing and transforming in an era where 
globalization is transforming the interpretation between the old concept of sovereignty and the 







7.2 Human rights considerations vs strategic and geo-political interests: A case for 
reform of the responsibility to protect doctrine 
 
The concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes is derived from the human 
rights discourse which states that any sovereign who violate them to an extent that is shocking 
to the conscience of the society of nations, should be restrained with the use or threat of force 
of arms. Acting on this principle has, however, lacked uniformity and consistency due to 
arguably the influence of geo-political interests. This section discusses geo-political interests 
specifically in the Middle East and North Africa, and how these interests act as a stumbling 
point to the promotion of human rights and democratic discourse in the region. 
 
The term ‘Geo-Politics’ was originally coined by a Swedish political scientist, Rudolf Kjellen, 
in 1899 (Tuathail; 1998: 1). A specific definition of the term is very difficult because the 
definition and usage of the term has kept evolving due to international political changes. The 
term was originally understood as, “that part of Western imperial knowledge that dealt with 
the relationship between the physical earth and politics” (Tuathail; 1998: 1). According to 
Tuathail (1998: 1), the term was later associated with, “the notorious Nazi foreign policy goal 
of Lebensraum (the pursuit of more ‘living space’ for the German nation)”, and it fell out of 
favour with writers and scholars after the Second World War (WW II). 
 
Geo-politics can be understood as the classification of world geographical regions in terms of 
their importance to a certain state or group of states. The classification entails giving names 
and planning on the amount of political and military resources that can be committed to the 
regions or states so named for political and economic reasons. It can be seen, from an 
imperialist perspective, as the curbing by major powers of spheres of influence and the creation 
of ‘empires’ for greater socio-economic reasons. For instance, the Arabs coined the terms, 
‘Maghreb’ and ‘bilaadul Sudan’ meaning the West and the land of the black people when they 
invaded and conquered North Africa in the 7th and 8th centuries (Bilgin; 2004: 26). This was 
the same with the creation of the terms ‘the Americas, Latin America and Africa’ by the 
European empires who conquered these regions. 
 
Since the rise of contemporary Europe as an imperial region, the Middle East has been 
important to Europe and later the world. Writing in 1902, a USA naval officer and strategy 
thinker and writer, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan (quoted in Bilgin; 2004: 25) stated that 
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“Britain should take up the responsibility of maintaining security in the (Persian) Gulf and its 
coasts – the Middle East – so that the route to India would be secured and Russia kept in check.”  
 
The discovery of oil in the region increased the geo-strategic importance of the region. Bilgin 
(2004: 28) sums up the regional strategic importance of the Middle East when he states that the 
Western definition of the Middle East is that conceptualized as security, which could be 
summed up as “the unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices, the cessation of Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemony while holding Islamism in 
check, and the maintenance of friendly regimes that are sensitive to these concerns”. The geo-
political and strategic importance of the Middle East can be understood as the protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea from Russian influence (or the influence of any power that would threaten 
British interests), having uninterrupted flow of affordable oil, protection of Israel and the need 
to curb the rise of terrorism, which could disrupt the first three reasons as well as threaten the 
security of western powers, specifically the USA by attacking their civilians in any part of the 
world. 
 
Former USA President, Jimmy Carter, summed the geo-political importance of the Middle East 
to the USA when he pointed that, “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of 
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force” 
(Carter, quoted in Woodward; 1991: 230). The statement was made in reference to Russia and 
other communist states outside the Middle East (see Tadman: 2013), thus the desire by the 
USA to remain the only hegemonic power to control the Middle East also meant that even an 
internal state which would try to attain regional dominance of the middle east would be treated 
in an equal manner as an ‘outside force’. This was exemplified by the manner in which the 
USA quickly accepted the UN mandate to repel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and went on to 
degrade his power through supporting Kurdish revolt and sanctions and finally an invasion in 
2003. 
 
Individual states in the region are of varying significance to the USA, Europe as well as other 
internal powers that seek to gain internal dominance in the region like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey and Iran. To the USA, for example, Saudi Arabia is important as one of the leading 
states in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which assures the USA 
of the maintenance of its currency as the only petro-currency, while Egypt is important for the 
130 
 
existence and security of Israel (Sharp; 2014: 20). Sharp (2014: 20) noted that, “Since the 1979 
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large amounts of 
military assistance. U.S. policy makers have routinely justified aid to Egypt as an investment 
in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and on sustaining the 
treaty—principles that are supposed to be mutually reinforcing.”  For the USA and European 
powers, the rivalry between Sunni states and Iran which is a Shia sect means that the states 
cannot collude to form a dominant force to repel USA and European influence in the region. 
 
GCC States and Egypt and other Sunni ‘friendly’ states rely on USA military and security 
support (Habibi and Woertz; 2009: 2). Egypt is the largest recipient of USA military aid after 
Israel in the Middle East (Sharp: 2010). GCC states enjoys diplomatic support and was not 
condemned by the USA and other major European powers when they came up with a coalition 
to put down an uprising in Bahrain during the Arab Spring as noted by Katzman (2012: --) in 
his summary that,  
 
The Obama Administration has not called for a change of the Al Khalifa regime but 
it has criticized the regime’s use of force against protesters and urged further 
political reform and sustained government engagement in dialogue with the 
opposition. The U.S. position on Bahrain has been criticized by those who believe 
the United States is downplaying regime abuses because the U.S. security 
relationship with the Al Khalifa regime is critical to U.S. efforts to secure the 
Persian Gulf. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. 
naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years. 
 
Leaders in Sunni Middle East states do not enjoy local support and count on their allies to put 
down any attempts to change the status-quo.  Democracy and human rights discourses, 
especially as understood from a western paradigm, is alien to most Middle East and North 
African states. The concept of human rights is a contested one which is restrained by religious 
discourses, while democracy has been an unknown concept to the region. Most of the states in 
the region (mostly before the Arab Spring) are either monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Morocco) or led by long serving dictators who either took power through military 
coups (as was the case with Libya, Egypt and Sudan) or inherited such powers from their 




The Middle East survived the post-Cold War western human rights and democratic onslaught 
which was meted out on most sub-Saharan African states due to geo-political concerns. From 
the end of the Cold War until the presidency of George W. Bush (Jr), the USA has been 
comfortable with the strong non-democratic rulers of the Middle East as long as they propped 
up the interests of the western world in the region (Markakis; 2012: 84-85). Markakis (2012: 
84-85) sums USA’s relations with Middle East non democratic leaders when he argued that,  
 
The US’s longstanding support of authoritarian governments in the Middle East had 
been based on several premises. First and foremost is the fact that authoritarian 
proxies have been effective in facilitating US interests in the region, particularly 
during the Cold War. The overriding interest in the Middle East during this period, 
as elsewhere, was its strategic value in the US-Soviet conflict. … Yet despite the 
end of the Cold War in 1991, the US has continued to support authoritarian rule in 
the region. Longstanding proxies include Saudi Arabia and Jordan. This continuity 
has been motivated primarily by the aim of maintaining stability in the near-term, 
given the potential impact of instability on core US regional interests. 
 
People in the Middle East were seen as not ready for democracy and the heavy handed leaders 
were seen as important to control different militant groups and terrorist organizations in the 
region. Their reliance on western support against their own people meant that they would be 
perpetually indebted to Western capitals, hence, responding positively to their geo-political 
needs and interests. 
 
The Bush government came with a policy to democratize the Middle East. Bush’s Middle East 
policy was followed by visits to the region in which he sought to encourage the democratization 
of the region from inside. Bush and Tony Blair, argued that their invasion of Iraq was in part a 
democratization process in the Middle East, even though the justification was made after the 
failure to uncover the alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) which had been used as 
the reason for the invasion in the first instance (Markakis; 2012: 101-102). The claims have, 
however, been disputed and the intervention, it is argued, was driven by geo-political 
consideration (Markakis; 2012: 102). The intervention was meant to diffuse Saddam Hussain’s 
plans to change the oil currency from the USA currency to the Euro (Simura; 2011: 42) among 




At the end of his presidency, George Bush and USA European allies had changed their Middle 
East policy from a democratization mission to fighting terrorism, after the terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The change of 
policy should not be found to be surprising because deep rooted conflict has been prevalent 
between Arab groups and the USA and Europe since the Western powers (specifically USA) 
entered the region and continue to dominate and influence political issues in the region (see 
Abdallah: 2003). There has been a complex rise of terrorist groups who argue that they will 
fight the western powers who interfere with their policies particularly the USA which has bases 
near the Islamic holy sites, until they pull out of the Middle East (Abdallah; 2003: 66-67). In 
that regard, combating terrorism while maintaining hegemony in the Middle East has remained 
a geo-political interest of Western powers. The call for a ‘crusade’ by the Bush government 
did not signal a transformation in USA-Middle East policy but simply heightened of the pursuit 
of an interest that had been pursued by previous presidents. 
 
The rise of Barak Obama and the coming of the Arab Spring, which took the world by storm, 
especially in its formative stages in North Africa, saw a change in the USA and European 
policies on the region from the democratization process to a return to a support for stability. 
USA and European states supported civilians in the initial stages, as exemplified by the calls 
to respect civilians to former Egyptian, Libyan and (incumbent) Syrian leaders, Hosni 
Mubarak, Muammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad, respectively, but the support dwindled as 
the opposition moved against ‘friendly’ states like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. 
 
Egypt became a clear case of the failure of the USA democratization process in favour of geo-
political consideration. The post revolution leader, Mohamed Morsi was overthrown by the 
military under the leadership of General Sisi. The takeover had all the imprints of a military 
coup but the USA failed to declare it so because such actions would have forced it to freeze its 
military aid to Egypt (Elmasry; 2014: 29). Such an action would have jeopordised the security 
of Israel, to which the aid to Egypt is attached (Elmasry; 2014: 31). One may also argue that 
USA saw it fit as the action got rid of Morsi, a leader regarded as Islamist from a country that 
is too important to be left alone. Morsi was seen as supportive of Hamas and Palestinian 
independence, which in itself is seen as anti-Israel in the region (Levy; 2014: 1). Therefore, 
when the Arab Spring challenged allies or brought into power unfriendly leaders, even in a 
democratic manner as was the case with Morsi, the support of human rights and democracy 
was sacrificed for geo-political interests. 
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In order for military intervention for humanitarian purposes to gain traction in the 21st century, 
there is a need for the re-definition of different political interests of different states in the global 
world. There is a need to acknowledge human rights and democracy as part of national interests 
of the states with the capacity to conduct such interventions. Such an acceptance, which can be 
made as recommendations to the responsibility to protect (R2P) document would provide a 
framework for military intervention for humanitarian purposes. 
 
The preservation of human rights and democracy in other states can be national interests of 
other states because the world is now intertwined to the extent that uprisings and instability in 
other states have the capacity to destabilize neighbouring states regional and geographically 
far away states. The assertion is evident in cases like the Bangladesh crisis in which India 
intervened arguing that Pakistan was destabilizing it through what it termed “refugee 
aggression” (Wheeler; 2000: 61), and millions of refugees from Syria who swarmed into 
Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan, with others attempting to flee to Europe. 
 
It can be argued that the rise of terrorism in the Middle East that specifically targets USA, 
Europe and their installations around the world is fuelled by the allegations that these countries 
are interfering in their affairs, including sponsoring undemocratic and unpopular leaders. It is, 
therefore, in the interest of western states to promote democracy in the region which has the 
capacity to curb or limit the escalation in terrorism, which with the growth of Al-Qaeda and 
ISIL, has become more complex as it now seeks to establish a state. 
 
The Egyptian case can be used as an example of how disgruntled Arabs can turn to terrorism 
as a counter measure. Prior to the presidency of Morsi, Egypt had not experienced any 
significant terrorist activities, however, after his deposition, there has been an escalation of 
terrorist activities with the Sinai region being the most affected. Terrorism in Egypt can easily 
spread to Africa, Persian Gulf, Europe and the USA. Although it is a USA geo-political interest 
that Egypt be ruled by a government friendly to the USA, it is also in their interest to promote 
policies that help in curbing terrorism, which is a threat to the entire international community. 
The responsibility to protect doctrine should, therefore, recognise the importance of the 
peaceful promotion of human rights and democracy as a wider global interest to curb the 
growth of terrorism, refugee aggression and the exposition of the world to massacres that are 




The above discussion provides a definition of geo-politics in relation to the concept of the 
responsibility to protect doctrine. It noted that military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
has been transformed with the passage of time to suit international political changes on the 
ground and is also influenced by globalization. It argues that Western states’ intervention in 
the Middle East and North Africa has been influenced by geo-political considerations than 
humanitarian intervention. USA presidents like George W. Bush and Barak Obama, developed 
policies that sought to democratise the region, although they were limited by the supremacy of 
geo-politics against mere principles and international morality. As argued in this chapter, the 
USA and Western intervention has partially led to the growth of terrorism and hatred of the 
West in the Arab world. Furthermore, objective support of democratization and human rights 
has the capacity to destroy terrorism and limit brutal regimes, hence, creating peaceful 
environments. Intervening powers should, therefore, take the promotion of human rights and 
democracy as international interests while humanitarian intervention is viewed as a principle 
and as a way for pursuing geo-political interests. 
 
7.3 Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 
 
This study has shown that there is no international consensus on the application and 
applicability of the concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The failure by 
the Security Council to fulfill its stipulated mandate by the ICISS to come up with a fair 
judgment and set rules of intervention in Syria is evident that the World Summit of 2005 that 
agreed on the Responsibility to Protect document as a successor concept of military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes was a mere lip-service. In a negation of the set role, 
veto powers were implicated in supporting different sides with even arms in the Syrian case. 
 
The Libyan and Syrian crises in particular and the Arab Spring in general have shown that 
national interests rather than humanitarian concerns have a primary influence on the response 
of international and regional powers to crises. This is understood from the fact that the USA 
and France argued for military intervention in Syria after the alleged use of chemical weapons, 
arguing that it was in the USA and Europe’s national interests to react, rather than intervene 
because of the more than one hundred thousand United Nations estimated civilian deaths at the 




The practical application of the concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes has 
shown that while there may be some states or leaders who may support the concept, vigilantes 
have the capacity to hijack the intervention in pursuant of national interests. This was the case 
in Libya where Gaddafi’s threats that his soldiers would have a killing spree in Benghazi 
(Kirkpatrick and Fahim: 2011) led African states (in the Security Council), Russia, and China 
not to veto passage of resolution 1973 aimed to protect civilians against the threats by Gaddafi. 
NATO took the opportunity to effect regime change, a move which is against the tenets of 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes and can be seen as condoning extra-judicial 
assassinations. 
 
The selective response by the Arab League also proved that the international community had 
not moved into the era of applying international law non-selectively and in pursuit of 
international justice. States apparently use international law as a justification of actions in areas 
where their interests are at threat and negate same international instruments in cases where it 
is in their advantage to do so.  
 
The application of military intervention for humanitarian purposes in Libya created a phobia 
among the African states against the concept. What has been established is that the AU did not 
condone the use of indiscriminate force and weapons against civilians but was undermined by 
major powers which sidelined its input on amicably resolving a crisis riddling its member state. 
 
Noteworthy is that the crafter of the doctrine of military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
had realised that some leaders may use excessive force against civilians in ways that 
delegitimize their sovereignty thereby rendering intervention necessary. There is, therefore 
need to come up with stringent rules and guidelines to govern such international intervention 
in states riddled with internal conflicts. There is also need to draw boundaries and lines of 
collaboration between the UN and regional powers given that any military intervention in a 
single state may also threaten the sovereignty and position of other regional states. 
 
It appears weaker states are mostly targeted for intervention, therefore, it may be prudent that 
the final prerogative to decide on embarking on such military intervention be given to the UN 
General Assembly in which all states stand equal, on a two third majority basis, to pass such a 
decision. This will help provide a balance between curbing ambitious leaders to pursue national 
interests under the guise of humanitarianism and also to open a room for the legalization of 
136 
 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes under UN law. The foregoing opinion is no 
guarantee of a just intervention but it may help to offset some of the obvious biases evident in 
the present UN system. Clear guidelines are needed because the consequences of failing to 
apply the Responsibility to Protect doctrine can result in the rise of non-state entities like ISIS, 
who are opportunistic groups who do not abide by or recognize international legal frameworks 
and effectively engage in their own forms of violations of human rights, while at the same time 
arguing that they stand for the protection of certain groups or sectarian interests.  
 
Finally, it must be noted that there is a need to create a legal basis for military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes under the UN law. Such a law will be strictly controlled by the 
application of measures noted above. Military intervention for humanitarian purposes is an 
important deterrent against excessive tyranny but should be fortified against vigilantes as noted 
by Grotius (1625: 248) that; 
 
But right does not necessarily lose its nature from being in the hands of wicked 
men. The sea still continues a channel of lawful intercourse, though sometimes 
navigated by pirates, and swords are still instruments of defence, though 





















Appendix 1: Journal Article to Middle East Journal 
 
USA AND RUSSIA IN SYRIA AND UKRAINE: THE IRONY OF GEO-POLITICAL 
INTERVENTIONS 
Blessing Simura 




The battle between the USA and Russia that had been snuffed by the demise of the Soviet 
Union has been rekindled. The USA and Russia have regional doctrines that demarcate areas 
to which outside powers cannot encroach. However, the Middle East has remained a contested 
region for the two powers. USA has also sought to encroach into the backyard of Russia in 
order to contain the resurgence of the Eastern power. Both states have sought to protect their 
regions of influence and in the era beginning with the Arab spring, the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention has been used to justify geo-political interventions. This article argues that the 
current tussle between the USA and Russia on Syria and Ukraine can be understood more from 




The defeat of Gaddafi by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in 
October 2011 after Russia and China had abstained from voting in resolution 1973 opened a 
new chapter in the politics of uprisings and major powers’ intervention. Whatever were the 
reasons for the Russian abstention, Moscow changed its policy when the Syrian uprising 
attempted to follow the Libyan script. Russia, with the alliance of China, became the protector 
of the Syrian government of Bashar al Assad. When the international community and the major 
powers had reached a stalemate in Syria as symbolized the resignation of two UN/Arab League 
special envoys to Syria (Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi), another uprising took place in 
Ukraine and led to the oust of President Victor Yanukovych. The uprising occurred because 
Yanukovych had refused to join the European Union and opted for more cooperation with 
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Russia.33 The uprising therefore occurred with the blessing of the EU and the USA. It was 
however not approved by Russia whose man was the victim. The new power bloc that was built 
in Kiev was also not approved by many people in eastern Ukraine and Crimea who saw the 
new government in Kiev as neo-fascist who usurped power to destroy the Russian links 
between eastern Ukraine and Russia. Putin described the leadership in Kiev as “Neo-Nazis, 
Russophobes and anti-Semites,” as well as the ideological heirs of Bandera, who was Hitler’s 
accomplice during the Second World War in the Region.34 A crisis was brewed which led 
Crimea to secede and join the Russian Federation. Other major cities and regions in eastern 
Ukraine attempted to follow the Crimean script. Another standoff erupted between Russia and 
USA and its European allies. USA and its allies in Europe saw Russia as the major player in 
the Ukrainian counter-uprising. Russia was slammed with targeted sanctions and threats of 
more sanction and was suspended from the Group of 8 (G8).  
 
These events are interesting in international relations. The two sides have defended their 
positions by attempting to stand on the high moral ground of either humanitarian intervention 
or protecting the governments in power from underground external power intervention. there 
is however a conflictual policy direction when ones notes that Russia is on the sitting 
government’s side in Syria while on the side of the ‘rebels’35 in Ukraine with the USA being 
on the side of the ‘rebels’ in Syria and the sitting government in Ukraine. This paper attempts 
to analyse the reasons of this irony and put forward reasons for it. 
 
A Brief overview of the Syrian and Ukrainian Crises 
 
There is no an exclusively accepted reasons for the uprisings in Syria (2011) and Ukraine 
(2013). It is important to note that the latest uprisings and wars in these countries are not new. 
They are the latest in a number of upheavals that have engulfed the countries in their years of 
existence. Syria had, before the 2011 uprisings experienced a latest civil war in the early 1980s, 
which was only put down by a brutal crackdown by Hafez al Assad. Ukraine had its latest 
upheaval before the current one in 2004 in the name of the Orange Revolution.  
                                                          
33 Ben Smith and Daniel Harari, “Ukraine, Crimea and Russia,” House of Commons Library, Research Paper 
14/16, 17 March 2014, p. 1 
34 Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation’s address to the State Duma Deputies, Federation Council 
Members, Heads of Russian regions and Civil society Representatives in the Kremlin on the Annexation of 
Crimea, 18 March 2014, accessed 24 June 2014, www.eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889 
35 This may be a contested term. Here, it is used in reference to those who rise in armed resistance against an 





The uprising in Syria started as peaceful demonstrations against some undemocratic practices 
by the Assad government.36 However, the demonstrations, due to a government crackdown and 
interference by militant forces, took a sectarian line pitting the minority but dominant Alawites 
against the majority Sunni Muslims.37 The ‘rebels’ were emboldened by the successes by the 
uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.  
 
In relation to the regional examples, the Syria rebels tried to push for a repetition of Libya. The 
SNC was quickly formed in the manner in which the NTC was formed in Libya. The leaders 
of the council/coalition got recognition from the EU, USA and GCC states and other regional 
states.38 The SNC was pro-western and pro-Sunni. They got military and financial assistance 
from the West and Sunni States in the gulf39 as well as sanctuary from Turkey, a pro-western 
state and a member of NATO. 
 
On the other hand, the Assad government labeled the uprising as a western instigation. The 
Assad government also argued that the uprising was being fought by terrorists and that USA 
and other Western states were funding terrorists to topple it (the government).40 This argued 
was accepted by Russia, China and also Iran. Russia and its allies on the Syrian case argued 
that the west was pushing for regime change in states they had no cordial relations with the 
governments. This was seen as a means to extend USA and NATO influence in resource rich 
and important geo-political zones. From this argument Libya fell because the west wanted to 
control its rich petroleum wealth while Syria is seen as the last bastion in the west’s battle 
against Iran.41 Russia therefore defended Syria at the Security Council and remained a major 
weapons supplier during the crisis. 
                                                          
36 Angela Joya, “Syria and the Arab Spring: The Evolution of the Conflict and the Role of the Domestic and 
External Factors,” Ortadogu Etutleri, Vol 4, No. 1, July 2012, p. 27, 31-32 
37 Fredric C. Hof and Alex Simon, “Sectarian Violence in Syria’s Civil War: Causes, Consequences and 
Recommendations for Mitigation,” paper commissioned by the Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United 
States Holocaust Museum, accessed 23 April 2013, www.ushmm.org/genocide/pdf/syria-report.pdf, p 1  
38 Stefan Talmon, “Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People,” Chinese 
Journal of International Law, 31 May 2013, par. 1-5, see also Christopher M. Blanchard, “Libya: Transition and 
US Policy,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 25 October 2014, www.crs.gov, p. 17 
39 Angela Joya, “Syria and the Arab Spring: The Evolution of the Conflict and the Role of the Domestic and 
External Factors,” p. 35 
40 Fredric C. Hof and Alex Simon, “Sectarian Violence in Syria’s Civil War: Causes, Consequences and 
Recommendations for Mitigation,” p. ii & 2 
41 Angela Joya, “Syria and the Arab Spring: The Evolution of the Conflict and the Role of the Domestic and 





Ukraine has been a major part of the Russian empire. Historically, Ukraine could not be 
separated from Russia. While the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s saw Ukraine being 
geographically separated from Russia, Russia consider it an important part of its sphere of 
influence. Since its creation, Ukraine had been torn between joining the European Union and 
in extension NATO, or remaining a Russian partner state and joining the Eurasian customs 
union which is dominated by Russia. The tipping point came in November 2013 when then 
president, Victor Yanukovych decided not to sign an Association Agreement and a deep and 
comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement with the EU and opted for a deeper cooperation 
with Russia.42 Pro-western demonstrations began in Kiev calling on the abandonment of the 
Russian deal and join the EU. The demonstrations continued into December and turned bloody. 
A compromise agreement which was mediated by the foreign ministers of France, Germany, 
and Poland failed to materialize. 
 
On 22 February 2014 president Yanukovych disappeared from Kiev as protesters occupied 
state buildings. The Ukrainian parliament responded by stripping the president of his powers 
and a new government was formed.43 Pro-western leaders, interim president Olexander 
Turchynov and Prime Minister Arsebiy Yatseniuk, took over power and aligned Ukraine to the 
West.  
 
After the ascension of the new government, the semi-autonomous region of Crimea, which is 
home to more than 60 percent ethnic Russian quickly held a referendum on 16 March 2014 to 
break away from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. The Russian government accepted 
to annex Crimea, while western states viewed is as a breach of Ukrainian sovereignty and a 
threat to the international order. A backlash of the uprising started against the new government 
in Kiev from the eastern cities that are predominantly ethnic Russia. Emboldened by the 
Crimean case, the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk pushed on for secession and to join Russia.  
 
                                                          
Yorker, 5 March 2007, accessed 25 June 2014, 
www.m.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/05/070305fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all   
42 Ben Smith and Daniel Harari, “Ukraine, Crimea and Russia,” p. 1  
43 “Ukrainian Parliament Votes to Strip Yanukovich of Powers as President Leaves Kiev,” Russia Today, 22 
February 2014, accessed 26 June 2014, www.rt.com/news/ukraine-president-parliament-chaos-249/  
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While Russia denied the calls to annex the other Ukrainian territories, and stand by Putin’s 
words that, “We do not want to divide Ukraine, we do not need that”44, when he accepted 
Crimea into the Russian federation, Russian forces conducted military drills in the border towns 
that were seen as military threats to Ukraine or a move to embolden the rising masses in the 
eastern regions.  
 
The USA and the EU blamed Russia for the escalation in eastern Ukraine. NATO secretary 
general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen echoed the same sentiments and called on Russia to 
deescalate the crisis.45 Russia denied having a hand in the crisis. However, the appearance of 
gunmen in unmarked military uniforms identical to the one used by Russian forces and the 
discipline they exhibited46 led the west to argue that Russia was behind the uprising or had sent 
in its special forces to act as pro-Russian Ukrainians. The crisis deepened with military 
exchanges between the secessionists and the Kiev government even after the presidential 
elections in May 2014 which were won by Petro Poroshenko. 
 
While Russia has denied any wrong doing in the Ukrainian backlash, it has shown support for 
the deposed president, Yanukovych, contempt of the interim government after the uprising and 
resentment of the newly elected government. While it has accepted to have talks and spoke 
against secession of eastern Ukraine, it has argued that it has no control of the movements. This 
has not helped the crisis which has also seen the former bipolar power in a new stand-off 
reminiscent of the Cold War era. 
 
Clash of Regional Control Doctrines 
 
In 1823 James Monroe declared that countries in the American continents where not to be 
considered colonies of the warring European states and that any interference by the European 
states in the affairs of the American continents was considered as endangering the peace and 
security of the continents.47 The declaration effectively stopped the European states from 
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interfering in affairs across the Atlantic. The doctrine was not meant to liberate South America 
from colonialism but USA declaration of control and politics within its vicinity. The Monroe 
Doctrine was the most influential regional doctrine that has influenced major powers to try and 
curve their exclusive spheres of influence and control that are regarded as regions of national 
interest. 
 
In January 1980, the Carter Doctrine added the Middle East as strategic region which an attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of 
the United States of America, which would be repelled by any means necessary, including 
military force.48 The region is so important that the USA is willing and compelled to sacrifice 
its military personnel and assets to safeguard. The doctrine was promulgated in order to deter 
the then Soviet Union from encroaching into the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions after 
the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan in 1979.  
 
Equally, even after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has its own regional control doctrine. 
Russia has always taken active and passive actions to guards the Caucasus region and the 
former soviet countries from external interference specifically interference from the USA. Any 
encroachment into this region is regarded as a threat to Russian national interest and security. 
 
USA has been an offensive actor in Middle East relations. The importance of the region to 
USA is hinged not only on the need to keep the petroleum tapes running to USA and its allies 
and curbing terrorism but also to the need to control the petrodollar system49 and the existence 
of Israel. It is for this reason that Jimmy Carter declared that the “An attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf (Middle East) region will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any 
means necessary, including military force”50 Because of this declaration, USA Middle East 
policy is continuously reviewed and threats redefined. This is exemplified by Saddam Hussein 
who at one time is seen as a USA ally and later turns into a foe and invaded in 2003. 
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The constant transformation of USA’s Middle East policy is the reason why Syria, which was 
not much seen as a special interest state, becomes important soon after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq. Syria grew to be a state of importance arguably because as a state under Alawite 
(a Shiite sect) it was the last major ally of Iran, which the then USA President George Bush 
classified among the “axis of evil”51 states together Iraq and North Korea. Being under the 
control of Alawites meant that Syria, like Iran, was viewed as a threat by the dominant Sunni 
states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, in the region who are all 
USA allies.  
 
Another reason for the need to change the leadership in Syria was driven by Israel’s security 
concerns. Syria provided safe external base for Hamas, a Palestinian liberation movement, a 
relationship which is now strained after the Syria uprising by predominantly Sunni groups.52 It 
supported and also used as a transit route for Iranian financial and military assistance to Hamas 
and Hezbollah, an anti-Israel Shia militia group based in Lebanon to counter Israel dominance 
in the region.53 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue that, there is a USA / Israeli plan to 
effect regime change against governments in the Middle East that are not friendly to them. 
They further add that the chief targets are Iran and Syria, and Iraq before the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein.54 They further note that the Israeli lobby in the USA was clear that “there has 
got to be regime change in Syria.”55 
 
It can be argued that because of the plethora of reasons noted, the uprising against Assad in 
2011 was given support by the USA and her European and Middle East allies. The rebellion 
was contextualized as pro-democracy uprising and deserved military support or a humanitarian 
intervention in the style of the intervention in Libya.56 However, the paradox of this support 
could be seen in the blind eye the USA turned on the Arab Spring style uprising in Bahrain 
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which the government crushed with Saudi Arabian led GCC military support.57 This paradox 
is clearly proven by the fact that when the Syrians rose for different reasons and with different 
tones58, the USA called on Bashar al Assad to step down and allow for democratic processes,59 
but in the uprising in Bahrain and the Saudi Arabia led intervention, the USA called on the 
leadership to exercise restraint.60 
 
At the United Nations (UN) level the USA and its allies sponsored Security Council resolutions 
that sought to pave way for an international military intervention and/or empower the Syrian 
opposition in a manner resolution 1973 paved way for the military intervention and support for 
Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC). 
 
Outside the UN, USA gave the SNC financial support. It also supported the different militia 
groups that were not classified as terrorist or working with terrorist, with military support.61 
The media from the USA followed the national policy and broadcasted in a manner that was 
supportive of the Syrian opposition.62  
 
The machinations by the USA can be understood in light of the Carter doctrine which 
exclusively classified the Middle East as strategic region of vital national interest to the USA.63 
The intervention in Syria was a war by proxy in a greater Middle East policy that targeted Iran. 
It would also translate that the Middle East would be a region under the rule of USA allies and 
countries that do not threaten the security of Israel. It can also be seen as a war that was aimed 
at pushing out the least Russian influence in the region. Syria has major arms deals with Russia 
and the Syrian port of Tartus houses a Russian Naval military facility, the only one outside the 
vicinities of Russian.  
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The argument that the USA has a policy to export democracy sound hollow given the fact that 
it has maintained cordial relations with the monarchies and military dictators in either the name 
of fighting terrorism as in the case of Yemen under Saleh or for the security of Israel as was 
the case with Egypt. The USA denied classifying the ouster of Mohamed Morsi by the Egyptian 
army on 3 July 2013 as a coup due to the need to preserve the Middle East peace treaty for 
Israel, and air space and naval privileges the USA enjoys from Cairo64, a declaration which 
would have forced the USA to review its military aid and cooperation with Cairo. 
 
Russia, on the other hand argued that it could not support or allow for the passage of any 
Security Council resolution on Syria after NATO abused resolution 1973 which was deficient 
in that it gave room for interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state in a manner that 
was reminiscent of the mediaeval crusades.65 True as it is, Russia knew that the interpretation 
of Security Council resolutions can be different in implementation from that given during the 
debating period. Russia had learnt from the Kosovo example that a Security Council resolution 
that was not water-tight could be abused for self interest by the intervening state. The argument 
that Russia did not allow the passage of any resolution on Syria due to the Libyan experience 
is therefore questionable. 
 
Strategic reason should be seen as providing a better understanding to the Russian behaviour 
in relation to the Syrian case. Russia could have allowed the passage of resolution 1973 because 
Muammar Gaddafi had, in his later stages of his rule, drifted to the western hemisphere and 
redirected his foreign policy to placate western powers. This is evidenced by Libya’s 
acceptance of the responsibility of Lockerbie bombing, and oil and other business agreements 
and investments with and/or in Europe and the USA companies. 
 
However, the Syrian case, in Russia regions of national interest is different from that of Libya. 
While Libya had ‘dumped’ its traditional allies in its re-engagement overdrive with the west, 
Syria remained a Russian ally since the days of Hafez al Assad. Even when Syria cooperated 
with the USA in fighting Al Qaeda, it did not do so at the expense of its relationship with 
Russia. Syria is also a strengthening ally of Iran against the Shia-Sunni regional battle. Iran 
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being a Russian ally in the Middle East could not be allowed to begin the process of falling 
through the fall of Syria. Russia, therefore, used its veto powers in the Security Council on 
Syria more than it had done on any other country to maintain equilibrium in Middle East so as 
to balance its influence against that of Russia.  
 
Ukraine is an extension of the battle of the control of strategic regions between USA and 
Russia. Deducing from its actions, Russia had already demarcated the Caucasus region and the 
Eurasian territories as its inviolable sphere of influence. Russia has not been comfortable with 
the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia (Rose Revolution, 2003), Ukraine (Orange Revolution, 
2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) which it viewed as western instigations to reduce the Russia 
sphere of influence which it views as pretexts to bring NATO to its backyard.66 The Georgian 
crisis of 2008 ended with Russia fighting a war against Georgia and supporting the autonomy 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a recognition which is not shared by other states in the 
international community, specifically the USA and the EU states.  
 
Russia has not been comfortable with the NATO encroachment into its sphere of influence. 
Putin summarized the Russian regional policy against the encroachment NATO when he stated 
that, “NATO remains a military alliance and we are against having a military alliance making 
itself at home right in our backyard or in our historic territory.”67 Ukraine is strategically 
important that Russia cannot leave it to fall to USA influence. Its geographical location makes 
it the bridge between Europe and Russia, and with it Russia is geopolitically safe from 
European and American threats. 
 
Ukraine, before the break away of Crimea was house to the Russian Black Sea fleet. Even 
though it had been neglected for some years due to the non-conclusive agreement on its future 
in Sevastopol, the Black Sea fleet is important for Russian naval access to the Mediterranean 
and Southern Europe. While Yanukovych had renegotiated the Ukrainian naval lease 
agreement from 2017 to 2042, the agreement was not guaranteed in the future pro-European 
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government in Kiev. One would also wonder if Ukraine would have joined NATO if it would 
have allowed for the stay of a Russian fleet in its territory. 
 
Geographically, the Ukrainian border with Russia is a few hundred miles from Moscow, the 
Russia capital city. If Ukraine is to join the EU and subsequently NATO, it would be bringing 
a Russian enemy on its door step and within closer striking distance of Moscow. Putin also 
stated the Russian fears if Ukraine with Crimea was to join the NATO alliance that, “Let me 
note too that we have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining NATO. 
What would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol? It would have meant that NATO’s 
navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory and this would create not an 
illusory but a perfectly real threat to the world of southern Russia.”68 
 
The Russian concerns for shutting out the USA from Eastern Europe can be seen as the reasons 
why the USA has been pushing to draw closer. Since Putin came to power, there has been 
growing concerns in the USA with regards to his desires to push Russian international 
influence.69  The USA has been in the drive to contain the growing Russian influence, while 
Russia has been pushing to ‘claim its place on the moon’. It is because of this reason that there 
has been an escalation in the geo-political struggle between Russia and USA. 
 
Be that as it may, the international order of the pre UN era and the Cold War era has been 
surpassed by international developments. The transformations in the international system now 
mean that states can no longer simply invade other states without a legal justification. In the 
absence of a viable justification, powerful states have adopted the responsibility to protect, 
formerly known as humanitarian intervention, to pursue geopolitical interest. It is this 
justification that the USA and its allies have used to try to gain access legally to Syria through 
a Security Council resolution. The irony is found in the fact that while the USA was sponsoring 
Security Council resolutions on Syria, it was also simultaneously funding the rebels, which is 
against the concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. Russia also argued that 
its intervention in Ukraine was a humanitarian intervention.70 The justification raises questions 
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on the reasons for military intervention for humanitarian purposes. There was no massacre of 
any target group in Ukraine and hence Russia also tried to strengthen its argument by saying 




The crises in Syria and Ukraine call for a revisit on the concept of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes. The crises have shown that while the concept is a noble one, the 
international community should pay heed to Ian Brownlie’s (cited in Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse) argument that it can be abused by vigilantes and ambitious power to extend their 
spheres of influence.72 The Syrian crisis is a noble case which would meet most of the 
requirements for a military intervention to save the suffering masses. However, the case will 
go down in history books as another failed case due to the primacy of the interest of the 
powerful regional and international players. On one hand, the USA and its allies financed and 
armed the rebels and also called for a military intervention to assist the same rebels. Such an 
approach is hypocritical and against the moral standards for an intervention. Russia and its 
allies on the other hand continued to arm and defend the Syria government in the Security 
Council. All the calculations were at the expense of the suffering civilians. The Syrian crisis 
shows that USA and Russia as the leading powers intervened in the conflict not because of the 
need to fulfill a moral responsibility to protect the civilians but with hidden interest to pursue 
geo-political influence. 
 
This paper argued that the Ukrainian crisis is an extension of the Syrian geo-political tussle 
between the USA and Russia. While Russia has tried in part to justify its intervention as a 
humanitarian adventure and in part an intervention by the legitimate president of Ukraine. This 
paper did not seek to discuss the second claim. However, the first claim has no basis if weighed 
against the principles of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. There was no threat 
on the lives of the civilians by the interim Ukrainian government after the fall of Yanukovych. 
The Russian intervention can therefore be explained in terms of its geo-political interest.  
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USA’s intervention can also be seen in the light of geo-political interests. USA had tussled 
with Russia regarding the Ukrainian fate since the birth of Ukraine. Having access to Ukraine 
is a major blow on Russian prestige and influence in global politics. Hence the USA had always 
had preferred candidates in Ukrainian elections with the latest official telephone links between 
US officials in Kiev and Washington showing that there had been preferred and non-preferred 
candidates to take over in Kiev.73   
 
The two crises have shown that great powers can be so desperate to use any case at their 
disposal to justify their actions if there is a major gain or major threat on their interest. The 
Middle East and Eastern Europe are regions of strategic importance to both the USA and 
Russia. It is for this reason that the Syria crisis ended with a stalemate while the backlash in 
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Appendix 2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (Libya) 
United Nations S/RES/1973 (2011) 
Security Council Distr.: General 17 March 2011 
11-26839 (E) *1126839* 
 
Resolution 1973 (2011) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March 2011 
 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011, 
Deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 
(2011), 
 
Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the 
heavy civilian casualties, 
 
Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and 
reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible 
steps to ensure the protection of civilians, 
 
Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, 
enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions, 
 
Further condemning acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities 
against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel and urging these authorities 
to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 
1738 (2006), 
 
Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity, 
 
Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness 
to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the 
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return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
 
Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas 
and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian 
personnel, 
 
Recalling the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the Secretary 
General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law that have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, 
 
Taking note of the final communiqué of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 
2011, and the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 
2011 which established an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya, 
 
Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 
to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe 
areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the 
Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
 
Taking note further of the Secretary-General’s call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate cease-
fire, 
 
Recalling its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 
2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and stressing that those responsible 
for or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, 
must be held to account, 
 
Reiterating its concern at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence 
in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, welcoming the response of neighbouring States, in particular 
Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and calling on 




Deploring the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities, 
 
Considering that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians as well as the safety 
of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in 
Libya, 
 
Expressing concern also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, 
 
Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya, Mr. 
Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful 
solution to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
 
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and 
national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
 
Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, 
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
 
1. Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all 
attacks against, and abuses of, civilians; 
 
2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the 
legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the Secretary-General to 
send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead 
to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution; 
 
3. Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, 
including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures 
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to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage 
of humanitarian assistance; 
 
Protection of civilians 
 
4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or 
through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-
General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 
(2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form 
on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the 
Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization 
conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council; 
 
5. Recognizes the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and bearing in mind Chapter VIII 
of the Charter of the United Nations, requests the Member States of the League of Arab States 
to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4; 
 
No Fly Zone 
 
6. Decides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 
order to help protect civilians; 
 
7. Decides further that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole 
purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including 
medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign 
nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by 
paragraphs 4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the 
authorisation conferred in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these 
flights shall be coordinated with any mechanism established under paragraph 8; 
 
8. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-
General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
157 
 
arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights 
imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and requests the States concerned in cooperation 
with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the Secretary General on the 
measures they are taking to implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate 
mechanism for implementing the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above, 
 
9. Calls upon all Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary overflight approvals, for the 
purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above; 
 
10. Requests the Member States concerned to coordinate closely with each other and the 
Secretary-General on the measures they are taking to implement paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above, 
including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or 
evacuation flights; 
 
11. Decides that the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary- General and the 
Secretary-General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of 
the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above, including to supply a concept of operations; 
 
12. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council immediately of any actions taken by 
the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above and 
to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this 
resolution, including information on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 
above; 
 
Enforcement of the arms embargo 
 
13. Decides that paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the following 
paragraph : “Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally 
or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of 
the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in 
their territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound 
to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides 
reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export 
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of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this 
resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, calls upon all flag States of 
such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and authorises Member States to 
use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections”; 
 
14. Requests Member States which are taking action under paragraph 13 above on the high seas 
to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General and further requests the States 
concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established pursuant to 
paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (“the Committee”) immediately of measures taken in 
the exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above; 
 
15. Requires any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional organisations or 
arrangements, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 13 above, to submit 
promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the 
grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection, and whether or not cooperation was 
provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States 
to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant 
details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a 
description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the 
initial report; 
 
16. Deplores the continuing flows of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and calls 
upon all Member States to comply strictly with their obligations under paragraph 9 of 
resolution 1970 (2011) to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya; 
 
Ban on flights 
 
17. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from, land in or 
overfly their territory unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the 




18. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or 
overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that 
the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by 
paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the 




19. Decides that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 
(2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their 
territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, as 
designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their 
direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and 
decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources 
are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities 
within their territories, to or for the benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by the 
Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities 
owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and directs the Committee to 
designate such Libyan authorities, individuals or entities within 30 days of the date of the 
adoption of this resolution and as appropriate thereafter; 
 
20. Affirms its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 
1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit 
of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; 
 
21. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and 
firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when 
doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or subject to its 
jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and 
entities owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable 








22. Decides that the individuals listed in Annex I shall be subject to the travel restrictions 
imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and decides further that the 
individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in 
paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011); 
 
23. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 
21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the 
Council or the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), 
particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof, or to have assisted others in doing so; 
 
Panel of Experts 
 
24. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation 
with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of 
the Committee to carry out the following tasks: 
(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 
1970 (2011) and this resolution; 
(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, 
regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the 
measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-
compliance; 
(c) Make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to 
improve implementation of the relevant measures; 
(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel’s 
appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of 
its mandate with its findings and recommendations; 
 
25. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate 
fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information 
at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and 




26. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 
(2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution; 
 
27. Decides that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities, or of any 
person or body in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, or of any person claiming through or for the 
benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where 
its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in 
resolution 1970 (2011), this resolution and related resolutions; 
 
28. Reaffirms its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review 
and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and 
resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting those measures, as 
appropriate, based on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 
1970 (2011). 
 
29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
 
Libya: UNSCR proposed designations 
 
Annex I: Travel Ban 
 
1 QUREN SALIH QUREN 
AL QADHAFI 
Libyan Ambassador to Chad.  
Has left Chad for Sabha. Involved directly in recruiting and coordinating mercenaries for the 
regime. 
 
2 Colonel AMID HUSAIN 
AL KUNI 
Governor of Ghat (South Libya). 





Annex II: Asset Freeze 
 
1 Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar Position: Director, External Security Organisation 
 
2 Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis 
Position: Defence Minister  
Title: Major General  
DOB: --/--/1952. 
POB: Jalo, Libya 
 
3 Matuq, Matuq Mohammed 
Position: Secretary for Utilities  
DOB: --/--/1956.  
POB: Khoms 
 
4 Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar  
Son of Muammar Qadhafi. 
Closeness of association with regime 
DOB: --/--/1970.  
POB: Tripoli, Libya 
 
 
5 Qadhafi, Saadi Commander Special Forces.  
Son of Muammar Qadhafi.  
Closeness of association with regime. 
Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations 
DOB: 25/05/1973.  
POB: Tripoli, Libya 
 
6 Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab Son of Muammar Qadhafi. 
Closeness of association with regime 
DOB: --/--/1982.  





7 Al-Senussi, Colonel Abdullah 
Position: Director Military Intelligence 






1 Central Bank of Libya Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential 
source of funding for his regime. 
 
2 Libyan Investment Authority Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and 
potential source of funding for his regime. 
a.k.a: Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO)  
Address: 1 Fateh Tower Office, No 99 22nd Floor, 
Borgaida Street, Tripoli, Libya, 1103 
 
3 Libyan Foreign Bank Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family and a potential 
source of funding for his regime. 
 
4 Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and 
potential source of funding for his regime. 
Address: Jamahiriya Street, LAP 
Building, PO Box 91330, Tripoli, Libya 
 
5 Libyan National Oil Corporation Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and 
potential source of funding for his regime. 
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